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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER 1972

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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ISOLATED AMERICA

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

SEVENTY-FIVE years ago, Archibald Cary Coolidge, who later became the first Editor of *Foreign Affairs,* wrote a book with a theme and title entirely novel at that time, "The United States as a World Power." In it he made the first attempt to define the new role in the world then rapidly being assumed by the United States. He remarked that all nations divide mankind into two categories—themselves and everybody else. And he said that Americans would be just as prone as others to cherish the pleasing belief that they had grown great by their own virtues and the favor of a kindly Providence, whereas the progress of other states was marked by unscrupulous rapacity; hence, they would demand that American statesmen keep sharp watch lest nefarious foreigners take advantage of their good nature and honest simplicity. The accuracy of Mr. Coolidge's analysis was corroborated before long by the alacrity with which the American people accepted the idea that they had come into World War I altruistically, in order to make the world safe for democracy ("American" democracy); and again by their readiness to suppose that President Wilson and his advisers at Paris had been bamboozled by wily European statesmen. The latter conception was promoted by American isolationists who depicted the League of Nations as a naïve and useless affair and a trap to involve us in Old World power politics.

The war in Vietnam has been the longest and in some respects the most calamitous war in our history. It has rent the American people apart, spiritually and politically. It is a war which has not been and could not be won, a war which was pushed from small beginnings to an appalling multitude of horrors, many of which we have become conscious of only by degrees. The methods we have used in fighting the war have scandalized and disgusted public opinion in almost all foreign countries.

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Not since we withdrew into comfortable isolation in 1920 has the prestige of the United States stood so low. Following Harding's sweeping victory and his announcement that Wilson's League was "now deceased," the League of Nations passed out of the minds of most Americans. Having won the war for their allies, as they put it, Americans considered that they were entitled to attend to their own affairs exclusively. The world was stunned. The United States had won glory by turning the tide of battle in Europe and moral stature by sponsoring, through President Wilson, a program for organizing the peace that the world craved. In their disillusionment, Europeans did not forget America's achievements in the war or minimize what the American Relief Administration and other organizations continued to do in feeding the starving and restoring the wreckage in devastated regions. But something was gone from the picture that the world had formed in wartime of Americans; their adventurousness, their willingness to take risks had disappeared. There were Americans, too, who felt that the American dream had paled and who had twinges of conscience that their country was taking no part in the endeavor to make a new war less likely.

Efforts were made before long to demonstrate that the United States was on the side of peace even though it would not share the alleged risks of becoming a member of the League of Nations. One effort was made in Coolidge's administration, the second in Hoover's. In the summer of 1928 Secretary of State Kellogg took part in negotiating what became the Pact of Paris, the purpose of which was, in the popular phrase, to "outlaw war." It aimed to establish peace by fiat and was acceptable to the U.S. Senate because its signatories were not committed to take any concrete action to prevent aggression. It was harmless except to the extent that it led the American public to suppose that something effective had been done to compensate for the refusal to participate in the League. A second effort to show that the United States was on the side of peace was made by Secretary of State Stimson in January 1932. The League had been struggling vainly to find means to curb the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Stimson sought to back up the effort by committing the United States to a policy of not recognizing the fruits of aggression. The plan was well intentioned, but its effect in slowing the Japanese invasion was nil.

This was not a period in which the United States was influen-

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tial in world affairs. Materially, it was a Great Power in capital letters; morally, its greatness did not shine. When the Great Depression overwhelmed the United States, as all nations, Roosevelt's spectacular measures of reform gave the American people hope and trust again, but there was little energy left to think about the troubles and dangers of others. The European landscape was black. A new arms race set in. Hitler's advent was a portent of what was to come. Roosevelt made an effort to have the Neutrality Act amended so that the United States need not, by insisting on its rights as a neutral, break a blockade set up by members of the League against an aggressor; the possibility that it would recognize a blockade would be a powerful deterrent to aggression. The Senate refused.

Through the interwar years the picture of the United States in the eyes of the world remained much as it had been after the Senate killed the proposal to join the League, refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and rejected the Tripartite Pact which promised France protection against fresh German attack and which she had accepted as a substitute for seizing territorial guarantees of her own on the Rhine. Nor did it ratify the Protocol of the World Court. American policy was looked upon as quirky and unpredictable.

II

In the first issue of *Foreign Affairs* Elihu Root expressed a fairly obvious fact in picturesque language: "When foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs." It is notable that Mr. Root, having in mind the collapse of four great autocracies following the First World War, referred to autocracies in the past tense, an error of which we soon became aware.

Since the United States is not an autocracy nor is it an oligarchy in the formal meaning of that term, the Vietnam War did not originate in what Mr. Root called sinister purpose. Did it, then, originate in mistaken beliefs? If we did indeed start down the road to war unwittingly and in ignorance, and if we failed to notice the points at which our leaders went wrong in time to curb or deflect them from a doomed failure, what are the characteristics of our society which account for our having been left in such a pitiable situation?

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Discussions of the issues raised by these questions, indeed the discussion of all the problems of American foreign relations, are being carried on today in a denatured terminology. The rhetoric of good words and high ideals is everywhere heard; but the opponents of selfish or provincial attitudes are at a disadvantage which they did not face formerly and do not altogether recognize now. The words used to express the highest aspirations have become shopworn. Calls to duty or endeavor like those uttered 50 years ago by Woodrow Wilson today sound hollow and meretricious. The phrases have been used and abused too long.

It was in that period of American public euphoria, misleadingly called "normalcy," that *Foreign Affairs* was founded. Its purpose was not to promote specific policies, however laudable, but to increase the interest of the American public in foreign policy as such and stimulate their consciousness that they were an integral part of a world society and had a concern for its welfare as a whole. To anyone who had a share in that enterprise there seems to be a similarity in the situation then and now. Actually, however, the forces at work are very different. The risk today is not that the American people may become isolationist; the reality is that the United States is being isolated.

In these conditions, an attempt to write other than cynically about the present situation of the United States seems bound to be an exercise in futility. Yet the attempt must be made. Unless we evaluate and not merely enumerate the elements in our society as they condition the quality of our foreign policy we shall not make progress in changing what we feel is wrong with it. And wrong it must have been. Not, in the experience of the present writer, since the Harding era when we denied our enlightened self-interest and retreated from responsibility in our foreign relationships, while confessing to scandal and tawdry commercialism at home, has the world had such a poor opinion of us. American principles, which sometimes were characterized as naïve but in general were respected as sincere and humane, now are freely called hypocritical and self-serving; the weight of American material and military power, looked to in the past as a mainstay of world stability, is now mistrusted and feared.

III

Once again in the Second World War the United States saved Western civilization. The victory won, it took the lead in form-

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ing the United Nations and the Senate voted membership in it almost unanimously. It is now one of the two superpowers, unassailable in nuclear strength. Nevertheless its political power is less than its material power and its prestige is tarnished.

Our methods of fighting the Vietnam War are what have chiefly fanned world opinion against us. But there are other causes of resentment too. Radical changes in the structure of our foreign policy undertaken recently without notice to friends and allies have strengthened a feeling that American policies are conceived for American purposes only. Gratitude for the immense sums given for foreign aid since the war, and especially for the help given Europe in the Marshall Plan, has largely evaporated. Just as the war has sharpened all our internal conflicts, so it has accentuated foreign criticism of American civilization and intensified the resentment of foreign governments that the United States seems more and more to ignore their political interests and economic needs.

In the summer of 1971 President Nixon announced without warning that his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, had been secretly consulting with Premier Chou En-lai in Peking and that he himself was planning a visit there shortly. A month later, he announced that he had unpegged the dollar from gold and ordered a ten percent surcharge on imports; this our allies considered contrary to international agreement. These actions, and to a lesser degree the later announcement that the President also planned to visit Moscow, confirmed the feeling in many foreign offices that American policy was erratic and egocentric.

The President's goal was to come to live-and-let-live terms with two great nations that had long sought to undermine our position in the world and that were hostile to our social and political system. His grand hope was to end the remnants of the cold war with Soviet Russia and make progress toward curtailing the arms race; and to open contacts with the People's Republic of China, with which we had no diplomatic relations and with which we had once come close to war on behalf of our protégé Taiwan. The objectives were admirable, provided the endeavor did not involve sacrificing friendships and alliances with peoples with whom we had had close ties, some of them traditional and in a sense sentimental, some economic and commercial, some rooted in similar concepts of constitutional gov-

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ernment, democracy and freedom. In his preoccupation with methods of attaining the goal, and in his excitement as he seemed to near it, the President lost sight of the proviso. The result was a chaotic situation. The stability of the monetary system was further undermined, with our NATO allies among those most adversely affected. Canada, an essential friend and neighbor, Japan, the rising power in East Asia, and India, the largest Asian democracy, were alienated.

The approach to Peking was not precipitate; it had been carefully prepared. But the announcement that the President would go there in person was made in a way that caused maximum embarrassment to the Japanese government. We had been pressing Tokyo to have as little as possible to do with "Red" China, "our mutual enemy." In so doing, we had opened Premier Eisaku Sato to domestic attack for sacrificing Japan's interests to those of the United States. Suddenly he found himself bereft of his excuse for having taken a position opposed in many influential circles. He felt betrayed.

Japan deserves consideration in the forefront of American foreign policy in her own right. Japan is now the world's third industrial power. Japan provides the second largest market, after Canada, for American goods, and a third of her foreign trade is with the United States. "Japan is our most important ally," said President Nixon on February 25, 1971. Our recent policies do not reflect a full awareness of these facts.

The end of our long-time friendship with India came about as a by-product of our efforts to please the People's Republic of China by averting our faces while the army of China's protégé, Pakistan, bloodily repressed a revolt in the eastern half of the country. India was overwhelmed by an influx of refugees from East Pakistan and took the occasion to help weaken her traditional enemy Pakistan and establish the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh, meanwhile accepting the support of the Soviet Union in exchange for the peevish "neutrality" of the United States. Our maneuvering included the futile naval demonstration—plainly directed more against the Soviet Union than India—of sending the *Enterprise* sailing up the Bay of Bengal (and down again). The gainer was the Soviet Union, which signed a treaty of mutual support with India and secured new facilities on the Indian Ocean, where the Soviet fleet will now face the American on better terms.

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Canada is our neighbor and, we have always assumed, our staunch friend. The British used to take us for granted, a fact that irked us considerably; the Canadians have been similarly irked that in our eyes Canada is a natural extension of our culture and a part of our economic domain. This has been particularly exasperating because it is based largely on fact. Our periodicals sell in Canada almost to the exclusion of the local product. We have provided the greater part of the capital for developing Canadian raw materials and have acquired majority control of Canadian industries.

The increasingly uncomfortable character of the Canadian-American relationship remained unrecognized by the American public and apparently was given scant consideration in Washington, as shown when President Nixon made his economic and financial announcements, and Secretary of the Treasury Connally at once began negotiations with Canada (as with many nations) in an effort to see that the United States derived maximum benefits from its new economic policy. In the talks with Canada he stressed the need to "rectify" Canada's favorable balance of trade with the United States, and demanded changes in the 1965 pact which allowed Canadian-manufactured automobiles to be shipped across the border duty-free.

Canada pointed out that not only had she suffered annual deficits in overall trade with the United States in the 20 years before 1970 but that for the five years before 1971 she had suffered deficits in the automobile trade up to $625 million. Was Canada to understand that the United States was prepared to trade with her only when she incurred a deficit, and required concessions from her when (for a change) the United States incurred a deficit? And how was Canada, with a trading deficit, to pay the immense sums of interest, dividends and transportation costs arising out of American investments in her industries?

The effort to improve the overall American trade balance and balance of payments, even if this meant resorting to protectionist measures, was of course connected with the financial drain of the war in Vietnam. Canadian public opinion was strongly critical of the war and this increased the opposition to American efforts to secure Canadian concessions to help pay for it. Canadian official resentment was exacerbated by Secretary Connally's seeming lack of understanding for Prime Minister Trudeau's difficulties in submitting to American demands when Canadian

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elections were in the offing. (American officials are not the only ones that must take account of elections.) In general, Canada simply put down the controversy as an example of the usual self-centered approach of Americans toward their northern neighbor.

Our isolation from other peoples is the reverse of 50 years ago; today we are the object, not the subject.

IV

Our age finds it convenient to simplify everything. "Know thyself," a difficult proposition, is supplanted by "Know everybody," not "everybody" as diverse types but as a single prototype—glands, psyches, behavioral reactions and all. That we take refuge in generality is not surprising. Our society has become so complex that the multiplicity of its individual problems overwhelms us. To save our self-respect we turn from the un-understandable particular to the perhaps understandable general.

What is called for is a resolute attempt at complication, as the events detailed above indicate. Interactions must be understood as well as facts. Science and technology are adding to the world's problems, not solving them. Something better than a hit-or-miss relationship must be established between the knowledge amassed by scientists in a multitude of fields and the decision-making processes of those who guide political action. How are discoveries in physics to be related to population trends, urban blight, television addiction, substitutes for standard nutritional resources? The answers will not come out of a computer because judgment as to utility and aesthetic choice cannot be fed in along with the facts. Robert Oppenheimer once said to me that physics had become so recondite that the formulae that demonstrate one scientist's conclusions often remain intelligible only to himself. How, then, is a statesman knowing nothing of science to choose between alternative recommendations regarding, say, the development of ballistic missiles, presented to him by scientific advisers who may not know possible variations in fundamental factors involved?

Those who watched the negotiators at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 struggle to find a realistic and usable pattern of the events that were transforming the world around them, and so to act to forestall new tragedy, redeem promises and justify hopes, were conscious that the leaders assembled there, men on the whole of unusual caliber and in some cases unusual idealism,

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were unable to come to grips individually with more than a single fraction of the problems they faced. Single minds could not encompass such complexities. Since then the condensation of time and space has magnified the complexities and made each component problem more immediate.

This ought to temper our criticism of our leaders as we look back at the remnants of half-understood policies and stumbling actions that strew the path of our involvement in Vietnam. It does not make us feel a need, however, to be lenient in our judgment where they disguised disasters in clichés or cloaked the miseries of millions of refugees, harried hither and yon under a rain of bombs, under comfortable terms like "resettlement" and "reëducation."

It must be made less likely—for it can never be made impossible—for American leaders again to take the country into war unawares. Proposed legislation to limit executive power to conduct an undeclared war by requiring the President to obtain congressional approval of his action within 30 days is misleading; in 30 days a war will have achieved a momentum of its own and will have introduced complications in relations with third powers that neither the public nor Congress will know how to limit or terminate. And of course no domestic legislation can prevent foreign attack, nuclear or otherwise. The prescription for reform is not written in specific terms. If we assume that mistaken beliefs, in Mr. Root's terms, have been responsible for the failure of the American democracy to curb actions of its leaders that are leading to war, the prescription is stunningly large and recovery can come only slowly as a result of a multitude of actions that could give our country a sense of direction again.

The direction is not backward, in nostalgia, to the virtues of our forefathers, except that we will draw from them an adventurous spirit and in that spirit will answer the question, "What is wrong?" with the answer they gave, "Let's do something about it." The direction is forward, to recognize and accept the present ills of our society and to set about curing them—by rehumanizing ourselves, by readopting civility as a part of good behavior, by recognizing that history can inform the future, by encouraging the growth of élites in many fields, not in order to copy them snobbishly but to set intellectual standards to which everyone may in some degree aspire, by asserting that aesthetics is an essential element in art, by reëstablishing learning as opening doors

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to choice, by leavening the mediocrity of our culture with snatches of unorthodoxy, by welcoming diversity of opinion as an essential element of strength in a democracy.

Is this a dream? The crudeness brought by the mechanization of modern life says, yes it is. But science need not be against us, nor need we be against science. Almost 40 years ago Newton D. Baker wrote in *Foreign Affairs:* "The triumph of science in the material world encourages us to do some laboratory work with the human spirit. A peaceful world would have been less amazing to George Washington than wireless telegraphy. We must not think too well of atoms at the expense of thinking too ill of men." If we accept that adjuration we may recover our self-confidence and self-respect and regain for our nation the standing in the world's estimation it once possessed.

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THE BENT TWIG

A Note on Nationalism

By Isaiah Berlin

THE rich development of historical studies in the nineteenth century transformed men's views about their origins and the importance of growth, development and time. The causes of the emergence of the new historical consciousness were many and diverse. Those most often given are the rapid and profound transformation of human lives and thought in the West by the unparalleled progress of the natural sciences since the Renaissance, by the impact on society of new technology and, in particular, the growth of large-scale industry; the disintegration of the unity of Christendom and the rise of new states, classes, social and political formations, and the search for origins, pedigrees, connections with, or return to, a real or imaginary past. All of this culminated in the most transforming event of all—the French Revolution, which exploded, or at the very least profoundly altered, some of the most deeply rooted presuppositions and concepts by which men lived. It made men acutely conscious of change and excited interest in the laws that governed it.

All these are truisms that need no restating; nor does the corollary, no less platitudinous, that the theories claiming to account for social change in the past could not be confined to it: if they were valid at all, they must work equally well for the future. Prophecy, which had hitherto been the province of religion and the preserve of mystics and astrologers, moved from preoccupation with the apocalyptic books of the Bible—the four Great Beasts of the Book of David or of the Gospel according to St. John—and other occult regions, and became the province of philosophers of history and the fathers of sociology. It seemed reasonable to assume that the realm of historical change could be dealt with by the same kind of powerful new weapons as those which had unlocked the secrets of the external world in so astonishing a fashion.

Nor did this prove to be an altogether idle hope. Some of the historical prophets of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, even the visionary among them, proved to have a firmer grasp of reality than their theological predecessors. Some thinkers of the Enlightenment were optimistic, some less hopeful.

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Voltaire and Rousseau were equally clear about the very different worlds they wished to see, but wondered gloomily whether human folly and vice would ever permit their realization. Melchior Grimm thought it would take centuries to improve human nature. Turgot and Condorcet were the most sanguine: Condorcet was sure that the application of mathematical methods—in particular social statistics—to social policy would usher in that reign of virtue, knowledge and happiness, "bound by an indissoluble chain," that would put an end forever to the reign of cruelty, misery and oppression whereby kings and priests and their wretched tools had kept mankind in subjection for so long.

What these men believed was not absurd. The new scientific methods did put vast new power in the hands of those who knew how to organize and rationalize the new society. The bright new world that Condorcet conceived in the darkness of his prison cell was that very world of "sophisters [*i.e.* Condorcet's rational men], economists and calculators" which Burke, who had perceived its coming no less clearly, had lamented only three years before. This great mutation did in due course come to pass, even though its consequences turned out very differently from Condorcet's dreams. So, too, Condorcet's disciple Saint-Simon, at the beginning of the century, correctly foretold the revolutionary role to be played by the union of applied science, finance and industrial organization, and, still more accurately, the replacement of religious by secular propaganda, into the service of which artists and poets would be drafted as they had once worked for the glory of the Church. And he wrote lyrical but acutely prophetic chapters about the vast increase of social human power, in particular over nature, that was in process of realization. His secretary and collaborator Auguste Comte saw that to achieve this a species of secular religion, organized by an authoritarian church dedicated to rational, but not liberal or democratic, ideals would be needed.

Events have proved him right. The transformation in our own century of political and social movements into monolithic bodies, imposing a total discipline upon their followers, exercised by a secular priesthood claiming absolute authority, both spiritual and lay, in the name of unique scientific knowledge of the nature of men and things, has, in fact, occurred, and on a vaster scale than even that most fanatical systematizer seems to have imagined. This was duly echoed by the fathers of science fiction, Jules

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Verne and H. G. Wells. Jules Verne confined himself to brilliant predictions of technological discoveries and inventions. Wells is the last preacher of the morality of the Enlightenment, of the faith that the great mass of prejudice and ignorance and superstition, and the absurd and repressive rules in which it is embodied, economic, political, racial and sexual, would be destroyed by the new élite of scientific planners. It was this type of approach that seemed so vulgar and dehumanizing to Victorian romantics, Carlyle or Disraeli or Ruskin. It alarmed even so rational a thinker as John Stuart Mill, who wished to believe in scientific method, but perceived in Comte's authoritarian arrangements a menace to both individual liberty and democratic government, and so became involved in a conflict of values which he was never able to resolve.

"The government of persons will be succeeded by the administration of things": this Saint-Simonian formula was common to Comte and Marx. Marx became convinced that this would be brought about by the true motor of all social change—the productive forces of society, the relationships of which were the primary factors that determined, and were as a rule disguised by outer forms—"the superstructure"—of social relationships. These included legal and social institutions as well as ideas in men's heads, ideologies that consciously or unconsciously performed the task of defending the status quo, that is the power of the class in control against the historical forces embodied in the victims of the prevailing system, which in the end would prove victorious. Whatever his errors, no one can today deny that Marx displayed unique powers of prognosis in identifying the central trend at work—the concentration and centralization of capitalist enterprise—the inexorable trend toward ever-increasing size on the part of Big Business, then in its embryo, and the sharpening social and political conflicts that this involved. He also set himself to unmask the conservative and liberal, patriotic and humanitarian, religious and ethical disguises in which some of the most brutal manifestations of these conflicts, and their social and intellectual consequences, would be concealed.

These were genuinely prophetic thinkers. And there were others. The unsystematic and wayward Bakunin predicted more accurately than his great rival Marx the circumstances in which the revolutions by the dispossessed would occur. He saw that they were liable to develop not in the most industrialized so-

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cieties on an ascending curve of economic progress, but on the contrary, where the majority of the population was near subsistence level, and had least to lose by an upheaval, that is, in the most backward regions of the world, inhabited by primitive peasants in conditions of desperate poverty, where capitalism was weakest—Spain, Russia. This doctrine was reformulated later but never attributed to anarchist inspiration by later Marxists such as Parvus (Helphand) and Trotsky.

These were the optimists. But by the early 1830s the first pessimists begin. The poet Heine warned the French in 1832 that one fine day their German neighbors, fired by a terrible combination of absolutist metaphysics, historical memories and resentments, fanaticism and savage strength and fury, would fall upon them, and would destroy the great monuments of Western civilization: "Implacable Kantians . . . with axe and sword, will uproot the soil of our European life in order to tear out the roots of the past. . . . armed Fichteans will appear" restrained neither by fear nor greed, like those "early Christians, whom neither physical torture nor physical pleasure could break." The most terrible of all will be Schelling's disciples, the Philosophers of Nature, who, isolated and unapproachable beyond the barriers of their own obsessive ideas, will identify themselves with the elemental forces of "the demonic powers of ancient German pantheism." When these metaphysically intoxicated barbarians get going, then let the French beware: the French Revolution will seem like a peaceful idyll.

Who can say that this, too, has not come to pass in a form far more horrible than any conceived even in Wagner's most sinister moments? A few decades later Jakob Burckhardt foretold the inevitability of the military-industrial complex that would, or at any rate might, dominate the decadent countries of the West. There follow the fears of Max Weber, and all the black utopias of Zamyatin, Aldous Huxley, Orwell, and the long row of blood-chilling Cassandras, half satirists, half prophets, of our day. Some of these vaticinations were pure predictions; others, like those of Marxists and of the Francophobe neo-pagans who terrified Heine, can be regarded as to some extent self-fulfilling.

These are examples of genuinely successful diagnoses and prognoses of the direction in which Western society was moving. Besides these there have been all those justly forgotten utopias—from Plato or Fourier or Cabet or Bellamy or Hertzka—em-

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balmed in the pages of the more voluminous histories of Socialist doctrines. On the other side, there were the liberal and technocratic or neo-medieval fantasies, which rest either on a return to a pre-capitalist and pre-industrial type of *Gemeinschaft;* or, alternatively, the construction of one single, technocratically organized, managerial, Saint-Simonian world. But in all this great array of elaborate, statistically supported serious futurology mingled with free fantasy, there took place one movement which dominated much of the nineteenth century, for which no significant future was predicted, a movement so familiar to us now, so decisive both within, and in relationships between, nations, that it is only by some effort of the imagination that one can conceive of a world in which it played no part. Its existence and its power (especially outside the English-speaking world) seem to us so self-evident today that it appears strange to have to draw attention to it as a phenomenon the prophets before our day, and in our time too, virtually ignored; in the case of the latter, at times with fatal consequences to themselves and those who believed them. This movement is nationalism.

II

No social or political thinker in the nineteenth century was unaware of nationalism as a dominant movement of his age. Nevertheless, in the second half of the century, indeed up to the First World War, it was thought to be waning. Consciousness of national identity may well be as old as social consciousness itself. But nationalism, unlike tribal feeling or xenophobia, to which it is related, but with which it is not identical, seems scarcely to have existed in ancient or classical times. There were other foci of collective loyalty. It seems to emerge at the end of the Middle Ages in the West, particularly in France, in the form of the defense of customs and privileges of localities, regions, corporations, and, of course, states, and then of the nation itself, against the encroachment of some external power—Roman law or Papal authority, or against related forms of universalism—Natural law and other claims of supranational authority. Its emergence as a coherent doctrine may perhaps be placed and dated in the last third of the eighteenth century in Germany, more particularly in the conceptions of the *Volksgeist* and *Nationalgeist,* in the writings of the vastly influential poet and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder.

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The roots of this go back to the beginnings of the eighteenth century, and indeed before it, at any rate in East Prussia, where it grew and whence it spread. Herder's thought is dominated by his conviction that among the basic needs of men, as elemental as that for food or procreation or communication, is the need to belong to a group. More fervently and imaginatively than Burke, and with a wealth of historical and psychological examples, he argued that every human community had its own unique shape and pattern. Its members were born in a stream of tradition which shaped their emotional and physical development no less than their ideas. Indeed, distinctions between reason, imagination, emotion, sensation, were for him largely artificial. There was a central historically developing pattern that characterized the life and activity of every identifiable community and, most deeply, that unit which, by his own time, had come to be the nation. The way in which a German lived at home and the way in which he conducted his public life, German song and German legislation—the collective genius, not attributable to individual authors, that created the myths and legends, the ballads and historical chronicles, was the same as that which made the style of Luther's Bible, or the arts and crafts and images and categories of thought of the Germans of his own time. The way in which Germans spoke or dressed or moved had more in common with the way in which they built their cathedrals, or organized their civic lives—a central German essence, as it were, an identifiable pattern and quality—than it had with analogous activities among the inhabitants of China or Peru.

Human customs, activities, forms of life, art, ideas, were (and must be) of value to men not in terms of timeless criteria, applicable to all men and societies, irrespective of time and place, as the French *lumières* taught, but because they were their own, expressions of their local, regional, national life, and spoke to them as they could speak to no other human group. This is why men withered in exile, that is what nostalgia ("the noblest of pains") was a yearning for. To understand the Bible one must imaginatively enter into the life of the Judean shepherds of primitive times; to understand the Eddas, the savage struggle with the elements of a barbarous northern race. Everything valuable was unique.

Universalism, by reducing everything to the lowest common denominator which applies to all men at all times, drained both

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lives and ideals of that specific content which alone gave them point. Hence Herder's implacable crusade against French universalism, and his concept and glorification of individual cultures—Indian, Chinese, Norse, Hebrew—and his hatred of the great levellers, Caesar and Charlemagne, Romans, Christian knights, British empire-builders and missionaries, who eliminated native cultures and replaced them with their own, historically, and therefore spiritually, foreign and oppressive to their victims. Herder and his disciples believed in the peaceful coexistence of a rich multiplicity and variety of national forms of life, the more diverse the better. Under the impact of the French revolutionary and Napoleonic invasions, cultural or spiritual autonomy, for which Herder had originally pleaded, turned into embittered and aggressive nationalist self-assertion.

The origins of cultural change and national attitudes are difficult to establish. Nationalism is an inflamed condition of national consciousness which can be, and has on occasion been, tolerant and peaceful. It usually seems to be caused by wounds, some form of collective humiliation. It may be that this happened in German lands because they had remained on the edges of the great renaissance of Western Europe. In the late sixteenth century, during the great creative age, which was far from spent even in Italy which had risen to an unparalleled height a hundred years before, and marked an immense upsurge of creative activity in France, in Elizabethan England, in Spain, in the Low Countries; German towns and principalities, both those dominated by the imperial power of Vienna and those outside it, were by comparison profoundly provincial. They excelled only in architecture and, perhaps, Protestant theology. The terrible devastation of the Thirty Years War doubtless made this cultural gap even wider. To be the object of contempt or patronizing tolerance on the part of proud neighbors is one of the most traumatic experiences that individuals or societies can suffer. The response, as often as not, is pathological exaggeration of one's real or imaginary virtues, and resentment and hostility toward the proud, the happy, the successful. This, indeed, characterized much German feeling about the West, more especially about France, in the eighteenth century.

The French dominated the Western world, politically, culturally, militarily. The humiliated and defeated Germans, particularly the traditional, religious, economically backward East

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Prussians, bullied by French officials imported by Frederick the Great, responded, like the bent twig of the poet Schiller's theory, by lashing back and refusing to accept their alleged inferiority. They discovered in themselves qualities far superior to those of their tormentors. They contrasted their own deep, inner life of the spirit, their own profound humility, their selfless pursuit of true values—simple, noble, sublime—with the rich, worldly, successful, superficial, smooth, heartless, morally empty French. This mood rose to fever pitch during the national resistance to Napoleon, and was indeed the original exemplar of the reaction of many a backward, exploited, or at any rate patronized society, which, resentful of the apparent inferiority of its status, reacted by turning to real or imaginary triumphs and glories in its past, or enviable attributes of its own national or cultural character. Those who cannot boast of great political, military or economic achievements, or a magnificent tradition of art or thought, seek comfort and strength in the notion of the free and creative life of the spirit within them, uncorrupted by the vices of power or sophistication.

There is much of this in the writings of the German romantics, and, after them, of the Russian Slavophiles, and many an awakener of the national spirit in Central Europe, Poland, the Balkans, Asia, Africa. Hence, the value of a real or imaginary rich historical past to inferiority-ridden peoples, for it promises, perhaps, an even more glorious future. If no such past can be invoked, then its very absence will be ground for optimism. We may today be primitive, poor, even barbarian, but our very backwardness is a symptom of our youth, our unexhausted vital power; we are the inheritors of the future which the old, worn-out, corrupt, declining nations, for all their vaunted present-day superiority, can no longer hope for. This messianic theme is sounded strongly by Germans, then by Poles and Russians, and after that, in our time, by many states and nations which feel that they have not yet played their part (but soon will do so) in the great drama of history.

III

This attitude, almost universal among the developing nations, is plain to the most untutored eye today. But in the home of political prophecy, the nineteenth century, when the future was discerned through many historical, sociological and philosophical

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telescopes, it was evidently not plain at all. The great masters did not foretell the huge proliferation of national pride, indeed, did not predict it at all. Hegel, in his emphasis on "historic," as opposed to "unhistoric," nations as the carriers of the ever forward-thrusting cosmic *Geist,* may have flattered the self-esteem of Western and Northern Europe or fed the ambitions of those who sought German or Nordic unity and power. But he was no less opposed than Metternich to the wild, violent, emotional nationalism of Francophobe and anti-Semitic students, with their chauvinism and bookburnings, which seemed to him barbarous excesses, as they did to Goethe, who forbade his son to fight against the French. To trace to Hegel's writings the fierce nationalism of later German writers who derive from them is certainly unjust. Even the fanatical early chauvinists—the Jahns, the Arndts, the Goerreses, and indeed, Fichte, who is in part responsible for this mood, with his paeans to the uncontaminated German language as a vehicle for the uniquely liberating German mission in the world—even they did not consciously view nationalism as the dominant force in the future of Europe, still less of mankind. They were merely struggling to liberate their nations from disabling dynastic or foreign or skeptical influences. Jahn and Arndt and Körner are German chauvinists, but they are not theorists of nationalism as such, still less prophets of its universal sway; inferior nations, indeed, are not entitled to it.

The rationalists and liberals, and, of course, the early Socialists, virtually ignore nationalism. For them, it is a mere sign of immaturity, an irrational relic of, or retrogressive return to, a barbarous past: fanatics like De Maistre (who for all his ultramontanism was an early believer in natural "integralism") or Friis or Gobineau or Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Wagner, or, later, Maurras, Barrès, Drumont, are not taken seriously until the Boulanger and Dreyfus affairs; these, in their turn, are regarded as temporary aberrations, due to the abnormal mood following on defeat in war, which will make way once again for the return of sanity, reason and progress. These thinkers, who look to the past for strength, do not play the part of social seers: with varying degrees of pessimism, they seek to revive a national spirit that has been undermined, perhaps fatally, by the enemy—liberals, Freemasons, scientists, atheists, skeptics, Jews. With a great effort something may yet be saved. But they believe that it is the other, "destructive" tendencies which work against the na-

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tional spirit, that are there in menacing strength and hold the field and must be resisted, if only to preserve islands of purity and strength and "integral" life. Gobineau is the most pessimistic of these, and, in any case, he is concerned with race rather than nations, Treitschke the most hopeful, reflecting, no doubt, their respective national moods.

As for Marx and Engels, for them, I need hardly repeat, it is the emergence of classes, economically determined by the division of labor and accumulation of capital, and the war between these classes, that account for social change in human history. Nationalism, like religion, is a temporary phenomenon which, generated by the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie, is one of the self-sustaining spiritual weapons against the proletariat. If, too often, it penetrates the masses, it does so as a form of "false consciousness" which disguises their true condition from them and breeds illusions that provide them with deceptive comfort in their benighted state. After the end of the conditions that have given rise to it—the class war—nationalism, like religion, will evaporate together with other politically potent and historically conditioned illusions. It may acquire a certain independent influence of its own, as many such by-products of the evolution of productive forces do, but it cannot survive the destruction of its primary source, the capitalist system.

This tenet became a dogma for every school of Marxism. No matter how wide the disagreements on other issues, this was common ground, from the peaceful gradualism of Eduard Bernstein to the most left-wing members of the Bolshevik Party. The belief that nationalism was a reactionary bourgeois ideology was tantamount to the belief that it was doomed. At most, national risings on the part of colonial peoples against their imperialist masters might be considered as historically determined, a tactical step on the road to the true Socialist revolution which could not be too far behind. Even so, a national rising was one thing, and nationalism another. It was this belief that caused such disappointment and indignation to the internationalist Left, led by Lenin, Karl Liebknecht and their friends, when the Socialist parties in the belligerent countries, instead of proclaiming a general strike which should have stopped the war in 1914, joined the national colors and went to war against each other. It was this that caused Rosa Luxemburg to protest against the very formation of a national state by the Poles at the end of

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the war. The October Revolution, it is fair to say, was genuinely antinationalist in character.

The contrast, enunciated in some quarters, between Lenin as the authentic voice of Russian feeling, as against the "rootless cosmopolitanism" of men like Trotsky or Zinoviev or Radek, has no foundation. Lenin looked on the Russian Revolution as the breaking of the weakest link in the capitalist chain, whose value consisted in precipitating the world revolution, since, as Marx and Engels were convinced, communism in one country could not survive. Events decreed otherwise, but the doctrine itself was altered only under Stalin. The initial mood among the early Bolsheviks was genuinely antinationalist: so much so that Bolshevik critics in Russia vied with each other in disparaging the glories of their own national literature—Pushkin, for example—in order to express their contempt for national tradition as a central bourgeois value.

There was a similar mood among the leaders of the abortive Communist revolutions that followed in Hungary and Munich. "National-chauvinism," "social-chauvinism" became terms of abuse, battle cries used to crush autonomous movements in some of the non-Russian provinces of the old Russian Empire. But after this, the genuine internationalist phase was over. Every revolution and upheaval thereafter contained a nationalist component. The rise of fascism or National Socialism was interpreted by Marxist theorists as the final and extreme, but desperate, resistance on the part of capitalism in these countries against the inevitable victory of international socialism. The systematic underestimate of the strength of totalitarian or authoritarian nationalist movements, and their triumph in central and northeastern Europe, the Iberian peninsula and elsewhere, was due to ideologically caused miscalculation.

The economic autarky which followed the great crisis of 1931, plausibly enough interpreted as a culmination of the internal contradictions of the capitalist system, was, whatever else it might indicate, a form of acute economic nationalism, which outlived its putative economic causes, and gravely obstructed the advance of the enlightenment, whether liberal or Socialist. What followed in the newly liberated territories in Asia and Africa seems to support the view that after the 1920s neither socialism nor any other political movement in the postwar world could be successful unless it came arm in arm not

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only with anti-imperialism but with pronounced nationalism.

IV

The rise of nationalism is today a worldwide phenomenon, probably the strongest single factor in the newly established states, and in some cases among the minority populations of the older nations. Who, in the nineteenth century, would have predicted the rise of acute nationalism in Canada, in Pakistan (indeed, the very possibility of Pakistan itself would have met with considerable skepticism among Indian nationalist leaders a hundred years ago), or in Wales or Brittany or Scotland or the Basque country? It might be said that this is an automatic psychological accompaniment of liberation from foreign rule—a natural reaction, on Schiller's "bent twig" theory, against oppression or humiliation of a society that possesses national characteristics. In most of these cases the desire for national independence is intertwined with social resistance to exploitation. This kind of nationalism is, perhaps, as much a form of social or class resistance as of purely national self-assertion, creating a mood in which men prefer to be ordered about, even if this entails ill-treatment, by members of their own faith or nation or class to tutelage, however benevolent, on the part of ultimately patronizing superiors from a foreign land or alien class or milieu.

So, too, it may be that no minority that has preserved its own cultural tradition or religious or racial characteristics, can indefinitely tolerate the prospect of remaining a minority forever, governed by a majority with a different outlook or habits. And this may indeed account for the reaction of wounded pride, or the sense of collective injustice, which animates, for example, Zionism or its mirror-image, the movement of the Palestinian Arabs, or such "ethnic" minorities as Negroes in the United States or Irish Catholics in Ulster, the Nagas in India and the like. Certainly contemporary nationalism seldom comes in its pure, romantic form as it did in Italy or Poland or Hungary in the early nineteenth century, but is connected far more closely with social and religious and economic grievances. Yet it seems undeniable that the central feeling is deeply nationalistic. More ominous still (and even more rarely, if indeed ever, foreseen a century ago), racial hatreds seem to be at the core of the most hideous expressions of violent collective emotion of this kind: genocide and near-genocide in India, in the Sudan, in Nigeria

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and Burundi, indicate that, no matter what other factors may be present in such explosive situations, they always possess a national or racialist core, which other factors may exacerbate, but which they do not generate, and without which they do not combine into the socially and politically critical mass. Passionate nationalism appears to be the sine qua non of contemporary revolutions.

Whatever may be the explanation of this phenomenon, which, in its own way, is just as menacing as the other dangers that loom over mankind—pollution or overpopulation or the nuclear holocaust—its rise is incompatible with nineteenth-century notions of the relative unimportance of race or nationality or even culture, as opposed to, say, class or economic competition, or of psychological and anthropological factors as against sociological or economic ones. Yet these were the assumptions upon which predictions of the emergence of a rational society, whether founded upon the principles of liberal individualism or on technocratic centralization, once rested. Unanticipated outbreaks of such dissimilar, yet equally nationalist movements in the Communist societies of our day—from the Hungarian resistance in 1956 to anti-Semitism and nationalism in Poland, and indeed in the Soviet Union itself—seem, to say the least, to weaken the orthodox Marxist thesis.[1] Yet they certainly cannot be described,

[1] The attitude of the founders of Marxism to national or local patriotism, autonomist movements, self-determination of small states and the like, is not in doubt. Apart from the direct implications of their theory of social development, their attitude to Danish resistance to Prussia over Schleswig-Holstein, to the Italian fight for unity and independence (when Marx in his dispatches to *The New York Times* so sharply differed from the pro-Italian Lasalle), to the efforts by the Czechs to defend their culture from German hegemony, and even to the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War, is quite clear. The charge brought by the Swiss anarchist leader James Guillaume against Marx, of supporting Pan-Germanism, was only a piece of absurd propaganda during the 1914–18 war. Like other historicists who believe in a single progressive universal civilization, Marx regarded national or regional loyalties as irrational resistance by lower forms of development, which history would render obsolete. In this sense German civilization (and the developed workers' organization in it) represented a more advanced stage of (admittedly capitalist) development than, say, Danish or Bohemian or any other *Kleinstaaterei*. Similarly, it was more desirable from the point of view of the International Workingmen's Movement that the Germans—with their superior workers' organizations—should win rather than the French, riddled with Proudhonism, Bakuninism, etc.; there is no trace of nationalism in Marx's conception of the stages of world progress toward communism and beyond it. It is all the more significant, therefore, that the creation of states founded on Marxist doctrines should, nevertheless, display acute national feeling. The latest and sharpest expression of this is contained in the report presented to the National Conference of the Rumanian Communist Party by its leader Nicolae Ceauşescu on July 19, 1972:

> Some people think that the nation is a concept which is historically obsolete, and that the policy of national unity and the development of the nation, particularly in Socialist conditions, would even be a wrong policy, would represent the expression of narrow-minded nationalism. Sometimes it is said that this policy is opposed to Socialist internationalism. . . . With respect to the national problem in Socialist conditions, we have to say that the victory of the new society has opened up the way

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as they sometimes are by those who are embarrassed by them, as mere relics and survivals of an earlier ideology. Neither Nagy in Hungary nor Moczar in Poland, despite the vast differences of their purposes, were in any sense bourgeois nationalists.

In the face of this, faith in countervailing forces—in multinational corporations which, whatever their relationship with class war and social conflict, at any rate do cross national borders, or in the United Nations as a barrier to unbridled chauvinism—seems about as realistic (at least so far as lands outside Western Europe are concerned) as Cobden's belief that the development of free trade throughout the world would of itself ensure peace and harmonious coöperation between nations. One is also reminded of Norman Angell's apparently unanswered argument a short while before 1914 that the economic interests of modern capitalist states alone made large-scale wars impossible.

V

What we are seeing, it seems to me, is a world reaction against the central doctrines of nineteenth-century liberal rationalism itself, a confused effort to return to an older morality. The lines of battle in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were more or less clearly drawn. On one side stood the supporters of tradition, of political and social hierarchies, whether "natural" or hallowed by history, or belief in, and obedience to, divine, or at any rate transcendent, authority. These were men who believed that the operations of untrammeled reason must be kept within bounds and should, above all, be prevented from questioning the validity of the laws and customs and ancient ways of life—those impalpable and unanalyzable bonds that hold society together and alone preserve the moral health of states and individuals. This is the faith in the "integral" community which critical examination by skeptical intellectuals, using rationalist methods,

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to achieving true national unity, to strengthening and developing the nation on a new basis. . . . The dialectical process of bringing together [different] nations presupposes their strong affirmation [of their national characteristics]. . . . Between national and international interests not only is there no contradiction, but on the contrary, there is a full dialectical unity. (*Scinteia*, July 20, 1972, p. 8.)

Ceauşescu is perhaps the most impeccably Leninist-Stalinist of all the leaders of Communist states. The fact that he should have chosen to make a doctrinal issue of what has, in practice, for many years been the line of many Communist governments and Parties in the East and West, is surely an event of some importance. The conflict between Marxist discipline and nationalist forces, which is a fairly constant factor in contemporary communism—indeed, the entire topic of Marxism and nationalism, both its theoretical aspects and in practice, deserves closer study than it has obtained.

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can only discredit in theory and undermine, and in the end, disintegrate in practice. On the other side stood the unswerving champions of reason, who rejected faith in tradition, intuition, transcendent sources of authority as mere smokescreens to justify irrationality, ignorance, bias, fear of the truth in matters of theory, and stupidity, injustice, oppression and the corrupt power of Bentham's sinister interests, in practice.

The party of progress, Liberal or Socialist, appealed to the methods of reason, especially the methods employed in the natural sciences, by which any rational being could verify the truth of a principle, or the effectiveness of a policy, or the reliability of the evidence on which these conclusions were founded. He could test such claims for himself by the use of techniques open to anyone, at any time, anywhere, without appeal to special faculties or mystical intuition with which only a chosen few were mysteriously endowed—magical ways of knowing for which infallibility was often claimed. Each side knew its enemies: on the right stood monarchists and conservatives, clericals and authoritarians, nationalists and imperialists, men whom their opponents called reactionaries and obscurantists; on the other side, rationalists, scientific materialists, skeptical intellectuals, egalitarians and positivists of many hues. Whatever the differences within each group, whether about ends or about means, the main lines of division between them were clearly discernible; and in spite of mixed and intermediate positions, each side was conscious of where it belonged, and who its natural allies and opponents were.

There is a sense in which, in our time, Burke's "sophisters, economists and calculators," the rationalists, the Victorian progressives, have won. Condorcet had once observed that all real issues of the future could be decided on the basis of rational calculation of utilitarian consequences. *Calculemus* was to be the new watchword, the key to the solution both of social and of personal problems. This method, with its stress on systems analysis, cost effectiveness, reduction to statistical and quantitative terms, reliance on the authority and power of organization and experts, is today the common property of both sides. The application of technological techniques in organizing the lives and productive activities of human beings, is the policy of governments, of industrial enterprises, indeed, of all large-scale economic (and cultural) activities in capitalist and Communist states alike. Scien-

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tific knowledge and scientific organization, which alone have succeeded in revealing the secrets of nature, animate and inanimate, can surely be made to rationalize social life and so bring about the maximum satisfaction of discoverable human needs, provided that the system is organized by disinterested experts.

Physicists and biologists, geographers and urban and rural planners, psychologists and anthropologists, mathematicians and engineers (including Stalin's "engineers of human souls"), specialists of every kind, can be, and to a larger degree have been, harnessed into the service of those who, sometimes with pure motives and a fanatical devotion to what they see as the cause of reason and human happiness, are determined to make the best use possible of available resources, natural and artificial, human and nonhuman. Marxists, or inhabitants of underdeveloped countries, may protest against the use of such methods in their own interest by the class enemy, internal or external, capitalists, "neo-colonialists," imperialists. But they do not protest against the technological approach itself, and indeed seek to adapt and perfect it for the promotion of their own interests. It is against this that a worldwide protest has begun.

The effectiveness of this revolt, for such it seems to be since it is still in its early beginnings, is hard to foretell. It springs from the feeling that human rights, rooted in the sense of human beings as specifically human, that is, as individuated, as possessing wills, sentiments, beliefs, ideals, ways of living of their own, have been lost sight of in the "global" calculations and vast extrapolations which guide the plans of policy planners and executives in the gigantic operations in which governments, corporations and interlocking élites of various kinds are engaged. Quantitative computation cannot but ignore the specific wishes and hopes and fears and goals of individual human beings. This must always be so, whenever policies for large numbers must be devised, but it has today gone very far indeed.

There is a growing number among the young of our day who see their future as a process of being fitted into some scientifically well-constructed program, after the data of their life expectancy and capacities and utilizability have been classified, computerized, and analyzed for conduciveness to the purpose, at the very best, of producing the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This will determine the organization of life on a national or regional or world scale, and this without undue attention to, or

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interest in (since this is not needed for the completion of the task), their individual characters, ways of life, wishes, quirks, ideals. This moves them to gloom and fury or despair. They wish to be and do something, and not merely be acted upon, or for, or on behalf of. They demand recognition of their dignity as human beings. They do not wish to be reduced to human material, to being counters in a game played by others, even when it is played, at least in part, for the benefit of these counters themselves. A revolt breaks out at all levels.

The dissident young opt out or attack universities, intellectual activities, organized education, because they identify them with this huge and dehumanizing machinery. Whether they know it or not, what they are appealing to is some species of Natural law, or Kantian absolutism, which forbids the treatment of human beings as means to ends, no matter how benevolently this is conceived. Their protests sometimes take rational forms, at other times violently irrational ones, mostly exhibitionistic and often hysterical attempts to defy the ruling powers, to insult them into awareness of the totalitarian effect of such policies, whether intended or unintended (the authentic Marxist component of such protests, the denunciation of exploitation and class rule, is not, as a rule, the dominant note). They protest against the destructive effect to individuals of global planning, of the substitution of figures and curves for the direct perception of actual human beings for whose ostensible good all this is being done, especially of those remote from them whose lives the planners seek to determine, sometimes by exceedingly brutal means, hidden from their own sight by the opaque medium of impersonal statistics.

In industrial or post-industrial societies, the protest is that of individuals or groups whose members do not wish to be dragged along by the chariot wheels of scientific progress, interpreted as the accumulation of material goods and services and of utilitarian arrangements to dispose of them. In poor or ex-colonial territories the desire of the majority to be treated as equals of their former masters—as full human beings—often takes the form of nationalist self-assertion. The cry for individual and national independence—the demand not to be interfered with or dictated to or organized by others—springs from the same sense of outraged human dignity. It is true that the movement for national independence at times itself leads to the creation of larger units, to

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centralization, and often to the suppression by the new élite of its own fellow-citizens, and it can lead to the crushing of various minorities, ethnic, political, religious. At other times it is inspired by the opposite ideal—escape from huge impersonal authority that ignores ethnic, regional and religious differences, a craving for "natural" units of "human" size.

But the original impulse, the desire *fare da se,* appears to be the same in both cases; it is the *se* that varies. The self that seeks liberty of action, determination of its own life, can be large or small, regional or linguistic; today it is liable to be collective and national or ethnic-religious rather than individual; it is always resistant to dilution, assimilation, depersonalization. It is the very triumph of scientific rationalism everywhere, the great eighteenth century movement for the liberation of men from superstition and ignorance, from the selfishness and greed of kings, priests and oligarchies, above all, from the vagaries of natural forces, that, by a curious paradox, has imposed a yoke that, in its turn, evoked an all-too-human cry for independence from its rule. It is a cry for room in which men can seek to realize their natures, quirks and all, to live lives free from dictation or coercion from teachers, masters, bullies and persuaders and dominators of various kinds. No doubt to do entirely as one likes could destroy not only one's neighbors but oneself. Freedom is only one value among others, and cannot be realized without rules and limits. But in the hour of revolt this is inevitably forgotten.

VI

Antinomianism is nothing new. Mutiny against the life of the barracks, the suffocation of "closed" societies against the laws and institutions that are felt to be unjust or oppressive or corrupt or indifferent to some of the deepest aspirations of human beings, occur in the history of every long-lived state and church and social order. Sometimes these institutions, whatever their official professions and ideologies, are felt to favor a particular class or group at the expense of others, whom they seek, consciously or unconsciously, to deceive or coerce into conformity. At other times the system is felt to be mechanically self-perpetuating and the reasons for its existence, even if once valid, have become obsolete. Its supporters delude men (and are themselves deluded) into supposing that human arrangements, which may have originally responded to real needs, are objective necessities, laws of

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nature (at least human nature) which it is idle and irrational to seek to alter. Diderot spoke of the war within each human being, of the natural man seeking to liberate himself from the artificial man, who is compounded of social conventions, irrational pressures and the "interested error" of the ruling class which rational criticism would blow sky-high but upon which contemporary society rests.

Protest against this takes the form sometimes of a nostalgic longing for earlier times, when men were virtuous or happy or free, or dreams of a golden age in the future, or of a restoration of simplicity, spontaneity, natural humanity, the self-subsistent rural economy, in which man, no longer dependent on the whims of others, can recover moral (and physical) health. The result would presumably be the reign of those eternal values which all but the hopelessly corrupt can easily recognize simply by looking within themselves; this is what Rousseau and Tolstoy and a good many peaceful anarchists and their modern followers still believe. Populist movements in the nineteenth century which idealized peasants, or the poor, or the "true" nation, very different from its self-appointed bureaucratic rulers, represented attempts of this kind—a return to "the people" in order to escape from a world of false values, "inauthentic" lives, organization men, or Ibsen's or Chekhov's crushed or repressed beings, where human capacity for love and friendship, justice and creative work, enjoyment, curiosity, pursuit of the truth, have been aborted and frustrated. Some wish to improve contemporary society by reforms. Others feel, as the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century may have felt, that the corruption has gone too far, that the wicked must be destroyed root and branch, in the hope that a new and pure society will arise miraculously upon its ruins.

These are extreme cases, chosen to illustrate the predicament at its most characteristic. It is with this mood and this predicament that nationalism is connected. It, too, is a pathological form of a self-protective resistance. Rousseau, the most spellbinding voice of this general revolt, told the Poles to resist encroachment by the Russians by obstinately clinging to their national institutions, their clothes, their habits, their ways of life, not to conform, not to assimilate; the claims of universal humanity were incarnated, for the time being, in their resistance. There is something of the same attitude in the Russian Populists of the last century. It is to be found among those hitherto suppressed peoples or

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minorities—those ethnic groups which feel humiliated or oppressed, to whom nationalism represents the straightening of bent backs, the recovery of a freedom that they may never have had (it is all a matter of ideas in men's heads), revenge for their insulted humanity.

This is less acutely felt in societies which have enjoyed political independence for long periods. The West has, by and large, satisfied that hunger for recognition, the desire for the *Anerkennung* which Hegel analyzed very memorably; it is lack of this that, more than any other cause, seems to lead to nationalist excesses. Nationalism to many liberals and Socialists in the West appears to be mere chauvinism or imperialism, part and parcel of the ideology of that very establishment which has robbed the victims of their birthright. What could be more paradoxical or more pathetic than that they should seek to realize the very values of the monstrous system which has reduced them to poverty and degradation? Is this not one of the best illustrations of the Marxist thesis that one of the greatest wrongs the ruling class does to its subjects is to blind them to their true interest, to infect them with its ideology dictated by its own interests, as if they were identical with those of the oppressed?

In fact, nationalism does not necessarily and exclusively militate in favor of the ruling class. It animates revolts against it, too, for it expresses the inflamed desire of the insufficiently regarded to count for something among the cultures of the world. The brutal and destructive side of modern nationalism needs no stressing in a world torn by its excesses. Yet it must be recognized for what it is—a worldwide response to a profound and natural need on the part of newly liberated slaves—"the decolonized"—a phenomenon unpredicted in the Europe-centered society of the nineteenth century. How did the possibility of this development come to be ignored? To this question, I volunteer no answer.

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THE NEW CHINA AND THE AMERICAN CONNECTION

By John K. Fairbank

FOREIGNERS approaching a North China village in the early 1930s met the barking of ill-fed dogs and the stares of children covered with flies. Villagers had skin and scalp sores due to poor nutrition. Their inbred civility was that of peasants who were conscious of the guest-host relationship but ignorant of the outer world. Typically their strips of dusty farmland had few trees and little water, which only came out of wells laboriously, bucket by bucket. The long years of Japanese invasion and Nationalist-Communist civil war down to 1949 brought no improvement in this essentially medieval situation.

Today the dogs and the flies are gone, rows of poplars and electric lines march across the flat North China landscape, electric pumps supply new irrigation ditches, and crops in the big fields are diversified and interplanted. The people seem healthy, well fed and articulate about their role as citizens of Chairman Mao's new China. Compared with 40 years ago the change in the countryside is miraculous, a revolution probably on the largest scale of all time. How did this happen and what are its implications for Americans?

First, we must correct the foreshortening created by the news and propaganda stress on Mao Tse-tung. The Chairman's portrait adorns most rooms, both public and private. There must be several billion likenesses of him in portraits and posters, busts and buttons. His sayings dominate the exhortations that ornament the landscape—big red or black characters on white village walls, or white on a red background in city parks and public buildings. But Mao is both a symbol and an inspiration. The work has been done by a whole people. The slogans may read "Long live our great leader Chairman Mao." But they also read "Let us use our own strength for regeneration." "Transform our fatherland." The Chairman is no more omnipresent than the Party and the people. A billion hands have planted and harvested the wheat and rice crops.

My strongest first impression in June 1972, in contrast with the deterioration of the 1930s and 1940s, is one of unity and

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homogeneity. The unity of slogan and standpoint, evident in the uniformity of verbal and written expression in all parts of the country (at least in the parts of six provinces that we visited), seems to be accepted as quite normal. I attribute this to a degree of homogeneity such as few other countries know. The Chinese have used one writing system and shared one culture for at least 3,000 years. Invasion in modern times has only heightened their sense of cultural identity, which is now far stronger than the European type of political nationalism. The Western nations arose as political units within the culture of Christendom and when their kind of nationalism spreads within a culture area, as, for example, in Latin America, it is far from an all-absorbing force. The Chinese realm, by contrast, is coterminous with the Chinese people's history, language, way of life and secular faith in Maoism. Given the relative unimportance of foreign trade, one can assert that in China more aspects of the society focus inward on the nation than is the case with any other people. Despite the diversity of racial types, of local dialects and traditions, the common denominator of being Chinese runs throughout most of the land and dwarfs any tendencies toward separatism or disunity. This is another way of stating the obvious fact that no other group of 750 million people has ever before held together as a political unit. This cohesion, of course, has been furthered by the Maoist monopoly of print and advertising, the Party committees at all levels, and the People's Liberation Army and security system. But all of these together are still superficial. In the last analysis China's homogeneity lies in the people themselves. It comes from their having lived together time out of mind in the same place.

II

The Chinese people's togetherness can be better appreciated by Westerners if we contrast it with our own diversity and expansiveness. China's capital city moved within a rather narrow orbit of Sian, Loyang, Kaifeng, Hangchow, Nanking and Peking while the center of Western civilization shifted from Athens to Rome, Paris, London and New York. European expansion by sea in the Mediterranean and Atlantic led after 1500 to migrations and colonies around the world, but this European explosion had no counterpart in China. There, the flowering of technology, roughly in the millennium from 1 to 1000 AD

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was marked by the great inventions such as paper, printing and porcelain and other achievements in engineering, military and nautical technology, but the effect was one of implosion more than explosion.

The resulting material superiority of the T'ang and Sung eras was accompanied by an advance in political-social technology marked by the introduction of the examination system to qualify for official service and the many devices and procedures of bureaucratic government. Out of the constant refinement of family and state organization, there eventually emerged the "gentry state" of the era roughly from 1400 to 1900, the very period when Europeans overran the earth and suffered the shock and inspiration that came from their explosion overseas.

For China this era never arrived. The Chinese people came into modern times with a strongly built ruling class, the network of gentry families schooled in the Confucian classical teachings of social status and order. Down to this century the Son of Heaven was supported by and in turn patronized a scholar class that rested mainly on landlordism and the privileges of officialdom. Scattered throughout the countryside, landlord-gentry families formed the local élite who managed affairs and dominated the society. They opposed adventuring abroad, and had no need of foreign trade or colonies overseas. Stretching so far from north to south, China was economically self-sufficient and preferred to remain so, a civilization unto herself.

This long history of self-containment leaves China today quite the opposite of the United States. We are a country of diverse peoples and cultural heritages, recently created by migration and given to continuing mobility on a massive scale (one in four Americans moves his home every year). It is not easy for us to imagine a community in which neighbors have usually lived side by side through several generations, nor can we envision a nation whose leadership is so genuinely isolationist in the literal sense of wanting to be left alone to work out its own problems in its own way.

A second impression is that China is still and will long remain an agrarian country. The people are almost too numerous to live in cities. In fact, many American suburbs are less densely populated than fertile sections of the Chinese countryside. Villages among the fields may hold 2,000 or 3,000 people per square mile. The agrarian bent of Chairman Mao, who disesteems city ways,

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is no accident but follows directly from his concern for the common people, who live by farming the land. The application of modern technology, developing richer soils and better crops, has been matched by a new attitude toward nature—conquest and mastery, instead of the old fatalism and superstition.

For example, the Shih-p'ing Brigade in Hsi-yang county, Shansi, has learned from its neighbor, the model Tachai Brigade, how to make eroded canyons into fields. The procedure is simply to hand-quarry local stone, transport it to the site and build a network of ten-foot-high stone tunnels two miles long running the length of the canyon floors. It only remains to tear down the canyon walls and fill in the floors to make broad level fields, from which flood waters in the rainy season can drain into the tunnels and harmlessly flow away. The arid terrain here is like eroded areas of Arkansas or Arizona that no American would ever try to farm. The expenditure of manpower over the Shansi landscape is quite beyond the American capacity to imagine or desire to emulate.

Third, the People's Republic under Mao, building on this homogeneous farming population, is now fully engaged in its own style of industrial revolution. While there are many big plants, the effort is to avoid the centralization of industrial growth, which would require an enormous transportation network to distribute centrally produced goods to so vast a consuming public. Instead, the stress is partly on local, small-scale production integrated with the collectivized farming communities. The Great Leap of 1958, for all its excessive and aborted hopes, catapulted farmers into small industries. A blacksmith forge grew into a foundry, which now with the help of electric power makes machinery. For Shansi farmers, who were probably the inventors of cast iron two thousand years ago, mining of coal and iron is no novelty. Casting of parts and assembling of trip-hammers, pumps, plows, and even lathes comes naturally. Meanwhile stonemasons vie with the brickmakers whose kilns dot the landscape. Food and housing are local products, and cotton planting for textiles is widespread.

The decentralization of industry is indexed by the tall chimneys in almost every rural landscape, as well as the big plants in out-of-the-way places. Truck traffic, another index, is quite marked on rural arteries. Decentralization fosters local self-sufficiency and so not only makes for a more balanced rural de-

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velopment but also has defensive value against air or missile attack. Like the network of evacuation tunnels that underlies much of Peking, and presumably other cities, this gives China a more confident defensive posture.

These impressions of nationwide balanced development among the people, in the endless countryside in which they live, naturally call for explanation. How has this great process of growth been started? How is it guided? Can it be controlled? Here one encounters the problem of ideology, which is the most difficult for an American observer to encompass.

III

The basic fact is that Marxism, which grew out of the European experience, has a considerable degree of resonance within the Chinese experience. First of all, the bulwark of the old order in imperial China down to 1911 was the landlord-gentry ruling class, a composite of landowners, scholars, officials and merchants whose rule had been ordained and sanctioned by two millennia of the Confucian classical teachings. In its day, the Confucian hierarchy of status, by which age dominated youth, men dominated women, and the literate few ruled over the illiterate peasantry, had given ancient Chinese society an initial strength and high culture. By the twentieth century, of course, the indoctrinated gentry élite was an anachronism, no longer capable of leadership in a shattered rural society. The old ruling class became the great target of the Revolution, and the gravest charge against the deposed chief of state, Liu Shao-ch'i, is in effect that he attempted to revive it in a new form. Stories of exploitation—the sufferings of women sold into household slavery, the struggles of the landless to survive—form the substance of a great saga. "Before Liberation" figures as a hell on earth far more vivid than the milder insecurities of the Great Depression which underlay FDR's four presidencies. "Since Liberation" has been Light after Darkness; to call the old order feudalism makes elementary sense.

China's other great evil, of course, has been foreign invasion, not only in the nineteenth century from the West but repeatedly from Inner Asia, where mounted archers of Turkish and Mongol tribes had been an intermittent menace ever since the founding of the empire. Dynasties set up by these non-Chinese invaders ruled parts of North China from the tenth century until finally

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all China was conquered and ruled, first by the Mongols of the twelfth century and later by the Manchus from 1644 to 1912. Foreign invasion is almost as old as Confucianism, and modern armies of Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Japan and the United States have appeared on Chinese soil against this age-old background. To speak of imperialism as a world menace has seemed simply the beginning of wisdom, especially since the invaders of China often made their peace with the Chinese ruling class at the expense of the people. The Marxist-Leninist analysis of the twin evils of feudalism and imperialism supporting each other thus makes excellent sense to any Chinese patriot.

This leaves the American people, who have been spared both the exploitation of ruling landlords and the conquest of foreign invaders, rather like a world minority. In our favored virgin land we have lacked the national experience so many other, older peoples have had. The exploitation of man by man, which is the essence of class struggle, has been less in America because man has used machines to exploit abundant nature. The great exception was black slavery. As for foreign invaders, we have not even been bombed. (If we had, we might have been less acquiescent, since 1965, in a national policy of bombing.)

The Chinese, with whom we are trying once again to be friends, will not help our self-comprehension because like any great people they are fervently convinced of the correctness of their worldview. The Maoist revolution is on the whole the best thing that has happened to the Chinese people in many centuries. At least, most Chinese seem now to believe so, and it will be hard to prove it otherwise. Since Maoism, including Marxism-Leninism, has got results inside the country, its validity abroad stands to reason. An America in which only six percent of the people are farmers, and 50 percent are neither farmers nor laborers but in tertiary or service industries, may be a new postindustrial phenomenon in which class struggle has been diffused into something else. But the Chinese still believe class struggle makes history here, as it has done for them. This ideological gap will be the greater because the Chinese self-confidence now matches the American. Newly articulate, they are ready to tell us how things are and must be in the world.

Moreover, under Mao the Chinese Revolution has become not only an advance in the industrial arts creating a new technology and a new class structure, but also a far-reaching moral cru-

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sade to change the very human Chinese personality in the direction of self-sacrifice and serving others. Where the old Confucian gentry élite was trained to put family duties first, the new cadre-managers are imbued with a secular faith in Mao's teachings and service to the people as a whole. This is a spur to the selfless coöperation and collective effort that have transformed Chinese life in a short two decades. Personal services for the traveler still abound in trains, hostels and eating places, but in place of tipping they are to be acknowledged by a handshake, person to person. All prices are fixed and the old medieval haggling is gone. Getting the better of others is no longer a national pastime nor is face any longer so esteemed.

All this may make for a more direct and explicit conflict of Sino-American interests and values. Instead of the indirect manipulation of foreign invaders from a position of weakness, the People's Republic is committed to egalitarian relations between sovereign states and peoples. Taiwan epitomizes this issue, for many Americans would now find it desirable to develop contact with Peking without abandoning Taipei. Since Chiang Kai-shek is still the avowed and deadly enemy of the new order, the "two Chinas" issue is emotionally supercharged and prëempts every discussion in which well-meaning Americans seek contact within their individual fields. Their coming to China is currently limited by the supply of interpreters, among other things, while sending Chinese specialists to visit the United States is inhibited by the presence of a Nationalist embassy in Washington and an American embassy in Taipei instead of Peking. While this impasse continues, the only makeshift may be for Americans and Chinese to meet in third countries like Canada which have embassies of the People's Republic. Yet there is plainly an urgent need to build up a new generation of Chinese who are America specialists, just as our own China specialists urgently need experience in China.

What then are we to conclude about the U.S.-China policy since 1949? The Truman-Marshall-Acheson disengagement from the Chinese civil war in 1949–50 was wisdom. MacArthur's push for the Yalu in late 1950 was folly. Only Stalin, perhaps, profited from the Sino-American war in Korea. The ensuing Dullesian cold war against Peking in the 1950s was fundamentally mistaken and unnecessary, based on an utter misconception of Chinese history and the Chinese Revolution. Only the Nixon

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visit could get us beyond this quagmire of errors, and we still have a long way to go to reach firm ground.

IV

Future relations will require an acceptance of differences, and hence, conflicts of principles and interests. The American post-industrial society will be committed to nurturing individual specialists who will try both through the division of labor and their own expertise to harness technology for humane purposes. In the United States the higher scholarship must rise still higher with the greatest diversity, initiative and autonomy. China is at a very different level of technology, where the electric pump and lathe have just arrived and the modern descendant of the McCormick reaper has not yet entered the hand-sown wheat fields. Production of goods, not services, is still the consuming passion, and neither the cinema nor travel nor television has as yet absorbed much leisure time. China will not copy the American automobile civilization but will create a new balance of man and machine in her own way.

Meanwhile China's higher scholarship, judging by six universities briefly visited, is just in the process of recuperation from the trauma of the Cultural Revolution, which closed the universities for four to five years and subjected their faculties to class struggle. This is a chapter about which little is known, though speculation has been rife.

To begin with, most of China's modern scholars after 1949 were participants in the outer international world, where many of them had been trained, and this in itself had the effect of setting them apart from the peasantry who formed the bulk of the People. But in the Revolution they were cursed with a double stigma because they were also the modern successors of the old Confucian literati, who had been a major arm of the old ruling class. Untainted peasant youths could easily view them as the product of both feudalism and imperialism.

The modern scholars' expertise was, of course, needed by the new régime, especially at first, but their status lacked the sanction which has attached to individual conscience and freedom of thought and investigation in the Western tradition. Old China's scholars, if they did not make the grade as officials themselves, generally remained appendages or stipendiary ornaments of the official class. While the modern universities had often asserted

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faculty autonomy, it was not a deeply rooted institution. As patriots, moreover, the Western-trained scholars who stayed with the Revolution in 1949 could not but be impressed by its enormous accomplishments. For all these reasons they more readily subjected themselves to the arduous self-criticism and remolding of class standpoint which eventually became the touchstone for their intellectual reintegration as part of the new China.

The Cultural Revolution, which would be better called by its full title as a "great revolution to establish a propertyless class culture," naturally meant many different things to many different people. The stress and even violence of 1966–69 have now been succeeded, in the aftermath or consolidation phase of this vast movement, by a sense of relaxation and euphoria that makes 1972 a happy time to be in China. If one may evaluate so large and recent an event, it seems to have been a second round of China's transformation, more penetrating and thorough than the thought-remolding efforts of the 1950s. One major aim was to forestall the tendency to create a new ruling class, apparatus and all, which under organization-men like Liu Shao-ch'i might have combined the worst features of both the Soviet and the Chinese traditions. At any rate the Cultural Revolution sought to put the process of change into the hands of the People, who were mainly villagers, under the necessary guidance of a new leadership purged of bureaucratic evils and the hankering after special status and privileges.

Among its many other aspects, this second revolution tried to nip in the bud the old evils of the privileged ruling-class outlook by making the universities into places where reliable village youths can be given special training of a sort they can take back to boost village production and enhance rural life. The old liberal arts tradition that had lingered on for want of something better has been denigrated as mere book-learning divorced from practice, while entrance examinations that would favor the children of literate families have been supplanted by a system of nomination from production units (after a middle-school graduate has done two years of practical work), followed by party screening and university acceptance. The new system is professedly experimental and in transition. But it points up the dilemma: how to train farm and city craftsmen in technology and yet at the same time recreate a modern system of higher scholarship such as the late twentieth century requires.

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Here is where time squeezes the Chinese revolutionaries, for the rather simple formulae of nineteenth-century Marxism-Leninism are not likely to be adequate for the increasingly gray problems of a century later. Yet Maoism—on the whole—has met the needs of a China transforming herself in isolation, and, in a society so devoted to rational suasion as the civilized way, the official ideology will remain all-important. One can hope that Chairman Mao, like other great leaders, has put forth enough generalities to be quotable for almost any purpose. But the contradiction remains: a philosophy of class struggle for mass liberation, now utilized to bring an agrarian people into modern life, does not lend itself easily to specialized scholarship and the professional autonomy which modern expertise requires. The inevitable demand for specialized knowledge may become confused or even connected with the dreaded revival of special privilege for a new ruling class divorced from the people.

One current preventive of such a tendency is the May Seventh Cadre School (or farm) to which white-collar personnel, administrators and educators regularly repair in rotation for a spell of farm work and Mao study. Certainly this brings the professor closer to understanding the villager, but it remains to be seen whether university faculties (where classes are now intermingled with production) can on this basis ever catch up with the break-neck growth of modern learning.

V

What may be the new China's contribution to the international world of the future? Each outsider since Marco Polo has offered his bit, and this one is no exception. The great ingredient of Chinese life that diminishes with distance and is hard to experience through study only from the outside, is the human warmth of personal contact. Chinese live very much together. They have for the most part always lived in this world, little concerned for an afterlife, skeptical of personal immortality, and not inclined to sacrifice people for alleged principles. Fanaticism, to be sure, breaks into their history of popular rebellion, but religious martyrdom bulks rather small.

The personal quality of China's government is evident if one compares the very human aura of Chairman Mao's thought as a final arbiter with the rather impersonal legal concepts of the American Constitution. Mao's thought rests on the ancient as-

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sumption that man is an instructable moral animal, that rational exhortation can improve his conduct, and that leadership consists in showing him by precept and example the right way to proceed. Politics and morality are thus intertwined, not separable as they have been in the West at least since Machiavelli, and China's rural industrialization is at the same time a moral crusade for a correct class attitude.

Policy thus remains intensely personal. Loyalty to a leader is inseparable from loyalty to his program. Since political conduct is a manifestation of moral character, it turns out that a man with a thoroughly "bad" policy, like Liu Shao-ch'i, was, necessarily, a thoroughly bad man. For the outside observer the fact that Liu was made chief of state seems highly anomalous. If one so evil rose so high, it is a serious reflection on someone or something. Nevertheless, in current Chinese thinking the idea that, for all his failings or evil deeds, Liu might have been loyal to the cause as he conceived it, in the posture of a loyal opposition, seems repugnant and inadmissible.

Applied to foreign contacts, this personal approach seeks in foreigners not "mutual understanding" (as the keystone of international comity is usually phrased in the West) but "friendship." This may be preferable, for it implies not merely an analysis of common problems but affirmative action. The nuance here involved may be illustrated in the difference between a "friendly understanding" (which may be temporary) and an "understanding friend" (who may be longer lasting). In any case, Americans may find in China's collective life today an ingredient of personal moral concern for one's neighbor that has a lesson for us all.

China's government by exemplary moral men, not laws, puts a heavy burden on the Party members and cadres (*kan-pu,* activists) who form the network of authority and leadership. Like the ideal Confucians of an earlier time, they should be the first to be concerned and the last to be content. One problem ahead is how this still rather thin stratum of management can not only survive the temptations of power but also foster a higher learning that by its nature will inevitably tend to remove itself from their control. Already the customary esteem for book learning, in the land where books were invented, is manifest in the hunger for print—new books and reprints draw long queues of buyers and are out of stock almost immediately.

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VI

Such problems suggest the infeasibility of all-out Sino-American contact. The old days of tourism will not come again. China's Revolution must continue in a restricted environment, not open to things that many Americans may want to offer. Foreigners injected into this homogeneous world are elements of potential disorder, especially if they come from a still acquisitive society of bourgeois individualism. As outsiders they are guests, and both politeness and security require that they be escorted and their speech translated. Carried in automobiles, all of which belong to the state, and accompanied by a necessary entourage, they are about as inconspicuous as the Prince of Wales on a weekend. How could it be otherwise if foreign visitors are to be shown infinitely detailed processes of production on the spot in the villages? They can get there only by being attached to the established organization.

The American people were fated to come into contact with the Chinese people just as the old order fell upon evil days. Their relations suffered from the fact that in retrospect the two peoples developed very different views of what their relationship had been. The Americans saw themselves as demanding in China only most-favored-nation treatment, the same as any other foreign power, but from the point of view of modern Chinese patriots this made the Americans part and parcel of the humiliating unequal treaty system set up by Britain after the Opium War.

In the early twentieth century the American missionary, educational, medical and relief work in China, supported with great good will by a broad segment of the American public, seemed to these supporters to be good works of high altruism, accompanied by friendly feelings and coöperation between the two peoples. As the Chinese revolutionary movement got under way, however, the American establishment and institutions in China were considered part of the conservative old order that must be swept away. As foreigners in China the Americans, to be sure, could foster and support social and economic reforms but they were incapable of joining in a national, political revolution.

Just at this point, after 1941, the American government became for the first time directly and deeply involved in China's domestic affairs. The result was a disaster, for American activity was now guided not by a primary concern for the Chinese people

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but by a primary concern for the American national interest, first to defeat Japan using China as a base, second to counter Soviet influence by nurturing a non-Communist China. Since the Chinese Communist Party was already the leader of the great revolution, the United States wound up in the 1950s intervening against it in support of the Nationalists after they had already been defeated except on Taiwan.

It is too easy in an age of hopeful negotiation in the 1970s to look back and decry a preceding age of bitter confrontation in the 1950s. It is not enough to deplore or condemn the recent cold war. We must also understand it, and from both sides. In America the cold-war attitude of indiscriminate feeling and commitment against "communism" was inspired largely no doubt by fear of the totalitarian police state, whether Nazi or Stalinist, and of its threat to rights of property and the civil liberties of each person. Compounded by the insecurities of the nuclear age of warfare, among other things, our performance in the McCarthy era showed us fearful at home as well as abroad. In our active search for defense and stability we developed a policy of containment and isolation of China which was based more on fear than on reason.

On the Chinese side the 1950s saw an overwhelming emphasis on the reorganization and regeneration of national life with little stress on foreign affairs. The great task was, as it still is, at home. The imperialist image of the American containment policy was utilized to encourage the virtue of self-sufficiency. And hence the new China was built in comparative isolation, especially after the open Soviet break in 1960. As the Chinese see it, today the American record in Asia since 1946, and particularly in Vietnam since 1965, serves only to confirm the idea that we are imperialist aggressors. Indeed, this idea has spread around the world and among ourselves.

From this record, which everyone must balance out for himself, it seems to me difficult not to conclude that the Chinese, despite their blind spots, have the better of the argument. If their highly organized and moralistic efforts at regeneration are to be stigmatized as regimentation, then we must ask whether our own unregimented efforts are equally adequate to our far different needs and circumstances.

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IF MAO HAD COME TO WASHINGTON: AN ESSAY IN ALTERNATIVES

By Barbara W. Tuchman

ONE of the great "ifs" and harsh ironies of history hangs on the fact that in January 1945, four and a half years before they achieved national power in China, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, in an effort to establish a working relationship with the United States, offered to come to Washington to talk in person with President Roosevelt. What became of the offer has been a mystery until, with the declassification of new material, we now know for the first time that the United States made no response to the overture. Twenty-seven years, two wars and *x* million lives later, after immeasurable harm wrought by the mutual suspicion and phobia of two great powers not on speaking terms, an American president, reversing the unmade journey of 1945, has traveled to Peking to treat with the same two Chinese leaders. Might the interim have been otherwise?

The original proposal, transmitted on January 9 by Major Ray Cromley, Acting Chief of the American Military Observers Mission then in Yenan, to the Headquarters of General Wedemeyer in Chungking, stated that Mao and Chou wanted their request to be sent to the "highest United States officials." The text (published here for the first time)[1] was as follows:

"Yenan Government wants [to] dispatch to America an unofficial rpt unofficial group to interpret and explain to American civilians and officials interested the present situation and problems of China. Next is strictly off record suggestion by same: Mao and Chou will be immediately available either singly or together for exploratory conference at Washington should President Roosevelt express desire to receive them at White House as leaders of a primary Chinese party."

[1] The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks the assistance of Mr. Ray Cromley and Mr. John S. Service who supplied information and elucidation, and of Mr. William Cunliffe of the Military Records Division, National Archives, who found and secured declassification of the relevant documents, *viz.* Nos. 322 and 324 from Dixie Mission to Chungking; Nos. 21084 and 25246 from Marshall to Wedemeyer; Wedemeyer's replies to Marshall of 22 and 27 January 1945; and the undated typewritten draft of the first of these. I am also indebted to Mr. J. C. James of the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park for several searches, both negative and positive.

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Chou requested air travel to the United States if the invitation from Roosevelt were forthcoming. In case it was not, Mao and Chou wanted their request to remain secret in order to protect their relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, which was then in the throes of negotiation.

The message, received in Chungking on January 10, was not forwarded, except as secondary reference in another context, either to the President, the State Department or the War Department. It was held up in Chungking by Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley with the arm-twisted concurrence of General Wedemeyer.

Before examining the circumstances and reasons for this procedure, let us imagine instead that, following a more normal process, the message had been duly forwarded to the "highest officials," and had received an affirmative response which is 99-44/100 percent unlikely but not absolutely impossible. If Mao and Chou had then gone to Washington, if they had succeeded in persuading Roosevelt of the real and growing strength of their sub-government relative to that of the decadent Central Government, and if they had gained what they came for—some supply of arms, a cessation of America's unqualified commitment to Chiang Kai-shek and firm American pressure on Chiang to admit the Communists on acceptable terms to a coalition government (a base from which they expected to expand)—what then would have been the consequences?

With prestige and power enhanced by an American connection, the Communists' rise and the Kuomintang's demise, both by then inevitable, would have been accelerated. Three years of civil war in a country desperately weary of war and misgovernment might have been, if not entirely averted, certainly curtailed. The United States, guiltless of prolonging the civil war by consistently aiding the certain loser, would not then have aroused the profound antagonism of the ultimate winner. This antagonism would not then have been expressed in the arrest, beating and in some cases imprisonment and deportation of American consular officials, the seizure of our consulate in Mukden, and other harassments, and these acts in turn might not then have decided us in anger against recognition of the Communist government. If, in the absence of ill-feeling, we had established relations on some level with the People's Republic, permitting communication in a crisis, and if the Chinese had not been moved by hate and sus-

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picion of us to make common cause with the Soviet Union, it is conceivable that there might have been no Korean War with all its evil consequences. From that war rose the twin specters of an expansionist Chinese communism and an indivisible Sino-Soviet partnership. Without those two concepts to addle statesmen and nourish demagogues, our history, our present and our future, would have been different. We might not have come to Vietnam.

II

Although every link in this chain is an "if," together they tell us something about the conduct and the quirks of American foreign policy. What we have to ask is whether the quirks were accidents only, or was the bent built in? Was there a real alternative or was the outcome ineluctable? Looking back to find the answer, one perceives the ghost of the present, and from the perspective of a quarter-century's distance, its outline is more clearly visible than among the too-near trees of the Pentagon Papers.

In the circumstances of 1945 there are three main points to remember: first, the Japanese were as yet undefeated; second, American policy was concentrated urgently and almost obsessively on the need to bring Nationalists and Communists into some form of coalition; third, the American Military Observers Mission of nine, later enlarged to 18 members (known as the Dixie Mission), was already in contact with the Communists, having been functioning in Yenan since July 1944. Its purpose was to organize an intelligence network using Communist men and facilities in a strategic area vital to future operations, and generally to assess Communist capabilities and aims. These had become acutely important with the approach of an American landing in China (at that time still contemplated as part of the final assault), and with the approach, too, of Russian entry against Japan.

Coalition was the central factor in American plans because only in this way would it be possible, while still supporting the legal government, to utilize Communist forces and territory against the Japanese entrenched in the north. A patched-up unity was the more imperative from our point of view because of the need to avert civil war between the Chinese parties. This above all else was the thing we most feared because it could defeat our major objective, a stable, united China after the war—and because civil chaos would tempt outsiders. If the conflict erupted

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before the Japanese had been defeated and repatriated, they might take advantage of it to dig themselves into the mainland. And then there was the looming shadow of the Soviet Union. In the absence of coalition, we feared the Russians might use their influence, when they entered the war, to stir up the Communists and increase the possibility of a disunited China afterwards. As early as May 1941, it may be worth noting, an unpublished policy study of the Council on Foreign Relations on the interrelation of the Chinese Communists, Japan and the Soviet Union, stated: "It is vital that there be no civil war in China."

During November and December 1944, negotiations for coalition were pursued by Ambassador Hurley as go-between, with optimism, enthusiasm and a minimum of acquaintance with the causes, nature and history of the problem. On November 10 he had succeeded in hammering out with the Communists a Five-Point Plan for their participation in a coalition government. Its terms would have allowed them relative freedom of political action while acknowledging Chiang's leadership and joint authority over their armed forces. Because Mao and his colleagues saw coalition as an avenue to American aid and, in the long run, to national power, they were prepared to pay this temporary price. To Hurley, who thought the Communists were a kind of Chinese populist Farmer-Labor party whose aim was a democratic share in national government, the terms seemed so workable and such a triumph of his own diplomacy that he signed the document along with Mao.

On November 16, to his dismay, Chiang Kai-shek rejected the plan in toto on the ground, as he told Hurley, that to admit the Communists to government on the terms Hurley had signed would eventually result in their taking control of it. Hurley, who identified the Generalissimo's tenure with American interest—and with his own—was ready at once to adapt coalition to the Generalissimo's terms. That these did not reflect the realities in China was not apparent to the Ambassador, although it was to his staff, who had been observing conditions under the Kuomintang for years and now had the opportunity to visit and investigate the Communist zone. Their assessment pointed to a different American interest, and this became the critical issue: was the American objective preservation of the Generalissimo, or was it a wider option that would not involve us in the fate of a "steadily decaying regime?"

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Hurley and Wedemeyer were convinced converts of the first thesis. It was not easy at that time to envisage China without Chiang Kai-shek. His towering reputation as national leader made it an article of faith to most outsiders that no one else could hold China together and that his fall would carry chaos in its wake. It was easy for Hurley and Wedemeyer to believe in him: the trappings of power are very persuasive. Both the new ambassador and the new commander were ambitious to show how they could succeed where General Stilwell had failed and both saw the obvious path to success as keeping in step with the Generalissimo.

Pressed by Hurley into making a counteroffer to the Communists, Chiang proposed a plan of coalition which would bring the Communist armed forces under Nationalist control and in return legalize the Communists as a party. Hurley promptly espoused the Generalissimo's plan although it nullified the terms he had negotiated with Mao, and exerted his most strenuous efforts, assisted by Wedemeyer, to persuade the Communists to accept it. They naturally refused an arrangement which would have meant submission, not coalition. Concluding that negotiations through a mediator who had committed himself to the other side were useless, they broke off the talks, and from that time on ceased to trust Hurley. When Wedemeyer argued that if they came to terms with the Generalissimo the United States could send them arms and supplies, they were not persuaded because they knew Chiang would control the distribution. When Hurley offered to revisit Yenan to resume the talks, he was turned down, and when Colonel David D. Barrett, Chief of the Dixie Mission, was asked to add his persuasion, he was told by Mao and Chou that they still hoped for and needed American arms but not on Chiang's terms. They said the United States was propping up a "rotten shell" in Chiang Kai-shek, who, in spite of all the United States might do, was "doomed to failure." Barrett left the interview feeling he had talked to two leaders who were "absolutely sure of the strength of their position."

Negotiations were thus deadlocked, leaving the Communists, who had made a serious effort from which they had hoped to gain much, in need of a new approach. Haphazardly at this point certain exploratory and apparently unconcerted overtures from American military sources were made to them which left them encouraged but confused. The proposals were brought on De-

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cember 15 by Colonel Barrett, and simultaneously but separately by Colonel Willis H. Bird, Deputy Chief of OSS in China. Both projects concerned possible airborne landings of American technical units to operate jointly with Communist forces. Colonel Bird's plan, which was the more grandiose, involved the "complete coöperation" of all Communist armed forces "when strategic use required" by the American command. Whether this plan was intended to bypass the Generalissimo or whether Colonel Bird had ever considered this aspect of the problem is not mentioned in his rather jaunty report, which does, however, make the claim that "Theater Command already agreed on principle of support to fullest extent of Communists. . . ."

Colonel Barrett brought two proposals authorized by Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff, General Robert B. McClure. McClure had cleared the first one, limited to 4,000 to 5,000 American technical troops, with General Chen Cheng, the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff, and secured the kind of ambiguous reply which a Chinese uses to disguise "No" and an American takes to mean "Maybe." The second more startling proposal on December 27 carried McClure's verbal assurance to Barrett that it had been cleared with Ambassador Hurley. It projected, after victory in Europe, a beachhead on Shantung and the landing of an entire U.S. paratroop division of some 28,000 men for whom the Communists were asked if they could take care of supplies, other than arms and ammunition, until U.S. Army supply procedures could begin to function. They said they could, although Barrett could not help wondering whether, behind Chinese composure, they might not have been slightly dazed by the responsibility and its implications.

Faced by such prospects, uncertain how far they were authorized at the summit, the Communists understandably felt a need for clarification by direct contact in Washington, bypassing Hurley. More than clarification, what they wanted was recognition. The offer to make the distant journey—which would have been Mao's first outside China—was a measure of their seriousness. Today, after 25 years of Mao's vicious denunciations of the United States as the fixed—and doomed—enemy of the Socialist camp (matched by vintage Dulles, early Nixon, and others from our side), the obvious question is: Were the Chinese Communists ideologically still sufficiently flexible in 1945 really to desire an association with the United States?

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III

Before everything else the Chinese Communists were pragmatic. Ideological purity having proved nearly fatal in the 1920s, they had learned to adapt political action to present fact, and were ready to deal, for survival or advantage, with whatever ideological opponent the situation required. If they could deal with Chiang Kai-shek, as they had in 1936 and were prepared to again, why not the United States? What they hoped to gain can be reconstructed from the frank conversations held by Mao and Chou with John S. Service, political officer of the Dixie Mission, who reported them at length.

Primarily they wanted to convince President Roosevelt that they, not the Kuomintang, represented the future of China. They knew that time was working in their favor, that the mandate of heaven was slowly and irresistibly shifting. If they could somehow make this plain at the policy-making level in Washington, then the United States might be persuaded to mitigate its support of Chiang and thus hasten the shift. Second, they wanted access, as a partner in a coalition government, to American arms and other munitions on the model of Tito, their Communist counterpart in Europe. On the basis of usefulness against the enemy, they considered they had no less a claim. Armament was their most serious deficiency; they had gained control of North China beyond and behind Japanese lines by an astonishing organization but without enough weapons to risk a real battle. In Washington they hoped to persuade the President of the validity of their claim. They felt the United States was blind to the real state of the Kuomintang's decline and their own rise, and that if they could reach Roosevelt they could make this clear.

Roosevelt's aura as a man with sympathy for the oppressed had penetrated the remotest corners of the world. In "Christ Stopped at Eboli," Carlo Levi tells how, on entering a hovel in a miserable village in God-forsaken Calabria, he was confronted on the wall by a crucifix, a picture of the family's absent son and a picture of Roosevelt. While it is doubtful if, apart from propaganda posters of the four Allied leaders, the American President appeared on any private walls of Yenan, he was present in the minds of the leaders. On Roosevelt's reëlection in 1944, Mao sent him a message of congratulations and received a reply in which Roosevelt said he looked forward to "vigorous coöperation with all the

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Chinese forces" against the common enemy, Japan. If not definitive, this was at least an opening.

The American observers in Yenan found their hosts intensely curious about the United States, anxious to learn what they could of means and techniques, especially military, developed by the Americans. Mao, according to Major Cromley, "would grab intellectually anything about the United States that anyone could tell him." He and his colleagues had been impressed by the steady advance of American forces in the extraordinarily difficult campaign across the Pacific, and they realized it was this that would be the main force in the defeat of the Japanese homeland. In the real world in which they now had to make their way, the United States with its money, its resources and its current presence in Asia was the country they had to deal with—for the interim.

"We can risk no conflict," Mao told Service, "with the United States." They were not concerned about adulteration by a rival ideology because they were confident of the ultimate victory of their own. They wanted American recognition of what they had accomplished and were capable of accomplishing and thus recognition as a major party, not an outlaw. They wanted to acquire belligerent status as a party to the coming Allied victory so that they could not be ignored in the arrangements for postwar China, nor in the organization of the United Nations. And certainly they had in mind that an American connection would help them to meet that none-too-welcome day when the heavy tramp of the Soviet Union should enter Manchuria. In short, they wanted to find out at the source whether, if Chiang continued to refuse coalition, there was "any chance," as Mao asked Service, "of American support of the Chinese Communist Party?" They wanted to know where they stood.

The governing factor was that in their own minds they fully expected to succeed to the sovereignty of China. Here lay the problem which in the Communists' relation to the United States eventually became the shipwreck rock. The Communist view of it was made explicit by Mao as early as August 1944: "For America to give arms only to the Kuomintang will in its effect be interference because it will enable the Kuomintang to oppose the will of the people of China." While this may have been a subjective judgment of the will of the people, it was more realistic than otherwise, and recognized as such by American observers whose duty was to assess the evidence. As "the only group in

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China possessing a program with positive appeal to the people," reported John P. Davies, second secretary of the Embassy who was attached as political officer to the Theater Command, the Communists were the first group in modern Chinese history to have "positive and widespread popular support. . . . China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs." He thought this was a consideration that the United States in seeking to determine policy should keep in mind.

The tenor of advice by our career officers both in China and the State Department at this time was that unqualified support of Chiang Kai-shek was not the best means of achieving unity in China. By encouraging in Chiang a false sense of his own strength, it made him intransigent to compromise and therefore more likely to precipitate civil war than prevent it. The staff in China felt that we should retain our freedom to establish contact with the Communists, who were certain to retain North China and very likely inherit Manchuria after the war, because only through U.S. contact and economic aid could we keep them out of the coming Soviet embrace. The plea of officers in the field for greater flexibility of approach" grew almost impassioned. Sustaining Chiang should not become, as one said, "an end in itself." The China Affairs and Far East Divisions of the Department tried to convey the voice of the field upward to the policy-making level, even to the point of suggesting that if Chiang himself did not take remedial action, a reëxamination of U.S. policy would not only be justified but "very likely imperative."

The difficulty was the not unusual one in the conduct of American foreign policy, that the voice of the field was not reaching, or certainly not influencing, the ear at the policy-making level—in this case the President. Out of an old prejudice against career diplomats, justifiable almost anywhere but in China, Roosevelt always felt he would be better informed by a personal envoy—in this case Ambassador Hurley.

IV

The personality of Hurley is a major quirk in this history. One would like to think that historical factors were more rooted in natural law, more Toynbeean in scope, than the chance character of a minor individual who was neither heroic nor demonic. But history is not law-abiding or orderly and will often respond to a breeze as carelessly as a leaf upon a lake.

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It happened that Hurley was a man whose conceit, ambition and very vulnerable ego were wrapped up in his mission to the point of frenzy. From birth in a miner's cabin in Oklahoma, he had risen through a Horatio Alger boyhood to the practice of law and a lucrative representation of the oil interests of the Choctaw Indians. A later client was Sinclair Oil. He made a fortune of $15,000,000, served overseas in World War I, became Hoover's Secretary of War, and coated the rough ebullience of a frontier background with the glossy Republicanism of Andrew Mellon. Tall, handsome and impressive, he dressed with the care of a Beau Brummel and when ordered to wear civilian clothes as Ambassador could only be induced to shed a general's uniform and medals on the direct intervention of the President. Vanity was Hurley's security.

His initial assignment to China as special envoy to facilitate the appointment of General Stilwell as Commander in Chief of China's armed forces had ended in a notable reverse. Instead of Hurley's cajoling Chiang, Chiang had cajoled Hurley into supporting his demand for Stilwell's recall. Hurley therefore felt a double need to make a success of coalition. He had wrecked his chances as mediator, however, by allying himself with the Generalissimo for the sake of the ambassadorship. Hurley was just what Chiang had always wanted in an envoy—a man with direct access to the President and no experience of China, who was easy to manipulate through his vanity. When Ambassador Gauss resigned at the time of Stilwell's departure, Chiang was only too pleased to ask for Hurley as successor. In a personal message to Roosevelt (sent via T. V. Soong to Hopkins, avoiding the State Department), he solicited a "more permanent" mission for Hurley who "has my complete confidence" in dealing with the Communists, and would thus be able to make a contribution to the war effort by solving the problem of coalition. Roosevelt was lured; he believed in the efficacy of harmony. If nothing else had worked in China, maybe a person pleasing to Chiang Kai-shek might. Hurley received the appointment and owed it to Chiang.

As a result, he at once convinced himself that his mission and the policy of the United States ("my policy" as he sometimes called it) were to "prevent the collapse of the National Government" and "to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies." No such instructions appear in the documents, and despite Hurley's later claims, they

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could hardly have been oral since he was in China when he was appointed. It should be added, however, that when he stated this understanding of his mission in a rare communication to the State Department, no one disabused him. This was partly because the Department had no rein on Hurley, who generally bypassed it, and partly because it was unable to decide, except in noble generalizations, exactly what our China policy was. And no one knew for sure what it was in the President's mind.

Before he ever reached China, Hurley's estimate of the situation was shaped by the premise, which he accepted without question because it was told to him personally by Molotov, that the Soviet Union was not interested in the Chinese Communists, who were not really Communists at all. He thereafter underestimated them, said their strength and popular support were greatly exaggerated, and insisted that as soon as they were convinced that the Soviet Union would not support them, they would settle with the National Government and be content with minority status. Coalition would be easy. "There is very little difference, if any," he reported, between the "avowed principles" of the Kuomintang and the Communists; both "are striving for democratic principles." This may well be the least sophisticated statement ever made by an American ambassador. It reflects the characteristic American refusal to recognize the existence of fundamental divergence; hence the American assumption that there is nothing that cannot be negotiated.

Hurley accepted no guidance from his staff. Because he was over his head in the ancient and entangled circumstances which he proposed to settle, he fiercely resented and rejected the counsel of anyone more knowledgeable about China than himself. When the coalition blew up in his face and he found Chinese affairs resisting his finesse, depriving him of the diplomatic success he had counted on, he could find an explanation only in a paranoid belief that he was the victim of a plot by disloyal subordinates. He did not consider there might be a Chinese reason.

On the premise that his mission was to sustain Chiang Kai-shek, Hurley of course blocked the bid of Mao and Chou to go to Washington, the more so as it was intended to bypass himself. Although their message had been addressed to Wedemeyer for just that reason, it reached Hurley because Wedemeyer was absent in Burma at the time, and he and Hurley had an agreement to share all incoming information. A second message from

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Yenan the next day, addressed to Wedemeyer on an "eyes alone" basis, quoted Chou En-lai as specifically stating that "General Hurley must not get this information as I don't trust his discretion." This, too, reached Hurley with effect that can be imagined. At the same time he learned through information passed by Nationalist agents in Yenan of Bird's and Barrett's military proposals to the Communists. A terrible bell rang in his mind: here was the reason why the Communists had walked out on coalition. They had received a direct offer and were already secretly proposing to go to Washington over his head!

Barrett's proposals had, of course, emanated from Theater Command but Hurley ignored that out of his need to find some conspiratorial reason for the breakdown of coalition. Wrathfully claiming that Bird and Barrett had acted without authority, he informed the President on January 14 that their action had become known to him only when it "was made apparent by the Communists applying to Wedemeyer to secure secret passage for Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to Washington for a conference with you."

Only in this context (repeated in a second telegram of February 7) was Roosevelt informed of the Communist request. It appeared as no more than a by-product of unwarranted action by American officers undermining Hurley's efforts for coalition.[2] The plan for military coöperation with Yenan, Hurley said, would constitute "recognition of the Communist Party as an armed belligerent," and lead to "destruction of the National Government . . . chaos and civil war, and a defeat of America's policy in China." In the meantime, he assured Roosevelt, by discovering and frustrating the Communists' maneuver, he had now prevailed upon Chou En-lai to return to Chungking to resume negotiations.

V

What of the receiving end? The Communist request reached Roosevelt in terms already condemned by his ambassador. It

[2] Hurley's accusations, passed on by the White House to General Marshall and by him in a peremptory query to Wedemeyer, caused a furious quarrel between Wedemeyer and Hurley, followed by an enforced agreement between them on an explanation for Marshall that would leave Wedemeyer's command blameless while not disputing Hurley. This was accomplished in a convoluted masterpiece covering everybody except Colonel Barrett, who had neglected the soldier's elementary precaution of obtaining his orders in writing. At Hurley's insistence, unopposed by Wedemeyer, Barrett's nomination for promotion to Brigadier General, which had already gone forward, was withdrawn. His was the first in a line of honorable careers damaged to fill the need for scapegoats in China.

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reached him, moreover, when he was plunged into preparations for the Yalta conference and overwhelmed by the dismaying problems of approaching victory. (Hurley's second, fuller telegram arrived after the President had already left Washington for Yalta.) War crimes, the postwar treatment of Germany, the Soviet claim to 16 seats in the United Nations, the Polish border, the arrest of Badoglio, trouble in Jugoslavia and Greece, the fall of the Iranian government, not to mention the necessity, according to Secretary Stettinius, of a "private talk with Mr. Churchill on British meat purchases in Argentina"—all these in the thirteenth year of a crisis-filled presidency did not leave Roosevelt eager to precipitate a new crisis with the unmanageable Chiang Kai-shek.

Bewildered by the intractability of China, disenchanted with the Generalissimo but fearful of the troubles that would rush in if the United States relaxed support, Roosevelt was inclined to look for a solution in the coming conference with Russia. His hope was to secure Stalin's agreement to support the Nationalist government, thus giving the Chinese Communists no choice but unity. He succeeded in obtaining the desired agreement at Yalta, and returned to be confronted by a choice in our China policy. Tired, ill and in the last month of life, he made a decision that closed this episode.

Coalition having reached another deadlock, Hurley and Wedemeyer arrived in Washington in March 1945 for consultation. Choosing their presence there as the opportunity to bring to a head the issue in American policy, all the political officers of the Embassy in Chunking, led by the Chargé d'Affaires, George Atcheson, joined in an unprecedented action. With the concurrence and "strong approval" of Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff, they addressed a long telegram to the Department, in effect condemning the Ambassador's policy. It pointed out that the Communists represented a force in China that was on the rise, that it was "dangerous to American interests from the long-range point of view" to be precluded from dealing with them, that with the approach of a landing in China the time was short before we would have to decide whether to coöperate with them or not. They recommended therefore "that the President inform the Generalissimo in definite terms that military necessity requires that we supply and coöperate with the Communists," and that such decision "will not be delayed or contingent upon" coalition.

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After precipitating the explosive reaction of Hurley, who could see only an "act of disloyalty" to himself, the telegram was submitted to the President with the Department's recommendation that it provided an opportunity to reëxamine the whole situation and "in particular" the possibility of "giving war supplies to the Chinese Communists as well as to Chiang Kai-shek." The President discussed it in two conversations with Hurley on March 8 and 24, with no officer of the State Department recorded as present on either occasion. Hurley evidently argued convincingly that the Russian agreement secured by the President at Yalta would sufficiently weaken the Communists so that he could promise unity in China by "the end of April," as he had already told the Department. Roosevelt, clinging to the goal he had started with and ever the optimist, decided in favor of Hurley's policy of dealing exclusively with the Generalissimo and of making no connection with the Communists without his consent. In effect this rejected the recommendation of the Embassy staff and left the conduct of American policy to the tyro Ambassador. Thus confirmed, Hurley was able to insist on his requirement that Atcheson and his colleagues involved in the Embassy telegram, five out of six of them Chinese-speaking and representing nine decades of Chinese experience, should be transferred out of China. This was duly accomplished on Hurley's return.[3]

In making his choice the President undoubtedly believed or was persuaded by Hurley that it would compel the Communists to accept Chiang's terms for coalition. But it was only possible to believe this by rejecting the Embassy's appraisal of the seriousness and the dynamism of the Communist challenge. The choice

[3] Morale at the Embassy having sunk low under the effect of Hurley's rages and vendettas, the officers on duty in Chungking, whose careers were vulnerable to unfavorable action by the Chief of Mission, were anxious to be transferred, or in the case of two who were on leave in the United States, not to return. Atcheson, as Hurley's ranking subordinate, though too senior to be adversely affected, could not remain under the Ambassador's violent objection, and was transferred to General MacArthur's command as Political Adviser. Hurley personally obtained the removal of Service whom he correctly guessed to be the principal drafter of the telegram, by direct request to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (Service being attached to the Military Command). In the case of Raymond Ludden, a political officer who had also served with the Dixie Mission and after a four-month tour of Communist territory had reported the likelihood of their coming to power, Hurley obtained a statement from Wedemeyer that he "no longer required Ludden's services." Fulton Freeman, third secretary of the Embassy, Japan Language Officer Yuni, and Arthur Ringwalt, former Consul in Kweilin recently transferred to Chungking, who suffered the longest under Hurley's vindictiveness, were all variously reassigned. With the exception of Atcheson, who died shortly thereafter, the careers of all these men were slowed or otherwise damaged to greater or less degree by this episode. (Information supplied to the author by John S. Service.)

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was the last important decision of Roosevelt's life. A few days later he left for Warm Springs where he died.

In March when the President made this decision, Mao and Chou in conversations with Service were still emphasizing and amplifying their desire for coöperation and friendship with the United States. The rebuff suffered by the lack of any reply to their offer to go to Washington was never mentioned (doubtless because they wished to keep it secret) and in fact none of the political officers attached to the Dixie Mission knew anything about it. Supported by Chu Teh, Liu Shao-chi and other leaders of the Party, Mao and Chou returned repeatedly to the theme that China and the United States complemented each other economically—in China's need for postwar economic development and America's ability to assist and participate in it. Trying to assess how far this represented genuine conviction, Service concluded that Mao was certainly sincere in hoping to avoid an exclusive dependence on the Soviet Union.

The banishment shortly afterward of Service and the others concerned in the Atcheson telegram was a signal to the Communists of the American choice. In reaction their first overt signs of hostility appeared in the form of articles by Mao in the Communist press. Confined so far to attacks on the "Hurley policy," these seemed still to retain hope of a change by Roosevelt's successor. In his speech to the Seventh Party Congress in June, Mao seemed to be half warning, half pleading. If the pro-Chiang choice by "a group of people in the U.S. government" were to prevail, he said, it would drag the American government "into the deep stinking cesspool of Chinese reaction" and "place a crushing burden on the government and people of the United States and plunge them into endless woes and troubles."

After V-J Day American forces enabled the Nationalists, who had neither the means nor the plans ready for the occasion, to take the Japanese surrender on the mainland and regain the occupied cities. The United States moved its marine forces into the important northern cities and ports (Tient-sin, Tsingtao, Peking, Chingwangtao) to deny these centers and the railroads in the area to the Communists until Chiang's troops, ferried by American ship and planes, could get there. This constituted clear intervention to the Communists since their own forces would otherwise have reoccupied the north. Though justified by us under the pressing necessity of disarming the Japanese, our action

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was a logical development of the decision to sustain Chiang, and was taken as such by the Communists. Confirmed, as they saw it, by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration's discrimination against Communist areas and by American toleration of Japanese troops serving with the Nationalists, they took the turn toward antagonism which in the course of the next four years was to become definitive.

Through 1945 efforts for coalition, mediated by Hurley, continued—largely because neither side wished to appear to have chosen the course of civil war—but they were empty of intent. Failing to move either side any closer to the unity he had so often and so confidently promised, Hurley grew increasingly erratic and disturbed and suddenly resigned in November 1945 with a famous blast, the first salvo of McCarthyism. His mission had been thwarted, he claimed, by a section of the State Department which was "endeavoring to support Communism generally as well as specifically in China." He could not admit, and perhaps never understood, that his own estimate of the situation had been inadequate and the current of Chinese affairs simply too strong for him.

VI

Beyond Hurley, responsibility lay with the President. Hindsight makes his rejection of the Embassy's advice appear shortsighted, but every historical act is entitled to be examined in the light of the circumstances that surrounded it. Without doubt the primary factor influencing him was the Russian agreement obtained at Yalta. Both Roosevelt and Hurley believed that the Soviet Union held the key and that its still secret pledge to enter a treaty of alliance with Chiang Kai-shek (subsequently fulfilled in August) would in its effect on both sides in China serve to block the danger of civil war.

This belief was made possible only by underestimating the Communists as a *Chinese* phenomenon with roots reaching down into a hundred years of unmet needs and strength drawn from the native necessity of revolution. Back in 1930 Ambassador Nelson Johnson, a man of no unusual powers but able to observe the obvious, reported that communism was not the cause of chaos in China but rather the effect of "certain fundamental conditions." One such small voice, however, was overwhelmed as time went on by the conventional wisdom which held, first, that the

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Chinese would never accept communism because it was incompatible with the structure of Chinese society, and second, according to the Molotov dictum which much impressed Roosevelt, that the Chinese Communists were not Communists at all. On these premises it was easy to persuade oneself that the Communists were not the coming rulers of China but a party of rebellious "outs" who could eventually be reabsorbed. When Hurley and Wedemeyer during this visit, along with Commodore M. E. Miles (Chief of Naval Intelligence in China), conferred with the Joint Chiefs, "they were all of the opinion," as reported by Admiral Leahy, "that the rebellion in China could be put down by comparatively small assistance to Chiang's central government."

A second factor was that no proponent of another view, no one within the government who could effectively counter Hurley's version, had regular access to Roosevelt. This left a terrible gap. The President, again according to Leahy who lived in the White House, "had much confidence in Hurley's reliability in accurately carrying out the duties assigned to him in the foreign field." Moreover, if Leahy can be used as a mirror, the White House bought the thesis that Hurley was undermined in his efforts by a group of jealous career diplomats who had "ganged up on the new Ambassador appointed from outside the regular foreign service."

Here is a beam of light on the most puzzling aspect of our China policy: why the information and opinions provided by experienced observers maintained in the field for the express purpose of keeping our government informed were so consistently and regularly ignored.

The answer lies in the deep-seated American distrust that still prevailed of diplomacy and diplomats, the sentiment that disallowed knee-breeches for Americans. Diplomacy means all the wicked devices of the Old World, spheres of influence, balances of power, secret treaties, triple alliances and, during the interwar period, appeasement of fascism. Roosevelt reflected the sentiment in his attitude toward the career Foreign Service which he considered a group of striped-pants snobs drawn from the ranks of entrenched wealth (as many of them were), unrepresentative of America and probably functioning as tools of the British.

There was enough truth in this picture to make it persist despite passage of the Rogers Act in 1924 formalizing the Foreign

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Service as a career based on entry by examination and promotion by merit. The Act itself had been the result of wide criticism of cliques in the State Department, leading to a congressional investigation. The tragedy was that Roosevelt's prejudice derived from his liberal instinct yet produced a quite astonishing rigidity. When the voice from the field reported evidence that interfered with his desire to believe, he assumed it was the voice of reaction. When officers of the Embassy in Moscow and of the Russian Division of the State Department (technically the Division of East European Affairs) reported critically and relentlessly the brutal truth of Stalin's purges of 1937, they spoiled an image and were accordingly judged to be a nest of reactionaries married to White Russian princesses. On orders from above, the Russian Division was abolished, its unique files destroyed, its library given over to the Library of Congress and its chief, Robert F. Kelly, who had assembled over the years a collection of material that Litvinov envied, transferred to another post.

Ironically, the snob reputation had not on the whole been valid for China which, not being considered a particularly desirable post by socialites who preferred the Quai d'Orsay and the Court of St. James's, had been filled by academics, missionaries' sons and hard-working men promoted from the consular service, like Johnson and Gauss, the two ambassadors preceding Hurley. By a double irony, just such men would not have found themselves on easy terms with the White House.

Hurley started his mission with his mind equally set against the Foreign Service. When he came to blame it for his troubles he accused it alternately of conspiring to support communism and of sucking the United States into a power bloc "on the side of colonial imperialism." In this odd coupling he was not unique. Robert Sherwood, when conferring with General MacArthur's staff in Manila, found a persecution complex at work which seemed to conceive of the War Department, the Joint Chiefs and even the White House as under the domination of "Communists and British Imperialists."

Finally, the weight of domestic opinion on Roosevelt must be taken into account. If the hold of Chiang Kai-shek as the archetype anti-Communist on American public opinion was such that his cause perverted American politics for a decade after the war, and if it has taken us 27 years to untie the silver cord, and even yet have not cut it loose, it can hardly have been easy for Roose-

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velt to untie it in 1945. Fear of communism lay very close beneath the skin, so close that in his final speech of the campaign of 1944, Governor Dewey, the Republican candidate, charged that Communists as a small disciplined minority, acting through Sidney Hillman, had seized control of the American Labor movement, and "now . . . are seizing control of the New Deal through which they aim to control the Government of the United States." Roosevelt, said this disciplined and respectable lawyer, had auctioned control of the Democratic Party to the "highest bidder," *i.e.* Hillman and Earl Browder, in order to perpetuate himself in office. Through him communism would destroy liberties, religion and private property.

If a man like Dewey could resort to the tactics of the enormous lie and to a charge as reckless as any in the history of political campaigning, Roosevelt was politician enough to know how little would be needed to revive it. The autocrat of the *Time-Life* empire, Henry R. Luce, was rabid on this subject, especially with reference to China; his publications were the trumpet of Chiang's cause. Summoned to battle by Chiang's partisans, some of them sincere and passionate advocates like the former medical missionary, Congressman Walter Judd, any of the myriad enemies of the Administration could create serious trouble. Roosevelt was concentrating now on the coming conference in San Francisco to organize the United Nations and on his hopes of a four-power alliance after the war to keep world peace. It was a time at all costs to avoid friction. Since China was in any case secondary to Europe—a disability it suffered from all through the war—it did not seem worth the risk that the Atcheson telegram asked him to take.

Thus passed the opportunity Mao and Chou had asked for. The factors operating against it suggest there never was an "if." And yet, there remains one strange contradictory sliver of evidence. Edgar Snow, the kind of outsider from whom Roosevelt liked to get his facts, reported a conversation with the President in March 1945 at the very time of the Hurley-Wedemeyer visit. Roosevelt was "baffled yet acutely fascinated," Snow said, by the complexity of what was happening in China and complained that nobody explained it satisfactorily, Snow included. "He understood that our wartime aid was actually a form of intervention in China;" he "recognized the growing strength of the Chinese Communists as the effective government of the guerrilla

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area;" he asked "whether they were real Communists and whether the Russians were bossing them," and asked further, "what, concretely, the Eighth Route Army could do with our aid in North China. He then said that we were going to land supplies and liaison officers on the North China coast as we drew closer to Japan." Snow questioned whether, so long as we recognized Chiang Kai-shek as the sole government, all supplies would have to go through him. " 'We can't support two governments in China, can we?' " he asked.

" 'Well, I've been working with two governments there.' The President threw back his head decisively. 'I intend to go on doing so until I can get them together.' "

This is a puzzle. It seems irreconcilable with the decision to uphold Hurley, unless Roosevelt was so convinced that Hurley would indeed achieve coalition "by the end of April" that what he had in mind was sending the Communists arms and aid *after* they had become part of the National Government.

Of the major quirk in the case one has to ask whether there might have been a different result if the ambassador had been a different man. A different man could still not have achieved coalition because no one on earth could have arranged terms that both parties could accept. A different man might have facilitated rather than blocked the visit of Mao and Chou to Washington, but if he had been a different man in whom they had confidence they would not have asked to go. There remains only the remote chance that an ambassador who both listened to his staff *and* had the ear of the President might have turned the President toward a wider option than the blank check to the Generalissimo.

Otherwise it would seem from the record that our course was destined, not by our stars but by ourselves and our inclinations; that the President, the public and the conduct of foreign policy combined to work toward an inescapable and, from our point of view, a negative end.

VII

Is any principle contained in this dusty answer? Perhaps only that every revolutionary change exacts a price in loss as well as gain, and that history will continue to present us with problems for which there is no good and achievable solution. To insist that there is one and commit ourselves to it invites the fate set apart for hubris. We reached in China exactly the opposite of what

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had been our object. Civil war, the one absolute we tried to prevent, duly came about. Though we defeated Japan, the goal that would have made sense of the victory, a strong united China on our side after the war, escaped us. The entire effort predicated on the validity of the Nationalist government was wasted.

What should have been our aim in China was not to mediate or settle China's internal problem, which was utterly beyond our scope, but to preserve viable and as far as possible amicable relations with the government of China whatever it turned out to be. We were not compelled to make an either/or decision; we could have adopted the British attitude, described by Sir John Keswick as one of "slightly perplexed resignation." Or, as a Brookings Institution study concluded in 1956, the United States "could have considered its China policy at a dead stop and ended all further effort to direct the outcome of events."

Yet we repeat the pattern. An architect of our involvement in Vietnam, Mr. Walt Rostow, insists that a fundamental premise of American policy is the establishment of a stable balance of power in Asia. This is not a condition the West can establish. Stability in Asia is no more achievable by us than was unity in China in 1945.

Basic to the conduct of foreign policy is the problem basic to all policy: how to apply wisdom to government. If wisdom in government eludes us, perhaps courage could substitute—the moral courage to terminate mistakes.

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INDIA AND THE WORLD

By Indira Gandhi

THIS year India celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of her independence. These have been years of change and turmoil everywhere. Deep surging forces have torn asunder our past colonial feudal structures and have combined with the tides sweeping the world to give our post-independence evolution its unique qualities. But our own unvarying concerns have been two: to safeguard our independence and to overcome the blight of poverty.

Many crises and dangers from within and without have obstructed our path but we have taken them in our stride. Contrary to predictions, the country has not broken into warring states. We have not succumbed to civil anarchy. There has been no widespread starvation; on the contrary, we have become self-sufficient in cereals. We have not jettisoned our free institutions, but instead gained greater political cohesion and economic strength. This does not justify complacency but it does give us confidence that the Indian people can rise to whatever challenge the future may hold. Under Mahatma Gandhi's inspiration, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress movement formulated a set of principles which have served as our guidelines and which are still valid for us. These are democracy, socialism and secularism so far as our internal affairs are concerned, and nonalignment in our external relations. One or the other of these principles has been the subject of criticism within the country and abroad. But generally speaking, internally there is a more mature awareness of the forces and compulsions of our age, and these principles have come to form the essential elements of a national program accepted by virtually all sections of our people, even though there are differences of interpretation and regarding tactics. The massive majority with which the Congress Party was returned to power in the fifth general election in 1971 and in the state elections in 1972 is an indication of this.

What holds people together is not religion, not race, not language, not even a commitment to an economic system. It is shared experience and involvement in the conscious and continuous effort at resolving internal differences through political means.

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It is a sense of "Indianness" which unites our people despite ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. Most conflicts and tensions in the world originate in the failure to take note of the importance of nationalism.

II

Two centuries and more of history marked by foreign intervention, domination and exploitation left India backward, apathetic and stagnant. The general scene was one of decay, reflected in the misery of the masses. For us, political independence became inseparable from economic freedom, which in turn could be meaningful to the extent that it served the interests not only of the few but of the many, of the nation as a whole. Hence our energies at home have been chiefly directed toward the reconstruction of our society.

Our national movement was committed not to a doctrine but to a purpose—the modernization of our society without loss of the Indian personality; the development and integration of industry and agriculture with modern science and technology; the uplift of the masses and the ending of archaic, hierarchical systems in which discrimination and exploitation had become entrenched.

In the economic field, it was clear from the beginning that we could not rely only on private enterprise and the play of market forces, that we would have to establish social control over the key sectors of the economy and adopt measures of economic planning appropriate to the stage of development reached. Our socialism is not a ready-made ideology but a flexible concept. Three successive Five-Year Plans have been implemented and we are halfway through the Fourth. None of them was beyond criticism in formulation or execution. And yet the overall progress of the last 25 years is by no means negligible. We have an impressive record of diversifying our industrial capacity and raising industrial output. The Indian peasant has quickly responded to the new strategy, with the state providing irrigation, improved seeds, better implements, fertilizers and pesticides. So marked has been the development of our industry and agriculture, our science and technology, our education and health, that some argue that India should not now be counted among the underdeveloped nations.

Although we have acquired certain features of an industrial

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state and although some classes and groups of our people are visibly prosperous, the vast majority still live in poverty and a substantial minority in crushing poverty. Moreover, the process of development has widened the disparities between different social classes and has created new imbalances between states and between districts within the same state.

Our very progress has drawn attention to the inadequacy of our achievement and to the magnitude of the tasks that still lie ahead. But it has increased our capacity to deal with them. We have realized that reliance on stereotyped processes of economic growth will not make an appreciable impact on the living conditions of the masses for decades to come. Hence, a basic review of our economic policies is now under way. We propose a more direct assault on poverty and its major manifestation, unemployment. Our next Five-Year Plan will emphasize investment and production programs which are closely related to a minimum level of consumption for all and are linked to the provision of employment opportunities on an extensive scale. This gigantic enterprise calls for institutional changes and innovations.

These radical policies do not conform to the code of capitalism and they may not adhere to orthodox doctrines of socialism but they are desired by the great majority of our people. The privileged do not hide their misgivings. Reform, as in every country where it has been an issue, is being hotly debated. Some of the more glaring inequities of the land system, *e.g.* absentee landlordism, were removed immediately after independence but the just redistribution of land and consolidation of holdings are yet to be satisfactorily completed. Industrialization and urbanization have given rise to new problems and have further accentuated disparities. However, our commitment to democracy is fundamental. Indian socialism is not a negation of democracy but its fulfillment, and democracy will be imperiled only in the measure by which we fail through lack of foresight or want of courage to respond to the aspirations of our people.

The resources for our economic development have come mostly from the sacrifices of our own people, but we have also received aid from abroad in the form of credits for the purchase of industrial equipment and food. Although aid was originally conceived of as external assistance for supplementing the self-help measures of developing countries, we have found that it is often used by some creditor governments as an instrument to enforce their

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short-term policy objectives and to secure political and economic concessions unrelated to our development. Aid is effective only if it is guided by considerations of development and when there is assurance of its continuity and not when it can be suspended or withdrawn abruptly. While aid is generally tied to purchases from donor countries, repayment under many of the agreements has to be made in freely convertible foreign currencies, adding to our burdens. At present more than half of the external assistance to us goes for repayments of earlier debts. It is our policy to reduce reliance on aid progressively. We are determined to mobilize internal resources and technological capacities more intensively.

III

India's foreign policy is a projection of the values which we have cherished through the centuries as well as our current concerns. We are not tied to the traditional concepts of a foreign policy designed to safeguard overseas possessions, investments, the carving out of spheres of influence and the erection of *cordons sanitaires*. We are not interested in exporting ideologies.

Our first concern has been to prevent any erosion of our independence. Therefore we could not be camp followers of any power, however rich or strong. We had equal interest in the maintenance and safeguarding of international peace as an essential condition of India's economic, social and political development. In the bipolar world which existed in the immediate postwar era, Jawaharlal Nehru refused to join either bloc. He decided to remain nonaligned as a means of safeguarding our independence and contributing to the maintenance of world peace. Nonalignment implied neither noninvolvement nor neutrality. It was and is an assertion of our freedom of judgment and action. We have not hesitated to express our views on any major controversy or to support just causes.

In conformity with the objectives of our foreign policy, India sought friendship with every nation. We did not allow past conflicts to impede our new links with Britain within the framework of the Commonwealth. The problem of French possessions in India, unlike those held by the Portuguese, was solved in a civilized manner by peaceful negotiations. Thereafter, our relations with France grew in cordiality. We have similar relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic

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Republic and other European countries, both East and West. With the nonaligned countries in Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and Africa south of the Sahara, there exist special understanding and coöperation based on a common interest in safeguarding freedom and a common struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism and racialism. We have friendships with the countries of Latin America whose concern with problems of development is similar to ours. India has always held Japan in esteem as a dynamic Asian country, and our coöperation with Japan is steadily growing.

We have also tried to have normal relations with Pakistan. Yet successive governments of Pakistan based the survival and unity of their country on the idea of confrontation with India. This has stood in the way of coöperation which would have been to our mutual benefit. India was partitioned in 1947 to solve what the British portrayed as irreconcilable Hindu-Moslem antagonism. Pakistan was based on the medieval notion that religion alone constituted nationhood. Encouraged by the imperial power, the Moslem League claimed that Moslem majority areas were entitled to become an independent nation. Thus, Pakistan was born a geographical curiosity, its two halves separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. India was left with a very large number of Moslems; they formed the largest of her many minorities. In keeping with her old tradition and the spirit of her nationalist movement, India adopted secularism—*i.e.* nondiscrimination on grounds of religion—as a fundamental state principle. Equal rights and equal protection have been vouchsafed for the followers of all religions. The Moslem population of India has grown since partition from 35 million to 61 million. It is noteworthy that the 1971 census showed that there are 14 million Christians and 17 million others including Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Jews.

Pakistan, on the other hand, clung to the political ideology which had led to partition. Those who came to power in Pakistan had sided with the colonial power in undivided India and had opposed the national struggle. These ruling elements, especially after the establishment of military dictatorship, set Pakistan on a course of pointless and seemingly endless conflict with India. Just as in the earlier days when the colonial power had used religious sentiments to blunt the nationalist drive in India, some powers sought to use Pakistan to offset India. Pakistan joined

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military alliances, which had been formed ostensibly to contain international communism, but which Pakistan used primarily in order to acquire weapons to be used against India. Moreover, it suited the West to play off Pakistan against India. China gave military assistance to Pakistan with the same purpose. Later, so did the Soviet Union in order not to lose leverage, but soon discovered its hazards. The consequence of this assistance was to strengthen the militarist oligarchy in Pakistan and inhibit the growth of democratic forces there. Hatred and suspicion of India were whipped up to maintain those in power and to divert the Pakistani people's attention from their demands. Since India remained outside military systems, our defense capacity, unlike that of Pakistan, had to be built up out of our own resources. We have bought defense equipment from a number of countries, however, particularly after the Chinese invasion in 1962 when we received very modest assistance from the United States and the United Kingdom.

Kashmir, as early as October 1947, was the first victim of aggression by Pakistan. This was at a time when there were no Indian forces at all in Kashmir—as acknowledged by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan at that time in the U.N. Security Council. A large part of that state has been under Pakistan's occupation for many years. India does not intend to recapture this territory by force; on several occasions we have given this assurance to Pakistan and have offered to conclude a "no war" pact. Pakistan has rejected this offer repeatedly, trying to invoke third-party intervention in our affairs. Infiltrators and saboteurs have been sent into Kashmir and other territories, notably in the northeast. Early in 1965, our Kutch area was invaded, and later the same year the infiltration was escalated into an attack on Kashmir which led to fighting all along the western front.

The immediate background to the latest aggression against us in 1971 was the other battle which Pakistan had been waging for many months against its own citizens of East Pakistan (as it then was). India had no part in the internal developments of Pakistan—West or East. We would normally have welcomed the attainment of freedom by any victim of colonial oppression but usually it would have little direct impact on us. Bangladesh, however, was a part of our subcontinent. How could we ignore a conflict which took place on our very border and overflowed into our own territory? Ten million destitute refugees poured

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into densely populated areas which were also politically sensitive owing to the activities of Marxists and the Left extremists we call Naxalites. This posed unbearable strains on our economy and on our social and administrative institutions. The terrible stories of genocide and the comings and goings of Mukti Bahini, the resistance force of Bangladesh, created a volatile situation for us also. Could we remain indifferent to these developments?

As I told the leaders of the various countries which I visited in October 1971, the situation could not remain static. Several border clashes took place during these tense months, and there was one serious skirmish in November; but we treated these as local incidents. In the last week of November, President Yahya Khan publicly announced that war would begin in ten days and, sure enough, on the tenth day there was a massive air attack on seven of our cities and a ground attack all along our western border. Thus did Pakistan extend its war to India.

However, when 14 days later, on December 16, 1971, Pakistani troops surrendered on the eastern front, India unilaterally announced a ceasefire on the western front also. On March 25, 1972, we withdrew our troops from Bangladesh in consultation with the new government. The political map of the subcontinent has been redrawn and the notion of an inherent and insuperable antagonism between a secular India and a predominantlyMoslem state has been discredited—not through any design on our part but because the idea itself was untenable and the military dictatorship of Pakistan, totally alienated from its own people, had followed a short-sighted and unrealistic policy. In his address to the nation on June 27, 1972, President Bhutto gave a perceptive account of the events when he said: "The war we have lost was not of our making. I had warned against it but my warning fell on deaf ears of a power-drunk junta. They recklessly plunged our people into the war and involved us in an intolerable surrender and lost us half our country. The junta did not know how to make peace nor did it know how to make war."

The shock of these events compelled Pakistan to exchange military dictatorship for civilian rule and opened the door to new possibilities for the peaceful resolution of the basic issues between the two countries. I took the initiative to invite President Bhutto for discussions. These have resulted in the Simla Agreement of July 2, 1972, by which Pakistan and India have proclaimed their determination to solve their conflicts bilaterally

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and without recourse to force, and to seek a durable peace and growing economic and cultural coöperation. The agreement, which holds the promise of settlement of the Kashmir and boundary problems, has been welcomed by almost all sections of the Indian people. It is my hope that the implementation of this agreement in the spirit in which it was made will close the 25-year-old period of Pakistan's hatred of India, and that both countries will become good neighbors. I appreciate the courage and realistic approach which enabled President Bhutto to come to India. If Pakistan also shows the wisdom to come to terms with Bangladesh which, under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is building a secular, Socialist-oriented democracy, the subcontinent will at long last have overcome the main obstacle to its progress.

IV

I have dwelt at length on Pakistan and the problems of the subcontinent for their impact on us is immediate and deep. But we want better relations with China also. Even when we were fully absorbed in our own struggle for liberty, we supported China's parallel fight against imperialism and sent a medical team to Mao Tse-tung's Eighth Route Army. We have respect for their culture and cherish memories of past contacts. We were among the first in 1949 to welcome the establishment of the People's Republic.

Much to our disappointment, the last two decades have failed to fulfill our initial hope that India and China, both great Asian nations newly independent and faced with similar problems, would learn from and assist each other and so coöperate on the wider international scene. We began, as we thought, with mutual confidence and good will, but the events of the 1950s brought tension and misunderstanding, culminating in the entry of Chinese troops and their occupation of thousands of square miles of Indian territory in 1962.

It would be an oversimplification to regard this merely as the result of a border dispute. Simultaneous or subsequent developments—such as China's systematic support of Pakistan against India, her provocative criticism of India for alleged subservience to the United States and later the Soviet Union, and her persistent though futile efforts to promote internal subversion—leave us no option but to infer that the border dispute was the outcome of a more complex policy which was aimed at under-

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mining India's stability and at obstructing her rapid and orderly progress. After the Cultural Revolution, conditions seem more tranquil, and there appears to be a new orientation of China's policies. We wonder whether this new mood will also be reflected in China's policy toward India. The earlier faint signs of a thaw have receded since China's unreserved support of General Yahya Khan's campaign against Bangladesh and India. We are not engaged in any competition with China, nor have we any hostile intentions. We hope that some day China will appreciate that coöperative and friendly relations between the 560 million people of India and the 700 million people of China are in our mutual interest.

Apart from the Soviet leaders, I think my father was the first Prime Minister to pay a state visit to China. Similarly, the exchange of visits with the leaders of the Soviet Union was memorable in that it was the first time since the October Revolution that a non-Communist personality of Nehru's stature and the head of a non-Communist government was welcomed officially by the Soviet government; it was the first time, also, that Soviet leaders traveled in a country outside the Socialist bloc. The talks held in Moscow and Delhi resulted in a significant measure of understanding that had more than bilateral implications. They demonstrated that it was possible for two countries such as India and the Soviet Union to maintain good relations and to work together in a friendly spirit in spite of very different social systems and without either having to modify its policies or sacrifice its philosophy and traditions.

The Soviet Union shares the Indian view on the maintenance of peace and the elimination of racialism and colonialism. On these issues it has supported the Afro-Asian stand in the United Nations and elsewhere. When matters vitally concerning our national security and integrity, such as Goa, Kashmir and more lately Bangladesh, became subjects of international controversy, the Soviet assessment of the merits of the case coincided largely with our own. In strictly bilateral terms also, there has been a steady increase in the range and volume of our coöperation—economic, commercial and cultural—to our mutual advantage. Economic relations with the Soviet Union are easier for us since we repay them through the export of our commodities. This mode of payment makes the Soviet credits self-liquidating.

The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Coöperation concluded

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last year grew logically from this expanding relationship. It affirms the determination of both countries for greater coöperation in various fields and to consult one another, if need be, on suitable measures to safeguard their peace and security. There is nothing in the treaty to which any reasonable person or government could take exception. It contains no secret clauses, nor is it aimed against any country. Yet there have been some misapprehensions that the treaty dilutes India's nonalignment. It is strange that such criticism comes mostly from those who have vehemently denounced nonalignment all along. In the text of the treaty itself there is explicit recognition and endorsement of India's policy of nonalignment.

V

Our relations with the United States started off rather well. At that time, the American people and government showed considerable sympathy for the colonial peoples who were struggling for independence, and particularly for India. However, this phase was short-lived. With the rise of the United States to a dominant world position, Washington's concern and respect for the national independence of India receded into the background. Everything was viewed solely in the context of checking communism and containing first the Soviet Union, subsequently China, and now once again the Soviet Union. There was a feverish building of military blocs and a continuous extension of a network of bases stretching across oceans and continents. The logical and practical consequence of this policy was to divide the world into two opposing camps and to expect each country to belong to one or the other—preferably the Western bloc.

A newly freed people, jealous of their independence, could not resign themselves to this position, nor could we isolate ourselves from what was happening around us. Successive U.S. administrations have ignored the fact that India must see her problems and her relationships in a different perspective. They have insisted on interpreting our nonalignment within the confines of a neutralism which they imagined to be slanted in favor of Russia. India was regarded with disapproval and resentment because of her independent policy. This could not but affect the bilateral relations between India and America. Despite fluctuations of mood, our relationship as a whole has been uneasy over a long period.

To our grave concern, U.S. policy as it developed impinged

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seriously on our vital interests. The admission of Pakistan into the U.S.-controlled system of alliances and the massive supply of arms to Pakistan were ostensibly part of the U.S. grand design against communism, but we cannot believe that the U.S. administration was unaware that these weapons could be and would be used only against India. We took considerable pains to point this out but our protests went unheeded.

Should not the people of the United States ask their government what they have gained from America's activities in Europe and in Asia? Has the United States succeeded in containing communism? On the contrary, has not the U.S. government been compelled to build bridges with the nonaligned and to woo the opposite bloc—the hated Communists? I have no doubt that if we had followed the advice of the Western bloc, conditions in India would have deteriorated and the extremists would have been strengthened.

In regard to Bangladesh and during the December war, the United States openly backed Pakistan at the cost of basic human values. This further strained our relations. I do not wish to analyze the U.S. role at that time or go into the misrepresentations which were circulated. But it is necessary to take note of the dispatch of the warship *Enterprise* to support a ruthless military dictatorship and to intimidate a democracy, and the extraordinary similarity of the attitudes adopted by the United States and China. Imagine our feelings. The original misunderstanding with the United States had arisen because of our contacts with China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We find it difficult to understand why, when the U.S. policy toward these countries changed, the resentment against us increased.

We do not believe in permanent estrangement. We admire the achievements of the American people. Indeed, a large number of Americans expressed sympathetic support for the cause of Bangladesh and India during the last year. We are grateful for the assistance from the United States in many areas of our development. We are ready to join in any serious effort to arrive at a deeper appreciation of each other's point of view and to improve relations. A great power must take into account the existence not only of countries with comparable power, but of the multitude of others who are no longer willing to be pawns on a global chessboard. Above all, the United States has yet to resolve the inner contradiction between the traditions of the found-

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ing fathers and of Lincoln and the external image it gives of a superpower pursuing the cold logic of power politics.

On fundamental questions such as disarmament, the abolition of nuclear weapons, the continuing struggle against colonialism and racialism, the widening gulf between the haves and have-nots, the war in Vietnam and the conflict in the Middle East, our stand has been consistent over the years and has been clearly stated in appropriate forums. In this article I have preferred to focus attention on the situation on our subcontinent because it is our special concern and has a significance beyond geographical frontiers. In considering the policies of some major powers, I have confined myself to bilateral relations which are intimately connected with their attitudes to the subcontinent as a whole.

VI

The international scene with which we had become familiar has considerably altered. Do the two recent summit meetings in Peking and Moscow indicate that communism and anticommunism will no longer be the ultimate criteria of political and moral values and that peaceful coexistence, which India has been advocating all these years, will be the governing consideration in international dealings? Whatever the motivation, the wisdom of these new approaches is beyond question, provided that the spirit of détente is also extended to other parts of the world. We cannot be sure if these flexible relationships necessarily point to a more stable world order. Coexistence by itself does not preclude policies, separately or in concert, which are detrimental to the freedom and interests of third countries. For example, coördinated action in the Security Council between China and the United States last year operated against an immediate restoration of peace in Bangladesh in keeping with the rights of its people. Agreements which promote the doctrine of balance of power or mark out spheres of influence are bound to increase tension and invite instability. No nation will be happy in a subservient role.

Europe has avoided war for more than two decades and is now attempting to build a framework of security and coöperation. But peace is indivisible and so long as there are conflicts and dissensions in Asia there will be no peace in the world. Asia has cradled many civilizations and contains a substantial section of the world's population. For more than two centuries, it has been drained of its resources and wealth which have contributed in

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no small measure to the industrial advance and affluence of the West. The countries of Asia are now politically free but the continuing interplay of international forces impedes our struggle against economic backwardness and the shadows of the past. We share many problems which can be solved through coöperation among ourselves rather than merely through assistance from the outside, which has tended to cause misunderstanding among us and which was motivated more by self-interest than by a genuine understanding of our needs.

Each country has its own heritage and distinct personality which it naturally wishes to develop in its own way. But we must also bear in mind our community of interests and take positive initiatives for working together among ourselves and with other countries in order to make a richer contribution toward the evolution of a world more liveable for all and of a social order more in consonance with the yearnings of modern man.

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CONGRESS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

The problem of the control of foreign policy has been a perennial source of anguish for democracies. The idea of popular government hardly seems complete if it fails to embrace questions of war and peace. Yet the effective conduct of foreign affairs appears to demand, as Tocqueville argued long ago, not the qualities peculiar to a democracy but "on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient." Steadfastness in a course, efficiency in the execution of policy, patience, secrecy—are not these more likely to proceed from executives than from legislatures? But, if foreign policy becomes the property of the executive, what happens to democratic control? In our own times this issue has acquired special urgency, partly because of the Indochina War, with its aimless persistence and savagery, but more fundamentally, I think, because the invention of nuclear weapons has transformed the power to make war into the power to blow up the world. And for the United States the question of the control of foreign policy is, at least in its constitutional aspect, the question of the distribution of powers between the presidency and the Congress.

II

On December 21, 1936, in the days when the Nine Old Men of the Supreme Court were, it was supposed, hellbent on confining the power of Presidents, the Court, speaking through one of its most conservative justices, conferred rather greater power on Franklin D. Roosevelt than it had denied him when in the previous 18 months it had vetoed such New Deal experiments as the NRA and the AAA. The decision in the case of *U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. et al* came as a ringing affirmation of inherent and independent presidential authority in foreign affairs.

The case arose because Congress in 1934 had passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to stop the sale of arms to Bolivia and Paraguay, then fighting each other in the Chaco jungles, if, in the presidential judgment, such an embargo would help restore peace. President Roosevelt immediately imposed an

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embargo by executive proclamation. Subsequently the Curtiss-Wright Corporation was discovered in a conspiracy to violate the embargo. Brought into court, Curtiss-Wright contended that Congress, when it gave discretionary power to the President through the joint resolution, had made an unlawful delegation of its authority. The Federal District Court accepted this argument, pronounced the resolution an "attempted abdication of legislative responsibility" and dismissed the charges. The government then took the case to the Supreme Court.

Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, himself a former Secretary of State, assigned the opinion to George Sutherland, a former member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. With only the intractable McReynolds dissenting, the Court saw a "fundamental" distinction between the President's power in domestic affairs and his power in foreign affairs. Sutherland found the two classes of power different both in their origin—"the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution"—and in their nature. In particular,

> participation in the exercise of the power [over foreign policy] is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.

In reversing the lower court and affirming the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations," the Court concluded that "congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved."

Several points must be made about this decision. It involved the power over foreign commerce, not the power over war; it did not free the executive from the necessity of acting on congressional authorization; its actual holding was restricted; and its more expansive contentions were in the nature of *obiter dicta.* Still the Court claimed "overwhelming support . . . in the unbroken legislative practice which had prevailed from the inception of the national government to the present day" for delegation to the President in the field of foreign relations; and the

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decision was the judicial culmination of the long drift of control over foreign policy into the hands of the executive. Certainly for another generation the mood here registered even by an anti-presidential Supreme Court and thereafter strengthened by 30 years of world crisis encouraged a succession of Presidents in the conviction that there were few limits to executive initiative in the making of foreign policy. Now the tide has turned; and, nearly 40 years after the Curtiss-Wright case, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is striving to recover for Congress the role in foreign policy that a one-time member of that committee appeared to take away in 1936.

The Constitution itself is cryptic and ambiguous in its allocation of powers affecting foreign policy. Its authors were great men because they knew what they did not know as well as what they knew. *"It is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies,"* Hamilton wrote with due emphasis in the 23rd Federalist. ". . . . The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed." But the rejection of shackles did not mean the rejection of processes and standards; it meant rather the establishment of a system which did not try to solve all problems in advance and would be capable of responding to unforeseen contingencies.

The intentions of the Founding Fathers may be better understood against the background of their own experience. That experience led them to seek more centralization of authority than they had known under the Continental Congress or the Articles of Confederation. So the Constitution in Article II bestowed general executive authority on the President; and, as the Federalist Papers emphasized, the characteristics of such an executive —unity, secrecy, decision, dispatch, superior sources of information—were especially vital to the conduct of foreign affairs. The President was expressly empowered to receive foreign envoys and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors and make treaties. In addition, he was designated Commander in Chief of the armed forces. "Of all the cares or concerns of government," said the Federalist, "the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand."

But experience also led the Founding Fathers to seek less cen-

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tralization of authority than they had known under the British crown. The presidential prerogative was to fall significantly short of the royal prerogative. Hence the qualification of the treaty power: where the British King could conclude treaties on his own motion, the American President had to win the support of two-thirds of the senators present before a treaty could go into effect. "The one can do alone," said Hamilton, "what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature."

Above all, the Founders were determined to deny the American President what Blackstone had freely conceded to the British King—"the sole prerogative of making war and peace." As Hamilton carefully explained in the 69th Federalist, the President's power as Commander in Chief

> would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces . . . while that of the British king extends to the *declaring* of war and to the *raising* and *regulating* of fleets and armies,—all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.

An early draft of the Constitution had even given Congress the power to "make war;" but Madison and Elbridge Gerry persuaded the convention to change this to "declare" in order to leave the executive "the power to repel sudden attacks." While this amendment allowed the President to respond when war was imposed on the nation, it was certainly not understood as giving him the power to initiate hostilities. Hamilton's dry comment on the treaty power would apply all the more forcibly to the war power: "The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States." As Madison put it in a letter to Jefferson in 1798: "The constitution supposes, what the History of all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the Legisl."

The Constitution conferred other relevant powers on the Congress: the power to make appropriations, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to raise and maintain the armed forces and make rules for their government and regulation, to control nat-

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uralization and immigration, to debate, oversee and investigate. But the allocation of powers could hardly be, in its nature, clear-cut; and particularly in the case of the war power and of the treaty power it was a matter, in Hamilton's phrase, of "joint possession." In these areas the two branches had interwoven responsibilities and competing opportunities. Moreover, each had an undefined residuum of inherent authority on which to draw—the President through the executive power and the constitutional injunction that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Congress through the constitutional authorization "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States." In addition, the Constitution itself was silent on certain issues of import to the conduct of foreign affairs: among them, the recognition of foreign states, the authority to proclaim neutrality, the role of executive agreements, the control of information essential to intelligent decision. The result, as Edward S. Corwin remarked 40 years ago, was to make of the Constitution "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."

The struggle began in the silences of the Constitution. Thus President Washington turned his constitutional power to receive foreign envoys into the assertion of diplomatic recognition as a prerogative of the executive; by receiving Citizen Genêt, he thereby recognized the revolutionary republic of France. Congress did not, however, abandon interest in recognition policy. In later years members of Congress tried various ways to force on reluctant Presidents the recognition of newly independent Latin American states—Argentina, for example, in 1818 and Cuba in 1898. In still later years Congress sought by concurrent resolution to dissuade Presidents from recognizing the People's Republic of China.

On the control of neutrality, Washington asserted the presidential prerogative by proclaiming American neutrality in the war between France and Britain in 1793. Congress recovered ground by passing a neutrality act of its own next year; and a century and a half later, in the nineteen-thirties, it triumphantly succeeded in imposing mandatory neutrality policies on the resistant Roosevelt administration.

On the control of information, Washington rejected a request

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from the House of Representatives that he turn over copies of instructions and other papers relating to the Jay Treaty. Though he based his refusal on the narrow ground that the House was not involved in the treaty-making process and that "all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Britain" had already been laid before the Senate, he established a larger precedent that future Presidents used to deny information to the Senate as well. By 1936 Justice Sutherland could write in the Curtiss-Wright case that the wisdom of Washington's original refusal "has never since been doubted," adding that the success of presidential action in international relations may well depend "upon the nature of the confidential information which he has or may thereafter receive;" this, Sutherland said for the Court, was another proof of "the unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be governed."

But the main battlegrounds lay in the critical areas of "joint possession"—the war power and the treaty power—and the changing contours of the struggle for control are best displayed in relation to these complex and contentious questions.

III

The war power has historically involved a competition between the power of the Congress to authorize war and the power of the President as Commander in Chief. It is important to state the issue with precision. The issue is not the declaration of war in a strict sense. Long before Under Secretary Katzenbach startled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 by pronouncing the declaration of war "outmoded," Hamilton had written in the 25th Federalist, "The ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse." One study of European and American wars shows that between 1700 and 1870 hostilities began in 107 cases without declaration of war; in only ten cases was there a declaration of war in advance of hostilities. Though the United States has engaged in a number of armed conflicts in the last two centuries, it has only made five formal declarations of war (of which four—all but the War of 1812—recognized the prior existence of states of war).

The real issue is congressional authorization—whether or not by declaration of war—of the commitment of American forces in circumstances that involve or invite hostilities against foreign

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states. One aspect of this issue emerged clearly during the undeclared naval war with France in 1798–1801. Mr. Katzenbach injudiciously testified that "President John Adams' use of troops in the Mediterranean" (by which he presumably meant Adams' use of the fleet in the Atlantic) was "criticized at the time as exceeding the power of the Executive acting without the support of a congressional vote." Others, before and since, have cited this conflict as an early precedent in the cause of presidential war-making. In fact, when trouble with France began, Adams called Congress to meet in special session "to consult and determine on such measure as in their wisdom shall be deemed meet for the safety and welfare of the said United States." In due course, Congress turned more belligerent than the President and in the spring of 1798 passed some 20 laws to encourage Adams to wage the war. Adams' Attorney General described the conflict as "a maritime war *authorized* by both nations," and in 1800 the Supreme Court, called upon to define the conflict, drew a distinction between "perfect" and "imperfect" wars. As it concluded in a unanimous decision, if war

> be declared in form, it is called solemn, and is of the perfect kind. . . . But hostilities may subsist between two nations, more confined in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and things; and this is more properly termed imperfect war. . . . Still . . . it is a war between two nations, though all the members are not authorized to commit hostilities such as in a solemn war.

Both sorts of war, whether solemn or non-solemn, complete or limited, were deemed to require some mode of congressional authorization. When John Marshall assumed leadership of the Court in 1801, he reinforced the point in a second case arising out of the trouble with France. "The Congress," he ruled, "may authorize general hostilities . . . or partial war."

Jefferson similarly acknowledged the congressional right to license hostilities by means short of a declaration of war, while at the same time he affirmed the right of the executive to repel sudden attack. When an American naval schooner was fired on by a Tripolitanian cruiser in the Mediterranean, it repulsed the attack with signal success; but, Jefferson instructed Congress, its commander was "unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense," so the enemy vessel, having been "disabled from committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew." Jefferson went on

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to ask Congress to consider "whether, by authorizing measures of offense also, they will place our force on an equal footing with that of its adversaries." Again, fearing incursions into Louisiana by the Spanish in Florida in 1805, he declined to broaden defense against sudden attack into defense against the threat of sudden attack and said in a special message: "Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have thought it my duty to await their authority for using force. . . . The course to be pursued will require the command of means which it belongs to Congress exclusively to yield or to deny."

In this case, Congress chose to deny. But half a dozen years later a more belligerent Congress led a more reluctant President into war. In 1812 Madison, now that he was the executive and the War Hawks of the legislature were demanding hostilities with Britain, may well have reflected ruefully on his argument of 1798 about the supposed greater interest of the executive in war.

When the Seminole Indians were conducting raids into American territory in 1818, President Monroe chose not to consult Congress before ordering General Andrew Jackson to chase the raiding parties back into Spanish Florida, where Jackson was soon fighting Spaniards and hanging Englishmen. But tangling with foreigners was incidental to Jackson's ostensible objective, which was punishing Indians. We would now call the principle on which he and Monroe acted "hot pursuit." Where direct conflict with a foreign state was the issue, Monroe was more cautious. When he promulgated his famous Doctrine, he neither consulted with Congress nor sought its subsequent approval; but, when Colombia requested U.S. protection under the Monroe Doctrine, John Quincy Adams, Monroe's Secretary of State, carefully replied that the Constitution confided "the ultimate decision . . . to the Legislative Department."

Jackson himself as President meticulously respected this point. Though he enlarged the executive power with relish in other areas, on the question of the war-making power he followed not his own example of 1817 but Jefferson's of 1801. Thus in 1831, after ordering an armed vessel to South America to protect American shipping against Argentine raiders, he said, "I submit the case to the consideration of Congress, to the end that they may clothe the Executive with such authority and means as they deem

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necessary for providing a force adequate to the complete protection of our fellow citizens fishing and trading in these seas." When France persisted in her refusal to pay long-outstanding claims for damage to American shipping during the Napoleonic wars, Jackson, instead of moving on his own, took care to ask Congress for a law "authorizing reprisals upon French property, in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt." (Albert Gallatin observed that this "proposed transfer by Congress of its constitutional powers to the Executive, in a case which necessarily embraces the question of war or no war" was "entirely inconsistent with the letter and spirit of our Constitution," and Congress turned Jackson down.) When Texas rebelled against Mexico and sought U.S. recognition as an independent republic, Jackson referred the matter to Congress as a question "probably leading to war" and therefore a proper subject for "previous understanding with that body by whom war can alone be declared and by whom all the provisions for sustaining its perils must be furnished."

Still the executive retained the ability, if he so desired, to contrive a situation that left Congress little choice but to give him a declaration of war. James K. Polk demonstrated this in 1846 when, without congressional authorization, he sent American forces into disputed land where they were attacked by Mexican units who, not unreasonably, considered it Mexican territory. Polk quickly obtained a congressional declaration of war, but many members of Congress had the uneasy feeling that the President had put something over on them. Two years later, with the war still on, the House resolved by a narrow margin that it had been "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States." Perhaps so; but, unlike some later Presidents, Polk did have behind him not just a congressional or U.N. resolution, but a formal declaration of war by the Congress. In any case, this was the situation that provoked Congressman Lincoln of Illinois into his celebrated attack on presidential warmaking:

> Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever *he* shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion. . . . and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix *any limit* to his power in this respect. . . . If, today, he should choose to say he thinks it necessary to invade Canada, to prevent the British from invading us, how could you stop him? You may say to him, "I see no probability of the British invading us," but he will say to you, "Be silent; I see it, if you don't."

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IV

The prevailing view in the early republic, it has been suggested, was that congressional authorization was clearly required for the commitment of American forces overseas in circumstances that involved or invited hostilities against foreign states. But what if the hostilities contemplated were not against foreign governments but were in protection of American honor, law, lives or property against Indians, slave traders, pirates, smugglers, frontier ruffians or foreign disorder? Early Presidents evidently decided as a practical matter that forms of police action not directed against a sovereign nation did not rise to the dignity of formal congressional concern. These were mostly trivial episodes; and, when Senator Goldwater, with such fugitive engagements in mind, said, "We have only been in five declared wars out of over 150 that we fought," he was stretching the definition of war in a way that could comfort only those who rejoice in portraying the United States as incurably aggressive throughout its history.

Jackson in Florida was an early example; but the commitment of armed force without congressional authorization was by no means confined to North America or to the Western Hemisphere. American naval ships in these years took military action against pirates or refractory natives in places as remote as Sumatra (1832, 1838, 1839), the Fiji Islands (1840, 1855, 1858) and Africa (1820, 1843, 1845, 1850, 1854, 1858, 1859). As early as 1836, John Quincy Adams could write, "However startled we may be at the idea that the Executive Chief Magistrate has the power of involving the nation in war, even without consulting Congress, an experience of fifty years has proved that in numberless cases he has and must have exercised the power."

Adams, who in any case (at least till the Mexican War came along) regarded the power of declaring war as "an Executive act," mistakenly turned over by the Founding Fathers to the Congress, somewhat exaggerated. Still the spreading employment of force overseas by unilateral presidential decision, even if not yet against sovereign governments, was a threat to the congressional monopoly of the war power. In the meantime, the demonstration by Monroe of the unilateral presidential power to propound basic objectives in foreign policy, the demonstration by Polk of the unilateral presidential capacity to confront Congress with

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faits accomplis, the demonstration by Pierce of the unilateral presidential power to threaten sovereign states (as when he sent Commodore Perry and a naval squadron to open up Japan in 1854)—all these further diminished the congressional voice in the conduct of foreign affairs. Congress continued to fight back, particularly on the question of the war power. It took, for example, special pleasure in rejecting half-a-dozen requests for the authorization of force from the punctilious Buchanan, who believed that "without the authority of Congress the President cannot fire a hostile gun in any case except to repel the attacks of an enemy."

Perhaps it was Buchanan's strict constructionism that led to the drastic expansion of presidential initiative under his successor; for Lincoln may well have delayed the convocation of Congress till ten weeks after Fort Sumter lest rigid constitutionalists on the Hill try to stop him from doing what he deemed necessary to save the life of the nation. In this period of executive grace, he reinforced Sumter, assembled the militia, enlarged the army and navy beyond their authorized strength, called out volunteers for three years' service, disbursed unappropriated moneys, censored the mail, suspended habeas corpus and blockaded the Confederacy—measures which, as he said, "whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity; trusting then as now that Congress would readily ratify them." He added that it was with deepest regret he thus employed what he vaguely called "the war power;" however, "he could but perform this duty, or surrender the existence of the Government."

No President had ever undertaken such sweeping actions in the absence of congressional authorization. No President had ever confronted Congress with such a massive collection of faits accomplis. Benjamin R. Curtis, who had been one of the two dissenting justices in the Dred Scott case, wrote that Lincoln had established "a military despotism." But Congress gave retroactive consent to Lincoln's program, and two years later the Court in the Prize cases found constitutional substance (narrowly; the vote was 5–4) for his idea of "the war power" by attaching it to his authority as Commander in Chief and to his right to defend the nation against attack. Throughout the war Lincoln continued to exercise wide powers independently of Congress. The Emancipation Proclamation, for example, was a

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unilateral executive act, pronounced under the war power without reference to Congress. But Lincoln's assertion of the war power took place, it should not be forgotten, in the context of a domestic rebellion and under the color of a most desperate national emergency. There is no suggestion that Lincoln supposed he could use this power in foreign wars without congressional consent.

V

The presidential prerogative has not grown by steady accretion. Nearly every President who has extended the reach of the White House has provoked a reaction toward a more restricted theory of the presidency, even if the reaction never quite cuts presidential power back to its earlier level. When Lincoln expanded presidential initiative, Congress took out its frustrations by harassing him through the Committee on the Conduct of the War, impeaching his successor and eventually establishing a generation of congressional government. In this period of relative military quiescence (there were only 17 instances of American military action abroad in the 20 years after the Civil War as compared to 38 in the 20 years before the war), the locus of conflict shifted from the war power to the treaty power. The Senate's constitutional right to consent to treaties—even though it had long since lost to George Washington its claim for a voice in negotiations and to his successors its power to confirm the appointment of negotiators—turned out to be more solidly embedded in the structure of government than the constitutional right of the Congress to declare war.

In the years after the Civil War the Senate freely exercised its power to rewrite, amend and reject treaties negotiated by the President. Indeed, it ratified no important treaty between 1871 and 1898. Writing in 1885, Woodrow Wilson observed that the President was made to approach the Senate "as a servant conferring with a master. . . . It is almost as distinctly dealing with a foreign power as were the negotiations preceding the proposed treaty. It must predispose the Senate to the temper of an overseer." Wilson grimly noted that the treaty-making power had become "the treaty-*marring* power," and a dozen years later John Hay told Henry Adams that he did not believe "another important treaty would ever pass the Senate."

Secretaries of State regarded the assertion of senatorial pre-

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rogative as the mindless expression of institutional jealousy. As Secretary of State Richard Olney observed in one case, "The Treaty, in getting itself made by the sole act of the executive, without leave of the Senate first had and obtained, had committed the unpardonable sin. It must be either altogether defeated or so altered as to bear an unmistakable Senate stamp . . . and thus be the means both of humiliating the executive and of showing to the world the greatness of the Senate." Hay regarded the one-third veto as the "original," the "irreparable" mistake of the Constitution, now grown to "monstrous shape," and wrote, "The attitude of the Senate toward public affairs makes all serious negotiations impossible."

Ways had to be found to evade the veto. One was the use of the joint resolution, which required only a majority of the Congress as against two-thirds of the Senate; by such means Texas was annexed in 1845 and Hawaii in 1898. Another was the use of agreements entered into directly by the President with foreign states. The "executive agreement" had the legal force of a treaty; and, though largely confined in the nineteenth century to technical matters, it could be the vehicle of large purposes. It was, for example, the means by which Britain and the United States agreed in the Rush-Bagot accord of 1817 to disarm the Great Lakes and by which the United States in 1898–99 developed the policy of the Open Door in China.

Still, Congress remained in the saddle. As Henry Adams put it in a famous complaint:

> The Secretary of State exists only to recognize the existence of a world which Congress would rather ignore; of obligations which Congress repudiates whenever it can; of bargains which Congress distrusts and tries to turn to its advantage or to reject. Since the first day the Senate existed, it has always intrigued against the Secretary of State whenever the Secretary has been obliged to extend his functions beyond the appointment of Consuls in Senators' service.

But, just as executive domination had produced a shift in power over foreign policy toward Congress after the Civil War, so congressional domination was beginning to produce a shift back to the presidency. And, in clamoring for war with Spain, Congress became its own executioner. Writing in 1900, Wilson eloquently portrayed the impact of that war upon the lodgment and exercise of power within the federal system. When foreign affairs dominate the policy of a nation, he said, "its Executive

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must of necessity be its guide: must utter every initial judgment, take every first step of action, supply the information upon which it is to act, suggest and in large measure control its conduct. The President of the United States is now . . . at the front of affairs, as no president, except Lincoln, has been since the first quarter of the nineteenth century."

VI

Oddly Congress, in its salad years, had not asserted itself on the question of the war power, perhaps because it so generally agreed with the use the executive made on his own motion of American forces abroad. Victory over Spain now made the United States a world power; and in 1900 President McKinley set the tone for the new century by sending 5,000 American troops to China. The pretext was the protection of American lives and property; in fact, the Americans joined an international force, besieged Peking and helped put down the Boxer Rebellion. This was done without reference to Congress and without serious objection from it. The intervention in China, resulting among other things in the exaction of an indemnity from the Chinese government, marked the start of a crucial shift in the use of the armed forces overseas. Where, in the nineteenth century, military force committed without congressional authorization had been typically used in police actions against private groups, now it was beginning to be used against sovereign states. In the next years Theodore Roosevelt and Taft sent American forces into Caribbean countries and, in some cases, even installed provisional governments—all without prior congressional sanction.

In 1912, in an effort to meet the constitutional problem, J. Reuben Clark, the Solicitor of the State Department, offered a distinction between "interposition" and "intervention." Interposition meant simply the insertion of troops to protect lives and property; it implied neutrality toward the government or toward contesting forces within the country; and, since it was a normal exercise of international law, it did not, Clark argued, require congressional approval. Intervention, on the other hand, meant interference in sovereign affairs; it implied an act of war and required congressional authorization.

Whatever merit this distinction might have had in the nineteenth century when the United States was a small power, by the

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twentieth century a great power could hardly interpose anywhere without intervening in sovereign affairs. On the other hand, it could be argued that the superior force of the United States was now so great relative to the Caribbean states that intrusion, whether interposition or intervention, did not invite the risk of war and therefore did not require congressional consent. Still, whatever the nuances of arguments, limitations were evaporating. The executive was becoming habituated to the unconstrained deployment of American forces around the world, and Congress chose not to say him nay. Though Wilson received retroactive congressional approval for an incursion into Mexico in 1914 and the approval of the Senate for another in 1916, he did not seek congressional authorization when he sent troops to Siberia after the First World War. Congressional resolutions of protest perished in committee.

The revival of presidential initiative under Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson provoked the predictable reaction. The Senate, reasserting its prerogative, rejected the Versailles Treaty (though when the elder Henry Cabot Lodge claimed in his second reservation that Congress had the "sole power" to "authorize the employment of the military or naval forces," his fellow isolationist William E. Borah called it "a recital which is not true"). By the thirties the Congress, regarding the First World War as the malign consequence of presidential discretion in foreign affairs, imposed a rigid neutrality program on the executive and remained generally indifferent when Germany and Japan set out on courses of aggression. The reassertion of the presidential prerogative in the years since must be understood in part as a criticism of what happened when Congress tried to seize the reins of foreign policy in the years 1919–1939.

The outbreak of war in 1939 found the President restrained both by the neutrality laws and by the balance of power in Congress from doing what he deemed necessary to save the life of the nation. Roosevelt responded, as Lincoln had 80 years before, by pressing to the utmost limits of presidential power. But, though doubtless encouraged by Justice Sutherland and the Curtiss-Wright decision, he did this without grandiose claims of executive authority. When he exchanged American destroyers for British bases in an executive agreement of 1940—Senators Fulbright and Church have both said that Roosevelt "usurped the treaty power of the Senate"—he did not found his action on

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novel authority claimed as Commander in Chief nor on inherent powers of the presidency but on the construction of laws passed by Congress in 1917 and 1935. Nor did the transaction involve promises of future performance, and Roosevelt's circle of prior consultation included even the Republican candidate for President.

When in 1941 he sent American troops to Greenland and later to Iceland, this was done in agreement with the Danish government in the first case and the government of Iceland in the second; moreover, the defense of Greenland and, less plausibly, Iceland, could be considered as part of hemisphere security. Senator Robert A. Taft declared that Roosevelt had "no legal or constitutional right to send American troops to Iceland" without authority from Congress. Few of his colleagues echoed this protest. The Selective Service Act of 1940 had contained a provision that draftees could not be used outside the Western Hemisphere (except in American possessions); but the younger Lodge, who sponsored this provision, evidently doubted its force and called it "a pious hope."

In instituting a convoy system and issuing the "shoot-at-sight" order to the navy in the North Atlantic, Roosevelt was bringing the nation without congressional authorization into undeclared naval war with Germany. Senator Fulbright has latterly charged that he "circumvented the war powers of the Congress." But the poignant character of Roosevelt's dilemma was made clear when in August 1941 the House of Representatives renewed the Selective Service Act by a single vote. If Congress came that close to disbanding the army at home, how could Roosevelt have reasonably expected congressional support for his forward policy in the North Atlantic? His choice was to go to Congress and risk the fall of Britain to Hitler or to proceed on his own with measures which, "whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity; trusting then as now that Congress would readily ratify them."

Roosevelt did not, like later Presidents, seek to strip Congress of powers in the name of the inherent authority of the Commander in Chief. The most extraordinary prewar decision—Lend-Lease—was authorized by Congress following intensive and exacting debate. After America entered the war, Roosevelt asked Congress for authority to send military missions to friendly

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nations. Both Roosevelt and Hull, remembering the fate of Wilson, made elaborate efforts to bring members of Congress from both parties into the discussion of postwar policy through the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy and through congressional representation at Bretton Woods, San Francisco and in the delegations to the United Nations. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 took express care to protect the war powers of Congress.

VII

The towering figure of Franklin Roosevelt, the generally accepted wisdom of his measures of 1940–1941, his undisputed powers as Commander in Chief after Pearl Harbor, the thundering international agreements pronounced at wartime summits of the Big Two or the Big Three—all these factors, combined with the memory of the deplorable congressional performance in foreign affairs during the years between the wars, gave Americans in the postwar years an exalted conception of presidential power. Moreover, Roosevelt's successor, a man much read in American history and of doughty temperament, regarded his office, in the words of his last Secretary of State, as "a sacred and temporary trust, which he was determined to pass on unimpaired by the slightest loss of power or prestige." Dean Acheson himself, though an eminent lawyer, was impatient with what he saw as constitutional hair-splitting and encouraged the President in his stout defense of high prerogative. Nor were they alone. As early as 1945 Senator Vandenberg was asserting that "the President must not be limited in the use of force" in the execution of treaties; and, when Vandenberg asked the retired Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes, whether the President could commit troops without congressional approval, Hughes replied, "Our Presidents have used our armed forces repeatedly without authorization by Congress, when they thought the interests of the country required it." It must be added that American historians and political scientists, this writer among them, labored to give the expansive theory of the presidency due historical sanction.

Above all, the uncertainty and danger of the early cold war, with the chronic threat of unanticipated emergency always held to require immediate response, with, above all, the overhanging possibility of nuclear catastrophe, seemed to argue all the more

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strongly for the centralization of the control over foreign policy, including the use of armed forces, in the presidency. And the availability of great standing armies and navies notably enlarged presidential power; before the Second World War, Presidents (Lincoln excepted) could call on only such limited force as was already in existence. Where Truman required congressional consent either because of the need for appropriations (the Marshall Plan) or for treaty ratification (NATO), he rallied that support effectively. But he decided not to seek formal congressional approval for the commitment of American forces to hostilities in Korea (though he consulted congressional leaders informally before American troops went into action) lest he diminish the presidential prerogative. This was followed by his decision, also proposed without reference to Congress, to send four divisions to reinforce the American Army in Europe. These initiatives greatly alarmed conservative members of Congress. On January 3, 1951, Congressman Frederic Coudert of New York introduced a resolution declaring it the sense of the Congress that no "additional military forces" could be sent abroad "without the prior authorization of the Congress in each instance." Two days later, in a full-dress speech before the Senate, Taft returned to the argument he had made against Roosevelt ten years earlier. "The President," he said,

> simply usurped authority, in violation of the laws and the Constitution, when he sent troops to Korea to carry out the resolution of the United Nations in an undeclared war. . . . I do not believe the President has the power without congressional approval to send troops to one country to defend it against a possible or probable attack by another country.

Tom Connally, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, responded with a stirring assertion of high prerogative. "The authority of the President as Commander in Chief to send the Armed Forces to any place required by the security interests of the United States," he said, "has often been questioned, but never denied by authoritative opinion." Secretary of State Acheson went even further:

> Not only has the President the authority to use the Armed Forces in carrying out the broad foreign policy of the United States and implementing treaties, but it is equally clear that this authority may not be interfered with by the Congress in the exercise of powers which it has under the Constitution.

Acheson added irritably: "We are in a position in the world

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today where the argument as to who has the power to do this, that, or the other thing, is not exactly what is called for from America in this very critical hour."

The debate also divided scholars. Henry Steele Commager wrote, "Whatever may be said of the expediency of the Taft-Coudert program, this at least can be said of the principles involved—that they have no support in law or in history." The present writer, with a flourish of historical documentation and, alas, hyperbole, called Taft's statements "demonstrably irresponsible." In reply Professor Corwin, who had studied the constitutional position of the presidency for many years with sardonic concern, pronounced Commager and Schlesinger (with some justice) "high-flying prerogative men" who ascribed to the President "a truly royal prerogative in the field of foreign relations . . . without indicating any correlative legal or constitutional control to which he is answerable."

The Great Debate of 1951 ended inconclusively in the passage of a "sense-of-the-Senate" resolution in which the Senate approved the sending of Truman's four divisions but asserted that no additional ground troops should be sent to Western Europe "without further congressional approval." The administration opposed this ceiling; Senator Nixon of California was among those who voted for it. Where Acheson noted that the resolution was "without force of law" and "had in it a present for everybody," Taft applauded it as "a clear statement by the Senate that it has the right to pass on any question of sending troops to Europe to implement the Atlantic Pact." Both were right; and since no subsequent President has tried to increase the American Army in Europe, the resolution has never been tested.

In areas more clearly dependent on the appropriations power, notably in foreign aid, Congress neither then nor later hesitated to tie up executive programs with all manner of hortatory prescriptions, rigid stipulations and detailed specifications, often against executive desire. In 1948 it forced an additional $400 million in aid to China; in 1950, over strong executive objection, it imposed a mandatory loan to Spain. Nor did it hesitate in 1951–52 to go beyond the administration in using economic aid to encourage not only economic coöperation but political integration in Western Europe. This congressional effort to shape foreign policy through appropriations did not relent in subsequent years; and the greater dependence of foreign policy on

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appropriations has meant that, in this sector at least, the presidency has lost power to Congress. When Monroe issued the Monroe Doctrine, he did not seek congressional assent, but when Kennedy called for the Alliance for Progress, he was at the mercy of Congress every step along the way.

The postwar argument between the Congress and the presidency spilled over to the treaty power as well. Members of Congress feared that the executive agreement, which had started out (with notable exceptions like Rush-Bagot) as a vehicle on minor matters, was now threatening to supersede the treaty as the means of major commitment. In December 1950, when Prime Minister Attlee came to Washington, a resolution sponsored by, among others, Senator Nixon, declared it the sense of the Senate that the President not only report in full to the Senate on his discussions but refrain from entering into any understandings or agreements. The Secretary of State dismissed this (as President Nixon would today) as "plainly . . . an infringement of the constitutional prerogative of the President to conduct negotiations." Still the resolution received 30 votes. Concern over the abuses of the executive agreement, already set off by hysteria among conservatives about the Yalta records, soon flowed into the movement for the Bricker Amendment.

This Amendment went through a succession of orchestrations; but the pervading theme was that treaties and executive agreements should become effective as internal law only through legislation valid in the absence of a treaty. This would mean not only that a treaty could not authorize what the Constitution forbids but that action by the House of Representatives and, in some cases, by state legislatures might be necessary to give it full effect. One version specifically empowered Congress "to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization." When moderate conservatives joined with liberals to resist the Amendment, Senator Knowland plucked out the section on executive agreements and offered a bill requiring that all such agreements be transmitted to the Senate within 60 days of their execution. Though the Senate passed this bill in July 1956, the House failed to act. In 1972, when Senator Case of New Jersey, a liberal Republican, revived the Knowland idea, the Senate, with liberals in the lead, passed it almost unanimously, and a liberal Democrat, Senator Pell of Rhode Island, recently remarked that the Bricker

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Amendment, "if put up today, I think, would be voted overwhelmingly by all of us."

VIII

The congressional protest soon subsided, in part because the election of a Republican President in 1952 seemed to promise a period of executive restraint and congressional influence and in part because Congress, no less than the executive, accepted the presuppositions of the cold war. Moreover, as so often, the acquisition of power altered perspectives. Secretary of State Dulles opposed the Bricker Amendment as strongly as any Democrat; and, while the Eisenhower administration was active in seeking joint resolutions at times of supposed vital decision in foreign affairs, it did so not because it thought Congress had any authority in the premises but because the resolution process, by involving Congress in the takeoff, would incriminate it in a crash-landing (this valuable aerial metaphor had been invented by Harold Stassen in 1946). The resolution process now became a curious ceremony of propitiation in which Presidents yielded no claims and Congress asserted few but which provided an amiable illusion of partnership; it was in domestic terms what someone had said of the Briand-Kellogg Pact—"an international kiss."

Sometimes even members of Congress considered such resolutions superfluous. When President Eisenhower, recalling Truman's omission in 1950, asked in 1955 for a resolution to cover possible American military activity around Formosa, Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House and presumably an incarnation of the congressional prerogative, said, "If the President had done what is proposed here without consulting the Congress, he would have had no criticism from me." The Formosa Resolution at least contained language by which the President was "authorized to employ the Armed Forces," however lightly the executive regarded that language, but Congress loosened even that pretense of control by adding that he could use these forces "as he deems necessary" in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. When Eisenhower sought a Middle East Resolution in 1957, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this time deleted the idea of congressional authorization. Senator Fulbright even expressed the fear that any resolution might limit the President's power as Commander in Chief to defend the "vital interests" of the nation. And when Eisenhower, in what in retrospect seems

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a mysterious and, indeed, hazardous mission, sent 14,000 troops to Lebanon the next year, he cited as authority for this action, not at all his own resolution but the now capacious presidential prerogative.

On the other hand, Eisenhower had acknowledged the practical importance of congressional support when in 1954 he yielded to congressional (as well as British) opposition and declined to commit American force to the relief of Dien Bien Phu. At the same time, however, he reduced the significance of the troop-commitment issue by confiding an increasing share of American foreign operations to an agency presumed beyond the reach of Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency. In the Eisenhower years the CIA became the primary instrument of American intervention overseas, helping to overthrow governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), failing to do so in Indonesia (1958), helping to install governments in Egypt (1954) and Laos (1959), organizing an expedition of Cuban refugees against the Castro régime (1960). Congress had no oversight over the CIA. It even lacked regular means of finding out what it was up to. There was a joint congressional committee on atomic energy but none (none to this day) on secret intelligence operations.

The cold war created both a critical environment and an uncritical consensus; and these enabled even a relatively passive President, a "Whig" like Eisenhower, to enlarge the unilateral authority of the executive. Nor did either the President or the Congress see this as a question of usurpation. During the fifties and much of the sixties most of Congress, mesmerized by the supposed need for instant response to constant crisis, overawed by what the Senate Foreign Relations Committee later called "the cult of executive expertise," accepted the "high-flying" theories of the presidential prerogative. In early 1960 Senator John F. Kennedy observed that, however large the congressional role in the formulation of domestic programs, "it is the President alone who must make the major decisions of our foreign policy." As late as 1961, Senator Fulbright contended that "for the existing requirements of American foreign policy we have hobbled the President by too niggardly a grant of power." While he found it "distasteful and dangerous to vest the executive with powers unchecked and unbalanced," the question, he concluded, was "whether we have any choice but to do so." Republicans were no less devoted to the thesis of executive supremacy. "It is a rather

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interesting thing," Senator Dirksen, then Republican leader, told the Senate in 1967, "—I have run down many legal cases before the Supreme Court—that I have found as yet no delimitation on the power of the Commander in Chief under the Constitution." "I am convinced," said Senator Goldwater, "there is no question that the President can take military action at any time he feels danger for the country or, stretching a point, for its position in the world."

In this state of political and intellectual intimidation, Congress forgot even the claim for consultation and was grateful when the executive bothered to say what it planned to do. ("The distinction between solicitation of advice in advance of a decision and the provision of information in the wake of a decision would seem to be a significant one," the Senate Foreign Relations Committee finally commented in 1969. Pointing out that in the cases of the Cuban missile crisis and the Dominican intervention congressional leaders were informed what was to be done only a few hours before the decisions were carried out, the Committee added dryly, "Such acts of courtesy are always to be welcomed; the Constitution, however, envisages something more.") In this mood, too, Congress acquiesced in national commitment through executive agreement—as, for example, in the case of Spain where the original bases agreement of 1953 was steadily escalated by official pronouncement through the years until the Foreign Relations Committee could conclude in 1969 that the sum of executive declarations was a virtual commitment on the part of the United States to come to the aid of Spain. Senator Fulbright recently remarked a little bitterly, "We get many treaties dealing with postal affairs and so on. Recently, we had an extraordinary treaty dealing with the protection of stolen art objects. These are treaties. But when we put troops and take on commitments in Spain, it is an executive agreement."

The case of Thailand is equally astonishing. In 1962 Secretary of State Rusk and the Thai Foreign Minister expressed in a joint declaration "the firm intention of the United States to aid Thailand . . . in resisting Communist aggression and subversion." While this statement may have been no more than a specification of SEATO obligations, the executive branch thereafter secretly built and used bases and consolidated the Thai commitment in ways that would still be unknown to Congress and the electorate had it not been for the indomitable curiosity of Senator Syming-

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ton and his Subcommittee on Security Arrangements and Commitments Abroad. The Subcommittee also uncovered interesting transactions involving the executive branch with Ethiopia (1960), Laos (1963) and South Korea (1966). The case of Israel is even more singular. Here a succession of executive declarations through five administrations have produced a virtual commitment without the pretense of a treaty or even an executive agreement.

In this mood also Congress accepted the Americanization of the Vietnam War in 1965. "If this decision was not for Congress under the Constitution," Professor Bickel has well said, "then no decision of any consequence in matters of war and peace is left to Congress." As for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, though President Johnson liked to flourish it as proof that Congress had indeed made a decision, he himself really did not think, as he later put it, that "the resolution was necessary to do what we did and what we're doing." As he unfolded his view of presidential power in 1966: "There are many, many, who can recommend, advise and sometimes a few of them consent. But there is only one that has been chosen by the American people to decide."

Listing 24 statutes facilitating the fighting in Vietnam, Senator Goldwater said in 1971, "Congress is and has been involved up to its ears with the war in Southeast Asia." The argument that Congress thereby "authorized" the war, especially by voting appropriations, has a certain practical strength up to the point (as Judge Frank Coffin put it in a 1971 decision of the First Circuit Court) where Congress asserts a conflicting claim of authority, which it has not done. But, also as a practical matter, it is rare indeed for parliaments to deny supplies to fighting men, and too much cannot be inferred from the refusal to punish the troops for the sins of those who sent them into the line. It is true that members of the British Parliament voted against supply bills during the American Revolution, but this was before the Reform Acts had created constituencies broad enough to include large numbers of relatives of men in combat. At the height of his opposition to the Mexican War, Congressman Lincoln said, "I have always intended, and still intend, to vote supplies." Still, though Congress has placed restrictions on troop deployment, it had not by the middle of 1972 interposed a decisive obstacle to presidential escalation of the war.

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IX

If President Johnson construed the high prerogative more in the eighteenth-century style of the British King than of the executive envisaged by the Constitution, his successor carried the inflation of presidential authority even further. In asserting that his power as the Commander in Chief authorized him to use American ground troops to invade Cambodia, and to do so without reference to or even the knowledge of Congress, President Nixon indulged in presidential warmaking beyond a point that even his boldest predecessors could have dreamed of. Those who had stretched the executive war power in the past had done so in the face of visible and dire threat to national survival: Lincoln confronted by rebellion, Roosevelt by the Third Reich. Each, moreover, had done what he felt he had to do without claiming constitutional sanction for every item of presidential action.

But, in justifying the commitment of American troops to war in a remote and neutral country, Nixon cited no emergency that denied time for congressional action, expressed no doubt about the total legality of his own initiative and showed no desire even for retroactive congressional ratification. All he was doing, he told the Senate Republican leader in June 1970, was fulfilling "the Constitutional duty of the Commander-in-Chief to take actions necessary to protect the lives of United States forces." This was no more, he implied, than the routine employment of presidential power; it required no special congressional assent, not even the fig-leaf, shortly repealed and abandoned, of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. William Rehnquist of the Department of Justice, himself soon escalated by the President to the Supreme Court, called it "a valid exercise of his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to secure the safety of American forces"—a proposition that might not have deeply moved the Nixon administration had it been advanced by the Presidium to explain why the Red Army was justified in invading a neutral country to secure the safety of Russian forces. "The President's authority to do what he did, in my view," Rehnquist concluded, "must be conceded by even those who read Executive authority narrowly." It was, in fact, challenged by even those who read executive authority broadly.

The government thus committed armed forces to hostilities first in Cambodia, then in Laos and North Vietnam (for the air force remains a part of the armed forces) on the basis of a theory

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of defensive war so elastic that a President could freely and on his own initiative order armed intervention in any country housing any troops that might in any conceivable circumstance be used in an attack on American troops. If this seemed an extraordinary invasion of the congressional war power, there seemed a comparable invasion of the appropriations power when Henry Kissinger informed Hanoi in secret negotiation that the United States "could give and undertake, a voluntary contribution by the President, that there would be a massive reconstruction program for all of Indochina, in which North Vietnam could share to the extent of several billion dollars."

Congress appeared increasingly impotent in the face of the size and momentum of the postwar institutions of American foreign policy—an institutional array spearheaded by an aggressive presidency and supported by a military and intelligence establishment virtually beyond congressional reach. Indeed, large sections of the electorate were coming to feel that foreign policy had escaped from democratic control and that the institutions would have their way however the voters might vote.

Excess, as usual, invites reaction; and the Senate, with due timidity, reacted. What Versailles had done to the congressional prerogative, Vietnam now did to the presidential prerogative. But Congress did not react by frontal attack on the means by which the President continued the war, though various members of Congress urged this course on their colleagues. The Senate reacted rather by passing in June 1969 by 70–16 the National Commitments Resolution, described by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as "an invitation to the executive to reconsider its excesses, and to the legislature to reconsider its omissions in the making of foreign policy." Neither invitation was accepted.

The Senate also reacted in April 1972 by passing a War Powers bill, from the workings of which Vietnam was specifically exempted. This bill, conceived and bravely promoted by Senator Javits, has, from some views, substantial defects. Had it been on the statute books in past years, it would surely have prevented Roosevelt from responding to Hitler in the North Atlantic in 1941 and would surely not have prevented Johnson from escalating the war in Vietnam (for Johnson would have received—indeed, did receive—overwhelming congressional support for escalation at every point till the middle of 1968). If passed by the Congress, the bill might be more likely to become

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a means of inducing formal congressional approval of warlike presidential acts than of preventing such acts. Moreover, the principle on which the bill is based—that the President must carry out the policy directives of Congress in the initiation and prosecution of military hostilities—might itself have bellicose consequences the next time War Hawks dominate the legislative branch. Still the Senate's passage of the bill—especially by the impressive margin of 68–16—might have been expected to have some cautionary influence in reminding the President that Congress in its pathetic way thought it had some voice in the determination of peace and war. It had no such effect. A fortnight after its passage, President Nixon, again without reference to Congress, threw the American Air Force into devastating attacks on North Vietnam.

If there is an imbalance of powers, if Congress has lost authority clearly conferred on it by the Constitution, it can only be said that Congress has done little to correct the situation. Its complaints have been eloquent; its practical action has been slight. Its problem has been less lack of power than lack of will to use the powers it has—the power of appropriation, the power to regulate the size of the armed forces, the power through joint resolutions to shape foreign policy, the power to inform, investigate and censure. As late as the summer of 1972, the Senate, in declining Senator Cooper's amendment to the aid bill, which proposed to cut off funds for American troops and bombing in four months, relinquished, in the words of *The Washington Post,* "the only opportunity it has ever dared afford itself to make an independent and conclusive judgment on the war."

In the present as in the past, Congress has preferred to renounce responsibility—which is why the presidency has retained power. "We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress," said Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure case, "but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers." The situation today, for all the wails of congressional self-pity, is much the one that Lincoln feared in 1848: "Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation [or, today, a nation on the other side of the world], whenever *he* shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion .... and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix *any limit* to his power in this respect."

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X

The Abraham Lincoln who had thus challenged the presidential prerogative of Polk was the same Abraham Lincoln who a dozen years later gave the presidency greater powers over war and peace than ever before, as the Andrew Jackson who showed such deference to Congress in the eighteen-thirties was the same Andrew Jackson who a dozen years earlier had charged without congressional authority into Spanish Florida. This is a critical point in understanding the nature of the issue. For nothing has been more characteristic of the perennial debate than the way in which the same people, in different circumstances and at different points in their lives, have argued both sides of the issue.

Richard M. Nixon had one set of views in 1951 on the question of whether Congress could control troop commitments and executive agreements. By 1971 he had an opposite set of views. Senator Fulbright, moving in the reverse direction, has long since repented his belief that the President needs more control over foreign policy. Professor Corwin's "high-flying prerogative men" of 20 years ago have zoomed downward on this question in recent times. Professor Commager has, in effect, accepted the Taft-Coudert case in his testimony in favor of the War Powers bill; and this writer, while remaining skeptical about the War Powers bill, would freely concede that Senator Taft had a much more substantial point than he supposed 20 years ago. But to make that point Senator Taft had to explain away the views of *his* father, the Chief Justice, who had written in 1916 that the President as Commander in Chief "can order the Army and Navy anywhere he will, if the appropriations furnish the means of transportation." And, while the younger Senator Taft has followed his father rather than his grandfather, such heirs of Taft as Goldwater and Rehnquist are today very high-flying prerogative men. For that matter Professor Corwin's own record was not all that immaculate. While he defended the congressional prerogative in 1951, in 1940 he had raised the question "whether the President may, without authorization by Congress, take measures which are technically acts of war in protection of American rights and interests abroad," and replied: "The answer returned both by practice and by judicial doctrine is yes." Even as late as 1949, Corwin described the power "to employ without congressional authorization the armed forces in protection of American rights and interests abroad wherever necessary" as "almost

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unchallenged from the first and occasionally sanctified judicially."

There are several reasons for this chronicle of vacillation. For one thing, the issues involved are ones of genuine intellectual difficulty, about which reasonable men may well find themselves changing their minds. For another, power usually looks more responsible from inside than from outside. For another, general questions often assume different shapes in different lights. It is agreeable to claim constitutionality for policies one supports and agreeable too to stigmatize policies one opposes as unconstitutional. All these reasons tend toward a single conclusion: that the problem we face is not primarily constitutional. It is primarily political. History offers the lawyer or scholar almost any precedent he needs to sustain what he may consider, in a concrete setting, to be wise policy. There is simply no absolute solution to the constitutional issue. This is no doubt why the Supreme Court has been so skittish about pronouncing on the problem. In our long and voluble judicial history, the decisions bearing even marginally on the question can be numbered on the fingers of one hand, and the illumination they provide is, at best, flickering if not dim.

If this is so, we must restrain our national propensity to cast political questions in constitutional terms. Just as in other years we went too far in devising theories of spacious presidential power because we agreed with the way one set of Presidents wanted to use this power, now we are likely to go too far in limiting presidential power because we disagree with the projects of another set of Presidents. We must take care not to convert a passing historical phase into ultimate constitutional truth. Professor Bickel has even suggested that "Congress should prescribe the mission of our troops in the field, in accordance with a foreign and war policy of the United States which it is for Congress to set when it chooses to do so. And Congress should equally review and settle upon an appropriate foreign policy elsewhere than in Vietnam, and reorder the deployment of our forces accordingly." There is no great gain in replacing high-flying presidential men by high-flying congressional men, nor is James Buchanan necessarily the model President.

As the guerrilla war between the presidency and the Congress for control over foreign policy has dragged along through our history, the issue is sometimes put as if one or the other were the

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safer depository of authority. Congressional judgment, Adolf Berle once argued, "tends to lag behind the facts in an international case to which the President must address himself . . . Defense means seeing trouble in advance and moving to prevent it. The President's estimates of what will happen have usually been better than those of men who do not live with the problems." Senator Goldwater opposed the War Powers bill because, as he said, "I would put more faith in the judgment of the Office of President in the matter of warmaking at this time than I would of Congress." But Senator Fulbright, who in 1961 feared the "localism and parochialism" of Congress, now believes "the collective judgment of the Congress, with all its faults, could be superior to that of one man who makes the final decision, in the executive."

History does not support any general assignment of superior virtue to either branch. In spite of Madison, the Congress is not always a force for restraint (as he himself discovered in 1812) nor the executive always a force for bellicosity. One need go back no further than the Cuban missile crisis to recall, as Robert Kennedy has told us, that the congressional leaders, including Senators Russell and Fulbright, "felt that the President should take more forceful action, a military attack or invasion, and that the blockade was far too weak a response." Those of us who hate the Indochina War may see more hope today in the Congress than in the presidency; just as those who grew up in the days when Congress rejected Versailles and promulgated the neutrality acts saw more hope in the executive. But it would be folly to regard either presidential or congressional wisdom as a permanent condition. Neither branch is infallible, and each needs the other—which is, I guess, the point the Founding Fathers were trying to make.

There is no worse fallacy than to build final answers on transient situations. The questions of the war power and the treaty power are, and must remain, political questions. This is not a zone of clear-cut constitutional prescription. It is rather what Justice Jackson in his brilliant opinion in the Steel Seizure case described as

> a zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential re-

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sponsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.

While the Constitution sets outer limits on both presidential and congressional action, it leaves a wide area of "joint possession." Common sense therefore argues for congressional participation as well as for presidential responsibility in the great decisions of peace and war.

To restore the constitutional balance, it is necessary in this period to rebuke presidential pretensions, as it has been necessary in other periods to rebuke congressional pretensions. Perhaps Tocqueville was not so profound after all (for once) in his theory of the antagonism between democracy and foreign policy. Perhaps Bryce (for once) was more to the point when he argued that the broad masses are capable of assessing national interests and of sustaining consistent policies. So far as judging the ends of policy is concerned, Bryce said, "History shows that [the people] do this at least as wisely as monarchs or oligarchies, or the small groups to whom, in democratic countries, the conduct of foreign relations has been left, and that they have evinced more respect for moral principles."

We are still told about the supposed structural advantages of the executive as portrayed in the Federalist—unity, secrecy, superior sources of information, decision, dispatch. These advantages seem less impressive today than they must have been 180 years ago. Our sprawling executive branch is often disunited and is chronically incapable of secrecy. Its information is no longer manifestly superior and is often manifestly defective. The need for decision and dispatch has been greatly exaggerated; apart from Korea and the Cuban missile crisis, no postwar emergency has demanded instant response. Moreover, there was far more reason for unilateral executive action in times when difficulties of transport and communication could delay the convening of Congress for weeks than there is in our age of the telephone and the jet aircraft. What remains to the President is his command of the institutions of war and his undeniable ability to create situations which will make it hard for Congress to reject his request. Here it might be well to recall the warning of the Federalist: "How easy would it be to fabricate pretences of approaching danger."

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But in demythologizing the presidency we must take care not to remythologize the Congress. If it is extreme to say that the President can send troops anywhere he pleases without congressional authorization, it is equally extreme to say he cannot do so short of war without congressional authorization (even Senator Taft proposed no limitations on presidential deployment of the navy and air force). In this area, John Norton Moore and Quincy Wright have proposed a test worth careful consideration: that the President must obtain prior congressional authorization in all cases where regular combat units are committed to what may be sustained hostilities or where military intervention will require congressional action, as by appropriations, before it is completed. This would leave the President with independent authority to deploy forces short of war (and, of course, to repel attack), while it would assure congressional authority to limit or prohibit presidential commitment when war impends. But this provision, however attractive, would not have stopped escalation in Vietnam where President Johnson would have had no difficulty in getting the necessary authorization. The War Powers bill, though excessively rigid in its definition of situations where the President is authorized to act and unconvincing in its reliance on a 30-day deadline, contains valuable provisions for presidential reporting to the Congress once hostilities begin. Congressman Jonathan Bingham has proposed a simpler approach, which would avoid the rigidities of the War Powers bill but retain its affirmation of congressional control of undeclared hostilities. Citing the Executive Reorganization Act as a precedent, he would give either house of Congress power to terminate such hostilities by resolution. Some declaration of congressional power in this area would serve as a useful check on Presidents.

As for the treaty power, Senator Case's efforts to bring executive agreements within congressional purview and to induce the executive to submit major agreements in the form of treaties are long overdue. But the notion that executive agreements must be rigorously confined to minor matters and that all important international undertakings must be subject to senatorial veto would bring us back to the frustrations of Olney and Hay. Does anyone seriously suggest that every time a President meets another chief of state their understandings can be extinguished by one-third of the Senate? Would even high-flying congressional men contend that the Monroe Doctrine, the Emancipation Proclamation, the

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Fourteen Points and the Atlantic Charter were cases of presidential usurpation? And in the period ahead, with the bipolar simplicities of the cold war giving way to the shifting complexities of a multipolar world, the executive simply cannot operate just on the leading strings of Congress. There has to be a middle ground between making the American President a czar and making him a puppet.

Senator Fulbright once distinguished between two kinds of power involved in the shaping of foreign policy—that pertaining to its direction, purpose and philosophy; and that pertaining to the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs. The former, he suggested, belonged peculiarly to Congress, the latter to the executive. The trouble was that Congress was reversing the order of responsibility. "We have tended to snoop and pry in matters of detail, interfering in the handling of specific problems in specific places which we happen to chance upon. . . . At the same time we have resigned from our responsibility in the shaping of policy and the defining of its purposes, giving away things that are not ours to give: the war power of the Congress, the treaty power of the Senate and the broader advice and consent power." Perhaps it would be well to recall the hope expressed by Senator Vandenberg in 1948 that the habit of senatorial intervention in foreign affairs would not become "too contagious because . . . only in those instances in which the Senate can be sure of a complete command of all the essential information prerequisite to an intelligent decision should it take the terrific chance of muddying the international waters by some sort of premature and ill-advised expression of its advice to the Executive."

XI

Vandenberg was everlastingly right in his emphasis on information; for a flow of information to Congress is indispensable to a wise use of both the war and the treaty powers. And in no regard has Congress, until very recently, been more negligent than in acquiescing in executive denial of information. As Woodrow Wilson said long ago,

> Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct.

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In Wilson's judgment, "The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function." The executive has devised no more effective obstacle to the democratic control of foreign policy than the secrecy system which has grown to such appalling proportions since the Second World War.

It is time for Congress to reject the "if-you-only-knew-what-we-knew" pose by which the executive deepens the congressional inferiority complex. Members of Congress, at least those who read *The New York Times,* know more than they think and, in general, would not receive blinding illumination if they read Top Secret documents too. While the executive, through its diplomatic, military and intelligence operatives, has an abundance of short-run information not easily available to Congress, experience shows that this information is seldom essential to long-run judgments. Nor is executive information all that infallible; one has only to recall the theory prevailing in the executive bureaucracy a few years back that Hanoi and the Vietcong were the spearhead of a system of Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. If the executive "had been subjected more quickly and more closely to the scrutiny of informed public and congressional opinion," Senator McGovern has said. ". . . it may not have fallen prey to its own delusions and fantasies."

And, as former government officials readily concede, there is no reason in most cases why Congress should be denied classified information. Thus George Ball: "I think there is very little information that Congress should ever be denied;" McGeorge Bundy: "I do not believe most of what is highly classified . . . should be kept from responsible members of the Congress at all. Indeed I believe the opposite." Nor should members of Congress be denied the opportunity to interrogate public officials presently shielded from them by the promiscuous invocation of executive privilege. Ball, calling executive privilege "a myth, for I find no constitutional basis for it," contends it should be invoked only when the President makes the decision himself and communicates that decision to Congress. George Reedy would even take the position "that the President has no executive privilege whatever in any public question." This is going a little far. The executive branch must retain the capacity to protect its internal processes of decision, and the President must on occasion assert a power to resist the disclosure of information against what he seriously believes to be the public interest. But Senator Ful-

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bright's bill to restrain the flagrant abuse of executive privilege surely deserves enactment.

If Congress really wants to reclaim lost authority, it can do little more effective than to assure itself a steady and disinterested flow of information about foreign affairs. More than ever, information is the key to power. That is why the MacArthur hearings were so valuable in 1951; why the hearings conducted in recent years by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under Senator Fulbright's leadership have done more to turn opinion against the Vietnam War than other more tangible weapons in the congressional arsenal. Perhaps the flow of information could be usefully institutionalized—as in Benjamin V. Cohen's proposal for the establishment by Congress of a commission of eight: two from the House, two from the Senate, four from the executive branch, empowered to exchange information and views on critical questions of foreign affairs.

XII

Structural change can effect only limited improvements. The greater hope perhaps lies in increasing sensitivity to the problem of "joint possession" of constitutional powers. Greater awareness of the problem, to which so many for so long were oblivious, has recently led serious men into serious consideration of the issues of constitutional balance. In the future such awareness may both restrain conscientious Presidents and reinvigorate responsible Congresses.

Nor can structural change save us from the exasperations of choice. We must recognize both that our government must operate within constitutional bounds and that, within this spacious area, questions involved in the control of foreign policy are political rather than constitutional. If we do this, we will perhaps stop turning passing necessities, or supposed necessities, into constitutional absolutes. For a self-styled strict constructionist, President Nixon has gone very far indeed in anointing manifest excesses with the lotion of constitutional sanctity.

In this regard he compares unfavorably with such Presidents as Jefferson, Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. Faced with infinitely more genuine emergencies, they had considerably more excuse for expansion of the presidential prerogative. But they did not claim that they were doing nothing more than applying routine presidential authority. Lincoln, particularly, in his trou-

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bled justification for the suspension of habeas corpus, said, "Would not the official oath be broken if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?" Jefferson put the case more generally:

> To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means. . . . The line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives.

A conscientious President must distinguish between the exception and the rule. Emergency may compel him to abandon the rule in favor of the exception; but he must not pretend—as Jefferson, Lincoln and Roosevelt declined to pretend and as Johnson and Nixon have pretended—that the exception *is* the rule. Rather, like Lincoln in 1860, the executive may at his own peril undertake measures about whose strict legality he may be in doubt, and do so, not under an illusion of constitutional righteousness, but in terms of a popular demand and a public necessity. In the end, he must rest such acts on the assent of Congress, the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives. Only Presidents who distinguish emergency from normality can both meet emergency and preserve the constitutional order. As Justice Jackson said in the Korematsu case: "The chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history."

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WHERE EGYPT STANDS

By Anwar el-Sadat

THROUGH a history of alternating victory and defeat, attainment and frustration, achievement and disappointment, Egypt formed an attitude and determination. This we must understand in order to comprehend Egypt today.

When we assumed responsibility after the Egyptian Revolution in 1952 three principles were fixed as our main targets. They appear as Egypt's motto: Freedom, Socialism and Unity. In Arabic, however, the words invoke for us meanings that can hardly be fully translated into English, word for word.

Freedom, for a country that has been coveted by almost every would-be empire-builder, means first ridding itself of foreign military rule. Four years after the Revolution, but 74 years after the British landed in our country, the last of the British troops departed from Egypt. During the 74 years of occupation, we were ruled as part of a political-military bloc. Our economic, social and cultural life, as well as our political and military attitudes, were directed to serve the interests of the British Empire. Although we had all the legal, political and moral arguments on our side in our struggle against the occupation, these arguments could do very little to dislodge the British, who made their presence secure by preventing Egypt from building any effective military force.

Freedom, regained, meant for us first a determination to keep away from all the political-military blocs. Secondly, it meant dedicated effort to strengthen the legal, political and moral forces in the world. Lastly, it meant that we should acquire and build our military defenses.

Staying out of blocs was not only the natural course for emergent Egypt. We considered it an attitude that should be adopted by all member-states of the newly organized United Nations. How could the Tribunal of Nations carry out its grave responsibilities if its members were to gang up in permanent blocs? How could matters of international justice, matters of peace and war, be judged on their own merits? "Nonalignment" came to be the word to indicate this attitude. The initial reaction of super-

Editor's Note: There is an invitation outstanding to the Israeli Prime Minister for an article in this field.

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powers to nonalignment differed. The United States welcomed the nonalignment of Jugoslavia but not that of Egypt or India. The Soviet Union, which welcomed Egypt's nonalignment, would have preferred to have Jugoslavia aligned. Nonaligned countries, however, continued to believe that this attitude was the best for their own peace and progress and for that of the world.

But to state that Egypt does not align herself with either East or West—a course which she will preserve—does not mean neutrality toward the international issues of justice, morality and the exigencies of human progress. For to be nonaligned does not indicate the absence of national decisions as to where we stand on an issue-by-issue basis.

We had hoped to see the legal, political and moral forces carrying more weight than they did during the period of British occupation of Egypt. We hoped that the Charter of the United Nations would be truly respected and jealously protected by all, especially by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

Freedom from the foreigner was not the only freedom that Egypt desired. Throughout the past 20 years, we have sought to free our people from exploitation and need. We have also tried to assure the freedom and dignity of the individual. Land reform and reclamation, harnessing the Nile for more irrigation water and electricity, mining and industrialization were all essential if we were to achieve that freedom from exploitation and need. The system adopted as the framework for these reforms was "Socialism"—the second word figuring in our national motto.

Egypt is a country 7,000 years old. She has deep-rooted traditions and beliefs. God has been worshipped in this country perhaps longer than in any other. Monotheism has been concretized here since Akhnaton. The Egyptian peasant loves and lives for the small piece of land that he owns and looks forward to bequeathing it to his son. "Socialism" in Egypt had to be different. What was essential was to give every Egyptian the right opportunity and to give the nation as a whole the soundest plan for its development. This we tried to do. Under our Socialist system, the rate of growth of the gross national product (GNP), which before 1955 averaged 1.6 percent, rose in the decade between 1956 and 1966 to 6.7 percent. The per capita income, which in 1952 was 37 Egyptian pounds, more than doubled in 1971 to 81

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Egyptian pounds, and this in spite of the great increase in the population. The rate of industrial growth averaged 11.4 percent between 1952 and 1971. The contribution of industry rose from nine percent in 1952 to 22 percent in 1971. Industrial exports were 11.9 percent of total exports in 1952, but rose to 32 percent in 1971. Electricity consumption in 1952 was 991 million KWH; in 1971, the figure was 8,113 million KWH.

In the social and cultural fields, the figures are perhaps more revealing. The enrollment of the universities and higher institutes, for example, was 40,000 students in 1952. The figure in 1971 was 213,000 men and women, with their education absolutely free, every youth having had an exactly equal opportunity since primary school.

The programs were all pragmatic in the development and organization of production and trade, and we have exerted every possible national effort in offering enlarged public services in the fields of education, culture, health and social affairs. We have also sought and accepted all assistance available, and in so doing we have been mindful of the responsibilities of the developed states toward the developing countries, conscious of the common struggle that must be waged if men are to progress in freedom.

In our effort to build our country in this Socialist context, we have sought to avoid class struggle and to protect our developing nation against it. Our socialism, accordingly, had to solve all class contradictions peacefully: the formula to reach this really was that of the alliance among all working forces where the intellectual and the national capitalist—the manufacturer, the trader and the farmer—as well as the worker, the peasant and the soldier can all work and coöperate. This alliance is still the backbone of our political structure in Egypt today.

Socialism, the second word in our motto, will not, however, be separated from the first: Freedom. Our socialism does not, and never has put us under any superpower or in any particular bloc. The American journalist or commentator who used to refer to Egypt as a client state or a satellite of the Soviet Union appears bewildered because he sees today that we are not. It is a simple fact that we have never been so. The Soviet Union did not seek, nor did we ever envisage, such a relationship.

Unity, the third word in our motto, has its historic connotations. The unity referred to is our unity with the Arab world around us. The nations of the Arab world are now fragmented

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—one country of 35 million and another of a few hundred thousand. The urge for Arab unity did not originate in Egypt. It did not begin after the 1952 Revolution. Its roots go deeper into many Arab lands. The Arabs are conscious that they were able to contribute most to human civilization when they were united. They think that, united again, they can assure a better and fuller life for their people on the one hand and best contribute to world peace and progress on the other.

In her era of independence, Egypt has constantly held two basic factors in mind: first, that any threat to the independence and territorial integrity of any of her neighboring Arab states is really a threat to her own independence and territorial integrity; and, second, that any assistance given to any Arab state in the course of overcoming such threats is an act of collective Arab self-defense. The cases of Egyptian assistance to North Africa, Syria, Yemen, the Gulf States and the Palestinian people must be understood in this light.

Pooling the human and natural resources of the Arab world would certainly generate a better economy for all its inhabitants. Closer coöperation would certainly assure their better security and ability to live in peace with a lesser effort and at a lesser expense.

The emergence of a unified Arab world, whose goals are peace and progress—not conflict and alignment—will take time, as does the growth of a tree or the maturation of a harvest, and as did the unification of the United States, of Germany and of Italy. The progression toward unity will meet with various negative factors as well as with various supportive circumstances.

Egyptian policy toward Arab unity today can be very briefly and clearly stated. It is not the imperial scheme. It is not a policy of coercion, pressure or even persuasion. Egypt is ready to go with any Arab country as far as that country wishes to go. We do not wish any country to go further—or quicker—than it wishes. Thus, Egypt is now a member of the Arab League, of the Syrian-Libyan-Egyptian Federation; she is a signatory of the Tripoli Declaration between Sudan, Libya and Egypt. We are now preparing for unity with Libya. Seven mixed Egyptian-Libyan Commissions have undertaken a full year's work to prepare in September 1973 for a plebiscite in both Libya and Egypt to ascertain the public will, in both countries, concerning this matter. The international community, West and East, should

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welcome such a policy. International support for unifying movements would, in our view, help in the harmonization of international relations on a global scale.

II

The longing of Egypt to stay independent and free, to assure the development of all her resources for all her people under a régime of social justice, and to build her ties and coöperate with her Arab sisters, have thus been the guiding lines of her policy for reconstruction ever since the Revolution in 1952, led by our late and great President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Egypt, however, was not able to give her full attention or to marshal all her forces in these directions. In 1952, the Egyptian government inherited the war with Zionism and Israel. As will be remembered, the United Nations, by a General Assembly Resolution in 1947, recommended, against Palestinian objections, the partition of the Arab country of Palestine into two states, one Jewish, one Arab. The state of Israel was proclaimed, but soon was to expand into the territory allocated to the Arab state. The armistice agreements of 1949 halted the war between the Arabs and the Zionists but did not put an end to tension or prevent clashes. In 1955, Israel launched a major attack on the sector of Gaza which was held in trust by Egypt for her Palestinian people. Egypt realized then that she did not have credible means of deterring such aggression. We tried to acquire arms. Failing to obtain them from the West, we were able to get them from Czechoslovakia (which had earlier provided the Israelis with the armaments they had desired). Israel did her best to capitalize on this in order to alienate us from the West and especially to alienate us from the United States.

The "Lavon Affair" should be mentioned here. Israeli agents were sent to Cairo to blow up U.S. and British buildings and, in general, to commit crimes against the Americans and the British which were to appear as if they were committed by Egyptians. Israel actively worked to get the West, especially the United States, exclusively on her side. This was the beginning of a relentless Israeli effort to create a bipolarization in our area. It suited Israeli policies to pose as the West's fortress in the Middle East against the Eastern bloc.

In 1956, Israel joined Britain and France in invading Egypt. The active opposition of both the Soviet Union and United States

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as well as of the United Nations to this aggression prevented Israel from expanding further at that time into new Arab lands. In 1967, however, the attack was relaunched, and this time the international reaction—especially that of the United States—has been different. Israel now occupies all of Palestine, the part allotted to her by the 1947 resolution and all the part allotted by the same resolution to the Palestinian people. She also occupies Jordanian, Syrian and Egyptian lands. Israel is now bent on colonizing all the occupied territories and on creating in them what she likes to call new facts, in order to make this colonization permanent.

The myth that was created by Israel and her supporters that in 1967 she was exposed to a grave danger of "extermination" by Egypt is now being dissipated by those who have created it themselves. Israeli generals now confess that there was never such a danger, that Egypt was not prepared and did not intend to attack. According to the correspondent of *Le Monde* in Israel, writing to his paper on June 10, 1972: "Mr. Benton, member of the [Israeli] Council of Ministers during the Six-Day War . . . affirmed that the story of the threat of extermination has been invented [by Israel] to justify the annexation of the [Arab] occupied territories."[1]

Five years have now passed, with the situation burdening our lives and turning our energies away from our battle for development. The rate of growth of the GNP which rose in 1966 to 6.7 percent fell after 1967 to five percent. We now have to allocate for defense almost twice as much as we can allocate for development. We have hundreds of thousands of our boys on the alert for the defense of our land—the part that is occupied and the part that is not. This atmosphere is certainly not one under which we can best wage our national struggle to achieve the three objectives

[1] The same correspondent reported about a broadcast on the Israeli radio on the occasion of the fifth "anniversary" of the 1967 war. He said: "General Matityahou Peled, chief of the Bureau of Logistics during the 1967 conflict, asserted again that there was no danger of the Hebrew State being exterminated by Egypt. He even went further and asserted that there was no proof that the Egyptians really intended to attack Israel at the time. General Haim Herzog, of the Israeli military intelligence, admitted, with some embarrassment, the non-existence of such a danger. Neither the Israeli headquarters, nor the Pentagon's—as proven in the memoirs of the President of the United States at the time, Lyndon B. Johnson, ever believed in this danger." The correspondent goes on to say, "The daily newspaper of the Labour Party *Ot* published this week [the week of June 10, 1972] a debate between Generals Weizman, Gavich, Peled and Herzog, in which they all agree, without ambiguity, that no danger of extermination threatened Israel before the Six-Day War."

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we mentioned above. To put an end to this situation, Egypt accepted all the U.N. decisions and suggestions.

Egypt has been coöperating with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General appointed in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. Egypt accepted and attentively followed the four-power talks conducted by the permanent members of the Security Council seeking to assist the Special Representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. Egypt accepted all the General Assembly resolutions in the years that followed. Egypt responded affirmatively to the proposal of the U.S. government in June 1970 to cease fire for a specified period and to appoint a representative for discussions with the U.N. Secretary-General's Representative, Ambassador Jarring. I also initiated a "Test for Peace" when we called for an interim step that would have resulted in a partial withdrawal and an opening of the Suez Canal as the first step toward an agreed evacuation of the occupied lands, and restoration of the legitimate and acknowledged rights of the Palestinian people and peace.

On February 8, 1971, Ambassador Jarring presented to us and to Israel an identical aide-mémoire asking for clear-cut commitments from us to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. On February 26, Israel boldly announced to the world that she had no intention of withdrawing from the lands she occupies. On July 26 this year, the Prime Minister of Israel declared the following to the Knesset: "Ambassador Jarring, in February 1971, made a surprise move which led, in fact, to the suspension of his activities. He demanded that Israel should make a prior commitment to withdraw to the international frontier, in other words, an attempt was made to exclude the subject of the borders from the scope of issues requiring negotiations and agreement. The Government of Israel rejected this demand. . . ."

In the same speech, the Prime Minister of Israel declared that "the ceasefire was attained following . . . the approach made by the U.S. Government to appoint representatives for talks with Jarring." She declared that she now considered Jarring's activities suspended; she insisted, however, that the ceasefire continue but announced to the world, at the same time, that "Israel has no intention of altering the [rejection] reply given on February 26, 1971."

III

How could Israel preserve her position, consolidate her occu-

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pation and frustrate our resistance? The answer is given in the same speech. The Prime Minister said: "The [U.S.] aid to Israel has been kept up and increased and has reached the level we have been privileged to perceive during the past two years" [the two years of our ceasefire, and Israel's refusal to coöperate with Ambassador Jarring].

Israel now insists on direct negotiations while she occupies our land and refuses even to announce her intention to withdraw from it in a context of peace. This is the same position she took in the summer of 1967 before the Security Council (and which the Council, in its Resolution 242 found—by omission—to be unacceptable). She feels she has the military means to defy one and all. She does. Israel, emboldened by the help she receives from the United States, is now obviously seeking to annex territories outside the land of Palestine. She declares that she is prepared to negotiate: how much—if any—may be restored of the land of Egypt proper, and at what price? These terms Israel knows to be unacceptable. Most probably, they are made because Israel is convinced that they are unacceptable. Israel, however, hopes to be able to dictate them in order that her will might be the law in our region.

On May 3, 1943, General Patrick J. Hurley, personal representative of President Roosevelt in the Middle East, reported to the President his discussions with the Zionists in Palestine. He said that the Zionists insisted on attaining Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East. The sophisticated weapons that Israel seeks now and acquires from the United States are more than weapons to dictate the peace that the Israeli military wish to impose; they are, in fact, weapons to ensure Israeli domination of our area. This domination is an old Zionist dream. If this ever happens and if the Zionist state were really to dominate our area, what would become of our three objectives? What would become of our freedom, of our effort to develop our resources for all, under a Socialist system of social justice? What would become of the consolidated Arab efforts to rebuild their lives, and to try, once more, to make a contribution to world peace and progress? All our objectives would certainly be shattered. Our efforts for the last 20 years—indeed much more than that—would be brutally undermined.

There is no "Delenda est Carthago" in our motto. We do not seek to conquer and destroy. The three words in our motto call

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for exerting all our efforts in order to reconstruct our country. With her burdens, Egypt has no need to squander her human and material resources on adventurism. Israel—on the other hand—obviously means to impose her will. By hoarding American sophisticated armaments, she seeks to intimidate and destroy the will of her neighbors. By speaking openly about the fruits of victory Israel is sticking to the old and discarded rights of conquest. The Israelis, moreover, are pointing the way by which we can regain our territorial integrity or they can reach more aggrandizement. In February 1971 they shunned the peace agreement which they had previously told the world was all they wanted. They have shunned my initiative for an interim first step toward complete evacuation and the restoration of justice and peace. Israel has in fact not forsaken the Zionists' demand that there would be "Jewish leadership of the whole Middle East." To us, this equals the restitution of the British, French and, before them, the dominant Ottoman régimes. The Arabs fought the British and French (who were Christians), the Ottomans (who were Moslem) and have now no alternative but to oppose the expansionist Israelis, who are Jews.

The United Nations, confronted with Israel's defiance, and frustrated in advance by the almost assured U.S. veto on imposing sanctions on Israel, offers little hope.

There is no alternative to the creation of a credible deterrent to the Israeli forces on which the U.S. administration lavishes most "generously" its most sophisticated weapons. Egypt here faces an embargo imposed by the West. In fact she also faces a partial embargo imposed by the East. The Soviet Union, whose great assistance to us in building our defenses and in the most important domains of development is unforgettable (and will remain unforgettable), declines to provide us with the weapons which would constitute this credible deterrent. This embargo is not likely to cause Israel and Zionism to abandon their impossible dreams or to cause us to abandon our determination to defend our integrity.

IV

Twenty years ago, we made our rebellion in order to be able to build our country and rid it of external and internal hindrances to its progress and prosperity. Throughout those 20 years, we tried our best to realize for our people the objectives of our

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motto: Freedom, Socialism and Unity. As a result of these efforts, our people are today better educated, healthier and better employed. They enjoy their freedom and wish to make their lives full and meaningful.They are able to extend help and assistance to their neighbors in all fields. Egypt has worked in the international community for the peace and prosperity of the world as best as she could. In her bilateral relations Egypt has sought, and is seeking, the friendship and coöperation of all countries which understand and sympathize with the three principles of her nonaligned policy.

Egypt is handicapped in her efforts by wars imposed on her by Israeli expansionism and by Israel's persistence in denying the people of Palestine what Israel says she has sought for herself: their rights and their nationhood. Egypt has no interest in these wars. They are tremendous obstacles on her road to progress. There are today two facts in the Middle East. Everyone sees the first one, which is that the Israelis have been able to stay in our occupied lands for five years. The other fact is that they have not been able, during these five years, to impose their will.

The cause of peace will not be furthered, however, if the victor is allowed to dictate his terms and to exact "the fruits of victory." This is the language of the old world, the world that we thought went up in the flames of two major wars. This is not the language of the U.N. Charter, which entrusted to the Security Council and its permanent members historic responsibilities that cannot be shaken off easily. With all countries that still believe in the United Nations and its Charter, we shall fight against those obsolete concepts.

Egypt today has little interest in a world where power dictates its will. The future we and the other Arab nations dream of is one of justice and of peace in coöperation with all those who wish to assist our progress toward these goals.

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THE GREAT COMPETITION IN SPACE

By Sir Bernard Lovell

THE political tensions in Europe during the decade following the end of World War II effectively sterilized scientific collaboration or interchange between the Soviet Union and the West. A retrospective judgment is that the Soviets were reluctant to expose the appalling conditions in their country to Western eyes until they could reveal at least the beginnings of a physical and intellectual restoration from the devastation caused by the German invasion. Conversely, only essential Soviet emissaries were allowed to visit the West, because of the fear of the effect of comparisons with Western standards of comfort and culture.

Although the international exchanges have subsequently achieved a degree of normality, they have been marked by continuing difficulties. Whatever may be held in some quarters to the contrary, it remains a sad fact that Soviet scientists are strictly limited in their ability to attend conferences or work for periods ouside the Soviet Union. Today, the reasons for this appear to be various. In many cases it seems to be simply the same kind of economic reason which, in the end, inhibits the scientist of any country from complete freedom in this respect. The difference at this moment is that the economic rationing of foreign visits is far more severe for scientists in Russia than for those in the West. Regrettably, in other cases the restriction is fundamentally political. Until the end of the Khrushchev era there were many Soviet scientists of the greatest international distinction who were effectively prisoners in their country. Undoubtedly some were in danger and would have been lost to the Soviet Union if given freedom of travel. In the more important and interesting cases, however, the reason was more subtle, namely that many important Soviet scientists, like their colleagues in the West, served the state as well as their science—with the difference that the Soviets during a decade that was so vital to them would not take the slightest risk of compromise.

In any discussion of these problems of collaboration and interchange between Russia and the West it is essential to realize that the Soviet Academy of Sciences exercises a control over Soviet science and scientists which has no parallel either in the

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United Kingdom or the United States. It is therefore possible for the state to exercise a degree of political control which, fortunately, has not yet been approached in the Western countries. The Western scientist visiting the Soviet Union is therefore allowed access only to those institutions and individuals which the Academy deems to be expedient. This isolationism was primarily responsible for the traumatic shock delivered to the West in 1957 by the Sputnik.

II. The influence of the Sputnik

It is rare for a scientific exploit of one country to monopolize the attention of the entire world. The launching of an artificial earth satellite from the Soviet Union—Sputnik One on October 4, 1957—was such an occasion. Further—and of greater significance—the event was the direct cause of a revolution in the U.S. attitude to science.

The extent of the technological and political shock which the Soviets delivered to the West surprised both sides. Clearly the responsible individuals on both sides of the barrier had little concept of the deep effects of the enforced isolationism. For those within the Soviet Union it appeared inconceivable that Soviet science and technology could have risen to such competitive heights within a decade of utter disruption. For those in the United States it also seemed inconceivable. Actually, there was little excuse for the continued American blind disbelief in the powerful advance of Soviet science and technology. The few contacts within the international unions and the assessments which could be made from the news of the development of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) provided evidence of the state of Soviet techniques in those matters. Unfortunately, this was an era of the deepest suspicion, when any individual speaking favorably of Soviet scientific or technical strength was regarded as a Communist or, at the best, a fellow traveler. Further, it was not then appreciated that responsible Soviet scientists, although often evading or refusing to give information, were entirely reliable when making specific statements.

Indeed, the preliminaries to the drama of October 1957 were entirely regular. Many years previously the appropriate international unions had scheduled the period of sunspot maximum (1957–1958) as the International Geophysical Year (IGY). In October 1954 the Special Committee, charged by the Interna-

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tional Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) with detailing the arrangements, met in Rome and recommended that, as part of the worldwide programs for the IGY, "thought be given to the launching of small satellite vehicles, to their scientific instrumentation, and to the new problems associated with satellite experiments, such as power supply, telemetry and orientation."

In accordance with this recommendation, President Eisenhower announced on July 29, 1955, that the United States would launch a satellite during the IGY. A similar announcement was made one day later by the Soviet Union. Those who believed this Soviet statement to be an idle dream, following in the wake of the realistic American plans, were presumably unaware that several months earlier (April 15, 1955) the Soviet Academy of Sciences had announced that it had set up a permanent commission of interplanetary communications, whose work included the development of meteorological satellites; or that the chairman of this commission, Professor Sedov, subsequently stated at a meeting in Copenhagen that Russia would launch a satellite within "the next two years" and that it would be heavier than the satellite proposed by the Americans.

The collective isolationist arrogance displayed by the West in the months immediately preceding the launching of Sputnik One appears today as a fantasy and could be dismissed as a regrettable issue of the past if there were not such serious parallels at the present time. During August 1957 the International Scientific Radio Union (URSI) convened at Boulder, Colorado, and the director of the U.S. Vanguard satellite project described the status of that satellite. The message was that Vanguard could not be ready for launching for several months but that, in any case, it was known also that the Soviets were encountering severe difficulties and there was little risk of competition. Yet in June Academician Nesmeyanov, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, had said that both the carrier vehicle and instrumentation for the Soviet satellite were ready. In fact, the Academy had even informed the IGY organization that they would launch their satellite "within a few months." The press reports of the successful testing of the Soviet ICBM which appeared during the course of the Boulder meeting should have removed any lingering doubts about the Soviet space potential.

It must be presumed that at least the intelligence sources of the West had access to the level of scientific information available

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to those of us who were concerned with the scientific problems of the IGY. In that case, the political treatment of the relative status of the American Vanguard project and of the Soviet Sputnik passes comprehension. Our own information in Britain, based purely on assessments of scientific information provided by scientific contacts from East and West, was that the Soviets would be able to launch a satellite before the Americans. In mid-September Radio Moscow said the launching would be "soon," and on October 1 broadcast the frequencies on which the Sputnik would transmit. Three days later Sputnik One, weighing 184 pounds, was launched. The miniature American Vanguard was not only late but, in the end, a total failure. Scorn about the level of Soviet science and technology had perforce to turn instantly to a vast new evaluation of the state of American science.

III. Interaction of the Soviet and American space programs

Two important lessons were learned by the United States (but unfortunately, not by the European Communities) as a result of this dramatic public display by the Soviets of their technical status. The first was that no modern power could sustain itself as such unless there was a willingness to make appropriate investments throughout the entire spectrum of scientific research, development and technology. The second was that competitiveness might well be in order as a stimulus to individual effort, but could be disastrous if allowed to manifest itself through competitive projects of national concern.

It is fortunate that there were at that time influential members of the U.S. administration who realized that the Soviet achievement was neither a purely scientific trick nor a "lump of old iron" in space, but the beginning of developments which could have vital military, commercial and political consequences. The effective restoration of the balance of power in these widest aspects is the direct result of the immediate action which was taken to place American science on a more appropriate financial basis.

In 1956 the United States spent only 6.5 billion dollars on all forms of research and development. Until that time the rate of growth was about half a billion dollars per annum. Within a year after Sputnik the figure was 10.5 billion dollars—a dramatic increase of one percent in terms of the gross national product. By contrast, in the six years before Sputnik Russia doubled

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her expenditure on research and development. Even so, the United States could not achieve parity of growth in the vital decade following Sputnik. In the ten years 1956–66 the U.S. research and development (R & D) expenditure trebled whereas that of the Soviets increased five times. In realistic terms, it has been estimated that at this period the Soviet expenditure on R & D was 6.5 billion rubles—an amount equal to that which was being spent on new housing. Taking account of the housing situation in Russia, this is a quite staggering indication of state policy, which could have no conceivable parallel in Western nations. By 1966 the effective purchasing power of the Soviet R & D budget was estimated as equivalent to 22.8 billion dollars, which was about 15 percent greater than that of the United States at that time.[1]

However, even unlimited resources are useless unless there is a consistent and coherent policy. This was the second lesson of the Sputnik. In 1957 the three U.S. military services were each developing ballistic missiles. Furthermore, in July 1955 when the decision was made to launch a satellite for the IGY a basic error was made: namely it was decided to base the carrier rocket on sounding rocket technology and not on the ballistic weapon developments. The contrast with the single-minded Soviet concentration on the ballistic weapon concept could hardly be more sharply defined.

The navy having failed dismally with Vanguard, the army was authorized to make an attempt with its Juno ballistic rocket (developed by Dr. Wernher von Braun). By the time of this successful launch on January 31, 1958, the Eisenhower administration had already begun the reorganization of the U.S. space effort in the form of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Even so, it was the third U.S. military authority—the air force—which organized the first American attempt to send a rocket (unmanned) to the moon, using the rocket of its Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile for the launching. They were still failing in these attempts even after the Soviets had hit the moon with Lunik 2 (September 13, 1959) and photographed the hidden side with Lunik 3 (October 1959).

As NASA gathered strength, with a budget increasing from

[1] The figures for Russia are taken from "Soviet Space Programs, 1962–65," a staff report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., December 1966.

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$150 million in 1959 to $5,500 million seven years later, a unique international situation evolved: a new form of cold war developed between the Soviet Union and the United States in outer space. The tight security barrier maintained by the Soviets on all aspects of their space program, plus their technical superiority, provided them with a new form of political initiative. The first manned orbital flight by Yuri Gagarin on April 12, 1961, preceded by ten months that of an American astronaut in February 1962. The soft landing of Luna 9 on February 3, 1966, and the transmission to earth of photographs from the surface of the moon, four months ahead of the U.S. Surveyor (May 30, 1966), were indicative of a narrowing technical gap as NASA surmounted formidable technical problems with an efficiency and speed which could never have been realized except in such an international competitive arena.

The landing of men on the moon and their safe return to earth became a prestigious goal. That it was an international race with prodigious stakes has at various times been denied by both sides. That it was so on the American side is implicit in the "new ocean" speech of President Kennedy, with which he initiated the Apollo concept in 1961. Some historians may have the good fortune to uncover official Soviet documents which may reveal the extent to which the incredible and almost miraculous success of Apollo caused the Soviets to change their space program.

A personal assessment is that the break-even point came toward the end of 1968. In September 1968 the Soviets succeeded in sending an instrumented Zond probe on a circumlunar journey. This vehicle contained a transponded voice communication system and was subsequently recovered after splashdown in the Indian Ocean. Two months later another circumlunar probe (Zond 6) with voice transmission was recovered after touchdown in the Soviet Union. The persistent rumors then emanating from Moscow that the Soviets were about to repeat this exploit with a manned vehicle seemed well founded. The exploit never materialized, and at the approach of Christmas 1968, the three American astronauts made their historic circumlunar orbital flight to the moon. In the event, the American program continued its triumphant progress to the landing of Armstrong and Aldrin on the lunar surface on July 20, 1969.

Within a decade the immense resources of America had been harnessed to bring to success this fantastic project, requiring

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revolutionary scientific and technical concepts and developments in organization and logistics of entirely new dimensions. The Soviets did not expect the project to succeed. To the end they hoped for political gain and the discomfiture of the United States. When Apollo 11 was already on its way to the moon the Russians announced that Luna 15 had been launched from the Soviet Union on July 13. It was injected into lunar orbit on July 17, two days before Apollo. Only an hour before the lift-off of Armstrong and Aldrin, Luna 15 crashed on the lunar surface in a neighboring lunar mare. Luna 15 was meaningless except in the context of an attempt to recover lunar samples automatically. That this was indeed the intention was confirmed by the success of the identical Luna 16 a year later which succeeded in soft landing and returning automatically to earth with samples of the lunar surface. A minor problem with a rocket motor had caused the failure of Luna 15. With the attention of perhaps a third of the world's population concentrated on the moon in July 1969, it needs little imagination to appreciate the effect on world opinion had this little technical difficulty affected Apollo 11 instead of Luna 15.

IV. The futility of competition

The international scientific organizations developed within the framework of the ICSU have provided excellent means for the free exchange of scientific information, discussion of future plans and for the initiation of action to provide safeguards for the prosecution of scientific work. The organization of the IGY provided the scientific framework within which the first earth satellites were developed and launched in 1957–58. Instantly it became clear that the scientific importance of this activity was so great that it could not be contained within the scope of the International Scientific Radio Union, the parent body for the IGY, and that there were important overlaps with other unions, for example, astronomy and geophysics. In 1958, ICSU established the new Committee on Space Research (COSPAR). The early meetings of this body soon revealed that the Soviet delegates were either uninformed of Soviet plans or were under instructions to limit their comments. Subsequently COSPAR became an important annual assembly for the discussion of scientific results, to which the Soviet delegates contributed freely. However, at no period have the COSPAR meetings provided

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the forum for the uninhibited review of progress and prospects typical of the other scientific unions.

When President Eisenhower created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration he did so to make the civil space activities of the United States coherent and to separate the civil and military interests. Therefore, NASA has throughout its existence maintained an influential international relations and publicity organization which has been able to distribute freely complete details about the present status and future plans for the U.S. civil space effort. The Soviets, on the other hand, have maintained a remarkable security screen around their facilities; the assessment of their future intentions and potential has been largely an exercise in guesswork. This is the inevitable result of the integration of the Soviet military and civil space programs, which in itself provided the foundations for the early success of the Soviets in space. Experienced observers have concluded that the space program is militarily dominated. A more generous conclusion might well be that the rockets and launching arrangements are entirely controlled by the military, with the actual military and civil interests in the payloads more evenly divided. Of the 470 satellites launched in the Cosmos series to the end of 1971 it would appear to be a fair judgment that the military and civil research interests have been evenly balanced.

The failure to coöperate in any space activities of real magnitude has occurred in spite of continuous attempts at all levels by the United States—through COSPAR, directly by NASA, through the United Nations Organization and at the presidential level. When President Kennedy brought up the question of coöperative space efforts at the Vienna meeting with Khrushchev in June 1962, he received the reply that coöperation was impossible because the Soviet Union preferred to maintain the veil of secrecy around Soviet rocketry.[2] An account of the detailed efforts made by the United States at collaboration to 1970, and of the limited progress made on such items as meteorological and magnetic mapping, has been given by J. G. Whelan.[3]

The result, to this moment, is that the major space developments of the Soviet Union and the United States have proceeded almost wholly independently and, even if not competitive in the strict sense, with political rivalry.

[2] See "Kennedy" by Theodore Sorensen. New York: Harper and Row, 1965, p. 529.
[3] See "Soviet Space Programs, 1962–65," *op. cit.;* also the report for 1966–1970.

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A dispassionate observer must surely view with dismay the scientific and technical conduct of man in the lunar investigations. Two civilized groups, a few thousand miles apart on earth, at great expense and with a huge display of human ingenuity, have, by working entirely independently, thrown at the moon a succession of rockets which have crashed landed, soft landed and orbited, duplicating one another in time and content. Eventually both groups succeeded in recovering samples of the lunar surface on earth, one by the intervention of man and the other automatically. As a final irony, the dispassionate observer notes that the national group successful in the great human adventure cancels a large slice of the remaining program with enormous scientific problems revealed but unsolved. This tremendous feat of human exploration and the scientific investigation of the moon were separate adventures properly to be undertaken in the name of mankind and not by national groups in rivalry for political ends. The confusion of motives has deepened the problems for the future.

V. Future prospects for collaboration

The euphoria introduced by the successful culmination of the Apollo program in 1969 induced optimistic thoughts about the next decade in space. The way seemed open for the establishment of lunar observatories for the further study not only of the moon but of the remote regions of the universe, with telescopes freed from earthbound restrictions which limit observations to a narrow and partially obscured region of the spectrum. Manned missions to the planet Mars by 1980–1985 became a realistic assessment. The dangers of disagreement on the organization of lunar observatories, and the need for regulations on the allowable limit of contamination of the planets by earthbound organisms increased the need for a supranational authority in control of these extra-terrestrial projects. The United States had at last achieved a decisively superior position in the lunar explorations. The world looked to the American scientists and politicians for the joint initiatives of the next great scientific enterprises in space and the international gestures for their control.

No one can say that today the Americans have neglected their opportunities on this second issue. The preparatory exchange of visits between NASA and Soviet space scientists led to the concept of a joint manned space flight with a docking between U.S. and Soviet spacecraft. The final agreement for a space link-up

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in 1975, made between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kosygin during the President's visit to Moscow in the spring of 1972, is a political movement of cardinal importance for future space activities.

The difficulties of more total collaboration necessary for a truly international project to the moon or the planets remain profound. Indeed, it is hard to see how this fuller collaboration can be achieved as long as space is regarded as a medium for militaristic activities by both nations, and particularly unless the Soviets dissociate their civil and military space activities. Still, some agreement has been reached which appeared impossible of attainment during the competitive phase of the lunar attempts.

This spirit of hope engendered by the Nixon-Kosygin agreement has unfortunately not been paralleled by similar successes among the European nations, or between Europe and the United States. Indeed, the European space scene is in almost complete disarray, and for this successive British governments since 1957 must bear a large share of blame. When the Soviets launched their Sputnik in 1957, Britain had ballistic rockets (Blue Streak and Black Knight) in an advanced stage of development for military purposes. The military arrangements with the United States, which at that time materialized in the establishment of American ballistic rocket sites in England, led to the cancellation of these projects and hence the situation was entirely favorable for their instant assembly and use as launchers for space vehicles. Unfortunately, the government's scientific advisory committee adopted an antagonistic attitude and its views prevailed to such an extent that not even a well-reasoned military space objective could be initiated.

The critical lead which Britain should have taken at that moment evaporated almost entirely as the politicians sought to ingratiate themselves with the European Community by the offer of British expertise and hardware. By 1960 it was reliably estimated that the integrated cost of maintaining the Blue Streak organization in being, without a policy directive since the cancellation of the weapon, was parallel to the cost of its development as a satellite launcher at that time. In any event, the political moves resulted in the emergence of the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO), with Britain offering Blue Streak as the first stage of a launcher.

The subsequent history of ELDO has been dismal. The attempt to integrate the British first stage with second and third

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stages built in France and Germany has not yet succeeded. The last Labour government withdrew British participation—a vacillation of policy within a decade which used up a substantial amount of money to no useful purpose. At this moment, after four failures to place a satellite in orbit (with Europa 2), the remaining partners in ELDO are trying to decide whether to proceed with the third version of the launcher (Europa 3) at a cost of $500 million. The French are now the chief movers in this proposal since they maintain that neither Russia nor America can be relied upon to continue to sell or donate launching rockets for European space projects, especially where commercial or military uses are in question.

In the meantime, the parallel European organization created specifically for dealing with the payloads (ESRO—the European Space Research Organisation) has been somewhat more successful. With Britain bearing one-quarter of the cost of the organization, several satellites have been created successfully on a multinational basis and launched by U.S. rockets. Disagreements over policy have, however, led to arguments about the role of ESRO and to modification of original intentions, so that purely scientific satellites now play a lesser role in future planning at the expense of more commercial or practical applications.

This general muddle in European space arrangements has been increased by the simultaneous unilateral action of France and the United Kingdom. Both have developed their individual launchers (apart from Blue Streak, Britain developed Black Arrow and then abandoned the project), and both have built satellites on a national basis and launched them in collaboration with the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. It is scarcely surprising that NASA has, as its major policy, collaboration with Europe as a whole rather than through bilateral arrangements. In 1970 approaches were made to extend this coöperation to the extent of inviting the European Community to be solely responsible for the provision of the space tug—a vital component in the new concept of the U.S.-manned orbital satellite with recoverable rocket. The disagreements within Europe on space policy and the continued postponement of a decision on this issue (the most recent proposed ministerial meeting which was expected to make a final decision in early July 1972 was postponed) is a sad reaction to this important phase of possible collaboration. The deep divisions of opinion in European space

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policy seem likely to remain until such time as the Community achieves greater political coherence. It is a regrettable thought that, notwithstanding the scientific contributions made by European space scientists, the ability to join with the Soviets or the United States in a space project of real magnitude seems remote.

Whereas the United States has made significant progress with the Soviets in the sphere of space collaboration, the belief that the U.S. space program would proceed to even more magnificent exploits after the success of Apollo has not proved to be the case. The savage cut in the NASA budget and the overall reaction from science as a whole immediately after the moon landings are most strange features of the contemporary scene. They afflict many Western communities as well as the United States. Whatever the cause, the effect on the possible space projects has been dramatic. A vigorous follow-up of the Apollo program could have led to regular habitations on the moon and initial manned approaches to Mars within two decades. No one could foretell what practical and psychological reactions such events would have for man and for his life on earth. Perhaps it is the thought that such enterprises might carry consequences not wholly for the benefit of life on earth that has caused a temporary withdrawal.

In any case, the U.S. administration first rejected the manned Mars program in favor of instrumented exploration, then even cut back on the remaining Apollo flights; it further rejected some of the attractive possibilities for unmanned exploration of the planetary system (the grand tour of the outer planets, for example, has been abandoned). Apart from the Viking landing of instruments on Mars proposed for 1975–76 and other wholly admirable projects to carry scientific instruments to interplanetary space, the main effort for this decade has become inward-looking, *i.e.* extensive manned flight in earth orbit, with scientific workshops and recoverable vehicles. To what extent the United States has desired to compete with the anticipated plan of the Soviets for a large earth-orbiting platform is a matter for conjecture. There are clear commercial and military interests in achieving at least parity in earth-orbiting facilities.

The retrenchment of the United States to a current NASA budget at less than three-quarters of the peak level of the 1960–1970 decade creates a real danger of another imbalance with Russia. Any analysis of the U.S.S.R. expenditure on space is acknowledged to be difficult, but the figures available to the U.S.

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Senate conclude that in 1965 the annual investment in space amounted to five billion equivalent U.S. dollars and that subsequently the amount has at least remained level. This means that the Soviets continue to devote to their space program a share of their GNP about twice the size of the largest share devoted to the space program of the United States at its peak level. If these trends continue, by 1980 the Soviets may recreate the 1960 level of space advantage over the United States. Whether they will then be in a position to deliver another Sputnik-like shock to the West depends largely on the extent to which the development of the Nixon-Kosygin agreement overcomes the isolationism.

Any detailed analysis of these future prospects is fundamentally handicapped by the obscurity of the Soviet intentions and by the unseen motives influencing the U.S. programs. At least we can see in the U.S. developments that the guiding motives have not been scientific. The essentially scientific space programs have been a minor burden on the economy. The major effort has gone into the Apollo program. The scientific advantages have been significant but could certainly have been achieved at a fraction of the cost with unmanned devices. The culmination of the scientific program required the large-scale extension of the concept; its truncation highlights the political motives which governed the decision to proceed with Apollo.

VI. Conclusions

For the next decade the U.S. space program is largely ruled by the argument that by spending a further 15 billion dollars to develop the space shuttle, the cost of placing massive satellites in orbit can be reduced. Although scientists will, of course, be glad to mount experiments in such massive satellites, the concept is not justified on scientific merits. The backing for such concepts must be largely strategic. Surveillance satellites are already a common feature of space. The large space platform, made economically viable by the shuttle concept, must be regarded as a desirable space launching pad for these devices and for their extensions into the more active phases of interception and attack. The U.S. interest in the large orbiting platform is clearly a response to the recognized Soviet attempts to establish a similar facility in space.

The military dominance of space activity has been well hidden within the Soviet security screen and by the extroverted nature

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of the NASA missions. The reality of the military influence is evident from the information given recently to the U.S. Senate.[4] To the end of 1971 America had delivered 764 payloads to space —241 by NASA, the remainder by the Department of Defense, of which 182 are classified as civil and 341 as military. The estimates for Russia are 661 payloads in space, of which 392 were military. Of these latter, 17 are classed as "fractional orbital bombardment" and 25 as "military inspection or destruction."

Any realistic discussion of collaboration in space in the foreseeable future must take account of the unpalatable fact that at least half the space effort of the two major powers involved lies in the military domain, and that an unseen but effective military influence lies behind some of the major trends of the remaining civil space activities. It is in this area of space activities that we look for new collaboration on the basis of the Nixon-Kosygin agreement. The major question is whether duplication of effort can be avoided, thereby freeing major resources for further advance into the unknown. Ten years ago the space agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States provided for coördinated launchings of meteorological satellites, of satellites for measuring the magnetic field, for communication tests and for exchange of data on space biology and medicine. It is in this sphere, together with the new studies of earth resources from space, that properly coördinated activities between the two powers could save overlapping costs and could immediately benefit the human race.

On the essentially scientific aspects of space exploration it is probably unreasonable, and may even be undesirable, to attempt detailed collaboration. The scientific brain requires a driving motive. It is not clear whether scientists are primarily motivated by sheer inquisitiveness about the universe or by the competitive instinct. It is at least probable that the latter is important for the scientist who finds his own level of essential international collaboration and resents bureaucratic or political direction. The continued purely scientific-instrumented flights in earth orbit, in interplanetary space and to the planets are cheap by the standards of space expenditure. This intellectual pursuit of fundamental knowledge of our environment and the universe may with advantage be used to absorb harmlessly the competitive instinct

[4] See "Soviet Space Programs, 1971," a staff report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., April 1972.

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of the space scientist in national, or at least localized international, groups where cost is important.

The real problems of international space collaboration lie in the exciting realms of manned excursions to the moon and beyond. After the conclusion of the Apollo program there are no U.S. plans for manned flights beyond earth orbit. No doubt within a few years the Soviets will, in their own time and by their own method, repeat the Apollo exploits. In their approach to these distant manned flights their whole attitude appears to differ essentially from that of the Americans. A fundamental edict of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy is that man can and must conquer his environment. The Soviets have made no secret of the fact that they interpret this, not merely as man conquering the hazards of the terrestrial environment, but moving into and establishing himself in the solar system. The question is not whether they will establish human colonies on the moon and Mars, and perhaps elsewhere in the solar system, but when they will feel ready to embark on these vast enterprises. Throughout the decade of Apollo, the Americans regarded man-on-the-moon as the winning goal. The Soviets no doubt expected to get there first, but their attitude has never wavered in regarding this exploit as a mere staging post to greater adventures.

The withdrawal of the United States from these manned planetary missions must be a cause of great concern. To allow one national group to establish itself unilaterally in lunar or planetary bases would be an incalculable disaster for the peoples of the earth. There are many dangers of local misuse arising from the massive engineering and technical advances which are first necessary on earth. There are more erudite dangers arising from the possibility that the Soviets might eventually attempt to change the planetary atmospheres to facilitate habitation, and the terrifying unknown dangers that might occur by the return of foreign organisms to the terrestrial globe. The ethical problems arising from man's tampering with his own local environment are current issues of concern. But they appear as shadows compared with the ethics of manned colonies in space unless such processes are governed and carried out by international agreements. Fortunately, the vast cost of these undertakings, which could well materialize during this century, might erode the military budgets. The tensions between men would then pass to outer space.

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GROWTH AND SURVIVAL

By Robert L. Heilbroner

LIFE on this planet is a fragile affair, a kind of miraculous microbial activity that flourishes on the thin film of air and water and decomposed rock which separates the uninhabitable core of the earth from the void of space. Over most of mankind's history, the existence of that environment has always been taken for granted, and human efforts have been devoted to "taming" it—that is, to altering that vital film in various ways to assure our easier survival. Now, with stunning suddenness we have come to the realization that the environment is not to be taken for granted after all—indeed that it may be on the verge of an irremediable deterioration. For if the calculations of a group of social and physical scientists are correct, it will take only another 50 years of population growth and economic expansion at present rates to cause a collapse of our life-supporting ambient, bringing mass famine in some areas, industrial breakdown in others, a drastic shortening of lifespans nearly everywhere.

This terrifying scenario stems primarily from the work of Jay Forrester and a team of scientists at M.I.T. who have projected, by means of computerized models, the complex interactions of human activity and the environment. The models form the basis for two clarion calls for an immediate halt to the destruction of the environment—"A Blueprint for Survival,"[1] signed by some 30 eminent British scientists, and a much touted and widely circulated book, "The Limits to Growth,"[2] sponsored by The Club of Rome, an international "invisible college" of 70 scientists and specialists. Essentially, both studies tell us the same thing—that if we are to preserve the life-supporting capabilities of our all-important film of air, water and soil, economic growth must be brought to a halt as rapidly as possible. For the projections on which the two studies rest show that even if population growth halts within two generations, even if we discover "unlimited" new resources, and even if we remove three-quarters of the pollution we generate, continued industrial growth by itself will

[1] "A Blueprint for Survival," *The Ecologist,* January 1972.

[2] "The Limits to Growth," by D. H. Meadows, D. L. Meadows, J. Randers and W. W. Behrens III. New York: Universe Books (A Potomac Associates Book), 1972.

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still bring us to a condition of "self-destruct" within the lifetimes of our grandchildren. Well before the year 2100, the population of the earth would then begin a period of decline as dramatic as that of Europe during the Black Death, but unhappily by no means so short in duration.

This is a projection so overwhelming in magnitude that it is difficult to confront it with any sense of detachment and balanced appraisal. Indeed, rather than detachment, the need of the hour seems to be a call to arms—or rather, to the crash program described by the scientists of the "Blueprint" and the "Limits." Yet, in full recognition of the gravity of the situation, I would propose a different course. In the end, the scenario that I project is no less sobering than that of the anti-growth school, but, as we shall see, it leads to a very different strategy for our times.

II

Let me begin by recapitulating very succinctly some of the trends and facts that have led to the recent impassioned call for a halt to economic growth. The first of these is by now so familiar that it may have lost its power to shock, but it must nevertheless be our starting point. This is the fearsome growth of population, increasing at a rate that doubles every 30 years. Today estimated at 3.5 billion, world population is pressing toward the level of 28 billion less than a century hence—I say "pressing," since no estimate that I have seen envisages increases in food production within that time span sufficient to feed such a multitude.

Of course, this neglects the potential braking effect of birth control. There is a growing consensus that demographic increase can be brought to a halt in the industrialized nations by the year 2000; and there is the possibility that net reproduction rates can be brought to zero in the underdeveloped world (where population is still doubling every 18 to 20 years) within two generations. Unhappily, because so much of the population in these areas is under child-bearing age, even a drop to zero net reproduction rates—approximately one female child per married couple—will not bring *total* population growth in these areas to zero, as larger and larger "cohorts" of children will continue to reach the age of fertility for some time. At best, then, demographers estimate that we will "only" have to cope with a global population of 15 billion by the year 2060. In fact, the number may be much larger.

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The population explosion brings us to the physical problems of the carrying capacity of the earth—I shall leave unmentioned such essentially social problems as cancerous urban growth or the psychological effects of overcrowding. The first of these physical problems is that we will simply run out of the resources required to maintain the present pace of industrial expansion. Curiously, this is not a problem that is immediately connected with population growth, for the great bulk of industrial activity in the world is concentrated in the advanced areas where the demographic problem is least severe. Industrial expansion in the advanced nations is today growing at a rate of about seven percent a year—a rate that doubles total output every ten years. If we therefore look ahead 50 years, it is probable that industrial output, using existing techniques, will have increased by the *exponential* number of five—doubling in 10 years, quadrupling in 20, octupling in 30, etc. Anyone familiar with the power of compound interest will recognize this curve as one whose upward slope becomes ever steeper.

Can we feed the industrial megamachine that these projections indicate? The table below, on which the anti-growth school bases its case, indicates that we cannot.

GLOBAL RESOURCE AVAILABILITY[3]

Resource	*Years available at present growth rates*	*Years available if resources are quintupled*
Aluminum	31	55
Coal	111	150
Copper	21	48
Iron	93	173
Lead	21	64
Manganese	46	94
Natural Gas	22	49
Petroleum	20	50
Silver	13	42
Tin	15	61
Tungsten	28	72

The table (based in the main on estimates of the U.S. Bureau of Mines) makes two formidable points. First, according to existing estimates, there are not enough resources to allow industrial expansion to continue unhindered at a compound rate of seven percent a year for anything like 50 years—much less a century—with the exception of a few items such as coal or iron. Long before then, the exhaustion of first one and then another

[3] "The Limits to Growth," p. 56–59.

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critical resource would have effectively brought the trajectory of growth to a halt. Thereafter, the M.I.T. computerized models show industrial output abruptly entering a period of steep and prolonged decline.

Second, the table reveals that even very large increases in resource discovery, such as the five-fold enlargement shown in the column at the right, add only disconcertingly small increments of time over which exponentially growing industrial output can be maintained. As we shall see, the problem of the astonishing rapidity with which an exponential series reaches any given finite limit appears again and again in the environmentalists' drama. So far as resources are concerned, this fact contains an important warning against expecting too much from the possibility of recycling scarce materials which, like the discovery of new resources, only adds a finite increment of new resources.

An even more serious aspect of the industrial growth problem is the capacity of the earth, not to yield up the needed resources, but to absorb the residues and wastes, the harmful products and by-products of industrial production—in a word, its ability to withstand the effects of pollution. "Pollution" is a word that covers many kinds of unwanted direct or side-effects of economic activity. There are pollutants that are nuisances, such as noise pollution or littering, and pollution that is local in extent—Lake Erie may be "dead," but its corpse is confined within its geographic boundaries. On the other hand there is pollution that is deadly, such as radiation, and pollution that is globally diffused —for example, lead spewed into the air by American and European cars has shown up over the last 30 years in a three-fold increase in the amount of lead in the Greenland icecap.

It is the second class of pollutants on which the environmental scientists focus their attention. Many examples of it have become familiar, although no less frightening for that reason. A now famous claim is that most mother's milk in the United States contains so much DDT that it would be declared illegal in interstate commerce if it were sold as is cow's milk. Less widely publicized, but of no less significance, are the effects of nitrates and phosphates deposited in the soil by chemical fertilizers. Nitrates, in particular, enter the water supply and are then converted within the human body into nitrites, which cause infant mortality. Chemical fertilizers also cause soil leaching and lead to eutrophication of the bodies of water into which they drain,

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bringing about huge algae "blooms" and the death of large marine populations.

Central to the argument against economic growth is that these deadly and globally diffused pollutants are also increasing exponentially, along with, and as a direct result of, exponential industrial growth. We shall have a chance later to examine some of the presumptions on which this contention rests. But there is no doubt that pollution is ultimately the mortal enemy in the eyes of the anti-growth school. For there are certain kinds of pollution that cannot be avoided, short of the most far-reaching changes in our industrial technology, and one kind that cannot be avoided by any known or imagined technology.

In the first class lies the polluting effect of the process of combustion, the central source of power throughout the world today. Combustion is a term that describes the conversion of oxygen into carbon dioxide in the process of "burning." As a result of the massive burning by which the industrial mechanism is kept operative (not to mention that which supplies heat for our homes), the amount of CO_2 in the atmosphere is steadily rising. Extrapolating from present trends, we can predict that it will increase by some 30 percent during the next 30 years. Scientists are uncertain but uneasy about the effects of this altered composition in changing the vital heat-trapping properties of the atmosphere. Over the longer run, they fear as well the slow exhaustion of the oxygen supply itself. Today the United States already consumes more oxygen than its green cover can regenerate. This is a process that can continue for a very long time, but not forever—especially if the entire world were to attain U.S. levels of combustion per capita.

Even more portentous is the problem of the production of heat. Inherent in the production of energy in any form is the generation of heat. Professors Pirages and Ehrlich have recently warned that the use of energy on an American per capita scale for the 750 million who today occupy mainland China would release heat in certain areas that could lead to "major, unpredictable effects" in climatic patterns. If we scale up this warning to take into account the 15 billion who may inhabit the earth in another three generations, we are forced to contemplate the possibility that an American standard of heat-generation at these population levels might bring an environmental disaster comparable to the onset of the Ice Ages.

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III

In the face of these overwhelming facts, that sense of detachment and balance of which I spoke earlier is not easy to achieve. It may be helpful to begin, therefore, by considering growth from another point of view—paying no heed for a moment to its destructive effects and emphasizing instead its constructive implications.

This brings us back to the population explosion that provided our initial point of entry into the ecological problem. Given the minimum figure of 15 billion a century hence, we confront a human problem that immediately places growth in a wholly new perspective. For it makes clear that any effort to strive for zero growth in industrial output today would, in effect, be a decision to deprive the forthcoming population of its ability to subsist. Such a decision might impose a very rapid "solution" to the population problem, but it would be the solution of starvation. Moreover, since most of the prospective population of the coming generations will be crowded into the underdeveloped areas, the forecast also makes it clear that growth in industrial output in those areas must take place *faster* than population, if the billions who are to be born in those regions can ever attain a standard of living better than that which they now "enjoy." At least some indication of the magnitude of this required increase can be gained in comparing the GNP per capita of Portugal—hardly a nation known for her high material standard of life—with that of the backward regions. In 1966, GNP per capita in Portugal was $529; in East and Southeast Asia (excluding Japan) it was $114; in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa) under $100. Thus if the poorest two-thirds of the world's prospective population are not merely to subsist, but to make an ascent to the level of a Portuguese peasant, output in the backward lands will have to rise about 12- to 15-fold—first to accommodate a probable three-fold increase in sheer numbers, then another four- or five-fold to supply each of these new inhabitants with an income on a Portuguese scale.

Admittedly, figures such as these must be treated with great caution. Gross national product is a very inadequate indicator of human well-being. In many of the backward lands important improvements could be made in the quality of life merely by the attainment of stable and just governments and economic sys-

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tems, the introduction of literacy, the vigorous promotion of public health measures including birth control and the repair of nutritional deficiencies. These changes are not likely to be reflected in changes in GNP to the extent that increases in steel production would be, even though their importance may be incomparably greater and their demands on the environment incomparably less. Therefore the need for growth in living standards must not be assumed inevitably to require environmental damage.

Yet, with all these caveats, the fact of a relentless burgeoning of populations—and the hope for a rise in their material consumption—makes inevitable the need for very large increases in physical output. Huge additions to food production, textile output and simple shelters will be required to sustain, much less elevate, the prospective billions in the backward world. In turn this requires the output of vast quantities of fertilizer, of steel, of cement and bricks and lumber, with all the environmental problems we have seen. That vast—although somewhat indeterminate—increase in needed output provides a powerful incentive to rethink the desirability of "zero industrial growth."

Now let us add to it the demands for growth stemming from the industrialized world. We may be tempted, of course, to dispute the moral value of much of this growth. Do we need more luxury goods per capita? Would not our own quality of life be vastly improved by increases in nonmaterial "outputs," or by the redistribution of what we already possess? However valid these queries, they are as irrelevant to the problem of the environmental challenge as questions regarding the "morality" of the projected population increases in the East and South. What we are interested in, both with regard to population and industrial output, are the levels to which the world will be "pressing" under the enormous inertia of its present social forces. Any realistic appraisal tells us that just as there will be vast increases in population if that population can be kept alive, so there will be vast increases in industrial output if that output is attainable. The question, then, is whether we have the resources and the absorptive capacity to allow that mounting trend of industrial output to materialize.

This returns us to the question of basic resources whose alarming limitations we have already noted. Do those limitations mean that potential industrial growth will be throttled by resource

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exhaustion, just as potential population growth may be curbed by food exhaustion?

Before we leap to that gloomy conclusion, we must reëxamine the table itself—or rather, the facts on which the table rests. Here the first important consideration is that those "facts"—the basic data of resource availability—are very insecure. With the possible exception of a few items (such as natural gas within U.S. continental boundaries), we have only the haziest knowledge of the full extent of the resources of the world. Indeed, the fact that for the past many decades each generation has ended its period of growth with larger amounts of "proved" reserves of many resources than it started with suggests that the size of our "known" reserves is mainly determined by the effort we invest in looking for them. In the Soviet Union, for example, the huge Siberian subcontinent has barely been prospected: one Russian economist recently estimated offhandedly that it contained the wherewithal for "a thousand years" of Russian resource needs. So, too, the South American continent is still largely terra incognita, and may reveal as much totally unexpected wealth as did, for example, the rich Alaskan oil slope or the Libyan oil fields, both vast reservoirs which have been discovered only in the last decade. Thus an "optimistic" estimate of the availability of resources may in reality not be five times the present estimates, but ten or 50 times. This does not rescue the world from the problem of exponential growth per capita, but it defers the day of reckoning by another generation or two.

Second, it is necessary to take into account a technological reality that the table cannot reflect. This is the substitutability that exists among resources. For instance, there is a strong likelihood that we will use up our reservoirs of natural gas and petroleum in another generation. However, the table does not show (nor do the anti-growth scientists discuss) the possibility of shifting to alternative sources of fossil fuel, such as the enormous reserves of oil shale the world possesses. By way of analogy we should recall that today we feed our steel industry with low grade ores that fifty years ago, when the Mesabi Range was still yielding its high-grade ores, were not even considered as potential "reserves." Thus, resource substitution also defers the day of reckoning by an indeterminate, but possibly quite substantial, period.

That pushing-back of the time frontier is all-important with

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regard to the resource problem. For potentially the globe *has* limitless resources—limitless, at least, in reference to the needs of its microbial surface—in the minerals locked into its rocks and sea water. Given enough power, which nuclear energy now begins to promise us, we could literally "melt" the rocks and reconstitute any substance by synthetic processes. To be sure, such processes would entail the processing of enormous quantities of seawater or granite, with associated problems of disposal and thermal pollution. But from the point of view of sheer bottlenecks of supply, the long-term future holds out much more promise than the anti-growth school of thought reveals.

The basic question, then, when we consider the ultimate resources of seawater and granite, is how long it will take us to achieve the power and the techniques needed to bring these alchemic possibilities into actuality. I do not know what time scales are to be attached to these objectives, but on the answers will depend the rate at which we can safely use up "raw" materials before we switch to synthetic ones.

If the scientific consensus is that fusion power is improbable (we know it is not impossible) for an "indefinite" period, we shall have to reconcile ourselves to the scale of resource use that is compatible with fission power. If our scientists agree that certain problems of synthetic chemistry will take us "generations" to solve, then we shall have to husband carefully those substances whose supplies will be limited to the amounts we can recycle each year from our industrial process. Thus the resource problem hinges finally on our scientific and technological capabilities. Judging by the past it would be foolish to take an attitude of determined pessimism before these capabilities. For if there is one factor that ultimately limits our growth from the input side, it is our reservoir of knowledge of science and technology, and the exponential curve of that resource soars steadily upward without sign of limit.

But what about barriers imposed by pollutants? Here, as I have said, are the most serious of the limits to growth put forth by the M.I.T. studies. Yet there is a certain arbitrariness in their treatment of pollutants. The models showing "collapse" in 50 to 100 years make the "generous" assumption that we can reduce pollution by a factor of four. Why not 40 or 400? At this critical juncture, the anti-growth school musters no evidence at all. Yet, could not one argue plausibly that the technology of pollution-

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suppression may increase its effectiveness exponentially, along with growth?

In the end, we are left, to be sure, with the long-run problems of carbon dioxide and heat. The former may be avoided by a shift of technologies away from combustion toward nuclear fission or fusion; the latter remains a brooding presence. It is only fair to add, however, that the presence is uncertain. The measurements of changes in the temperature of the earth's ambient are imprecise; we do not even possess very accurate knowledge of the relative effects of man's heat pollution compared with nature's—there are, after all, volcanoes, geothermal springs and currents, the steady heat input of solar energy. Thus, while there is every reason to be cautious, panic is hardly indicated. "The principal defect of the industrial way of life with its ethos of expansion," begins "A Blueprint for Survival," "is that it is not sustainable." In the end, that charge, with its exponential emphasis, cannot be faulted. That end, however, is still probably far distant. The question, then, is what to do about it now.

IV

The authors of the "Blueprint" and "Limits" have a very clear idea of what to do about it now. We must engage in an all-out effort to bring about zero population and zero industrial growth as soon as possible. To that end, every technological means to reduce waste, expand resource availability through recycling, and to lower pollution must be vigorously pushed. But ultimately, the prime requirement is the attainment of a society in which both the size of population and of the capital stock are stable. In a word, the only solution for ecological equilibrium is the stationary, growthless state.

This is a very curious solution for two reasons. The first, to which the studies pay only fleeting heed, is that a "stationary" state—one in which industrial growth had ceased—would not necessarily be a society in ecological balance. This is because a society can be "stationary" and can still be polluting the environment. Indeed, under the assumptions of the M.I.T. model, a stationary state will still asphyxiate itself, although it will take somewhat longer to do it.

Second, a stationary state, as we have seen, would impose fearful costs on the populations of the underdeveloped world and severe institutional strains within the industrialized world. Sup-

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pose, however, that it were possible to go on growing—producing more grain, more consumer goods—*without adding to pollution,* by the discovery of new and better seeds, or cleaner production processes. Would there then be any reason to deny more food and more consumer goods to the poor, or even to the rich? I can think of none, and I suspect that the members of the anti-growth school cannot either.

A very important conclusion follows. As the M.I.T. models themselves show, it is not "growth" that is the mortal enemy, but pollution. The program of the ecologically minded scientist, therefore, should not be aimed against growth, but only against pollution-generating growth. Any technological change that will increase output without further damaging the air or water or soil, any technological change that will enable us to increase output by shifting from a less to a more abundant resource (again, without an increase in pollution), represents perfectly safe growth, and should be welcomed with open arms.

This emphasis on finding "cures" for pollution, resource exhaustion and population growth clearly puts technology in the key position. To this, the M.I.T. scientists reply that too much reliance on technology diverts us from taking "effective action" on the problem of growth. Does it? Let us assume that the anti-growth scientists are correct, and that they convince their colleagues around the world that collapse will be inevitable within a generation or two unless fully corrective measures are begun today.

What sorts of measures would these be? In the underdeveloped world, we would certainly require the imposition of compulsory birth control aimed at a negative net reproduction rate (say only one child—not one *female* child—per family); in the advanced countries, stringent measures to bring immediate zero population growth. In the underdeveloped world, we would have to stop the green revolution with its agricultural increases bought only at the expense of vast, pollution-generating fertilizer inputs; in the developed world, we would necessarily anticipate decreases in food production as a result of a ban on chemical fertilizers. Further industrialization might perhaps be permitted in the neediest countries—a few steel mills in Asia and Africa; an absolute halt to capital formation would be necessary in the West.

I could extend the list of particulars, but there is little point

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in doing so. For it is clear that the imposition of such a program is far beyond our existing political and social capabilities. What Asian, African or South American leader, confronted with all the scientific evidence in the world, would endorse such a program for his people now? What Western statesman would advocate a program of immediate asceticism to avert a disaster that is still at least a century away?

What is at stake here is more than the obvious resistance that such measures would encounter from existing political and economic institutions. It is also a matter of our personal willingness to undergo present sacrifice for the well-being of our unborn progeny. I have wondered, for example, how many of the 100-odd signers of the "Blueprint" and the "Limits" have sold their automobiles or never take a taxi? I wonder how many have dispensed with all unnecessary gadgets in their homes, use both sides of the page when they type a manuscript, flush their toilets but once a day, and generally conduct themselves with the Spartan restraint integral to a program of economic limitations such as they urge?

In a differently constituted society, such an identification with future generations might be possible. It is not easy to find in our own. Of course I know that a beginning has been made. Some toxic products have been banned. Anti-pollution laws have been written. A concern for ecology has become part of the standard political rhetoric. But measured against the scale of action demanded by the anti-growth scientists, what has been done is pitifully inadequate. Anti-pollution measures have been contested and evaded by powerful economic interests. The determination of family size has been declared by our President to be a "personal matter." The most casual inspection of cityscape or landscape testifies to the lack of concern for our own generation, much less for coming generations.

The problem evaded by the anti-growth school, in other words, is how to mobilize the social will—how to induce us to apply *existing* technologies against the resistance of entrenched interests and ordinary people alike. If we are to mount a response on the scale they propose, I suspect there is only one way—by the ghastly appearance of the initial stages of ecological disaster itself. A temperature inversion that takes the lives of a few thousand people in New York or Tokyo may lead to banning cars and smoke from those cities; a horrifying rise in infant mortality

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traceable to nitrate-based fertilizers may bring effective bans on chemical additives to the soil. Short of such terrible stimuli, I do not believe that the pace of industrial growth will be significantly slowed in the cause of environmental safety or that the overloading of the environment will be significantly diminished. Thus if, in the end, I pin my faith on "technology"—meaning the search for resource-extending and for pollution-suppressing techniques, even if they remain for a long while unused—it is because I cannot think of anything today that is more likely to be useful in the solution of the problem that one day mankind will have to solve.

V

That brings us finally to the fundamental problem of containing within a finite system an ever-mounting volume of contaminants. Here, as I have said, the scientists are right. However "alarmist" the data on which their models are based, however naïve their call for social change on a scale that is beyond reach and by means they do not make explicit, one cannot fault their assertion that the exponential curves of growth, human and industrial, will sooner or later overtake the finite capabilities of the biosphere, bringing dreadful declines in population and in the quality of life. I have suggested that the period of grace before that time of catastrophe and collapse may be considerably longer than they project, but it is not an indefinite period. Sooner or later the problem must be faced.

But how is it to be faced? Let me try to answer the problem by stressing an aspect of it which we have hitherto ignored—the extent of the institutional changes needed to attain a condition of ecological equilibrium. Central among these changes will assuredly be the extension of public control far beyond anything yet experienced in the West, Socialist *or* capitalist. To bring environmental stability, the authority of government must necessarily be expanded to include family size, consumption habits, and of course the volume and composition of industrial and agricultural output. In a word, the social price of ecological control is a vast increase in the scope and penetration of regulatory authority, designed to enforce the necessary zero-growth behavior at the micro level on which our collective safety will depend at the macro level.

It is here that my scenario departs most strikingly from that

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of the authors of the "Limits" and the "Blueprint" and the anti-growth community in general. More sanguine than they about the technological possibilities of continuing industrial growth for a considerable period, I am far more pessimistic about the ease with which such a social transition can be made.[4] In the West, for example, surely the eventual necessity for a stabilized flow of output (quite aside from the other regulatory interventions that may be needed) spells the end of the mindlessly self-aggrandizing corporation as we now know it. Whether capitalism can adapt to the tensions of such a static state, in which growth no longer tempers the struggle over the division of the social product, is a moot question. If something called "capitalism" does survive, it will surely be cast in a very different mold than it is today.

Nor is the prospect an easy one for the industrial Socialist nations. Ministries as well as corporations find the ethos of growth both exhilarating and socially useful, and will find the constraints of a growthless state much more cramping than those of an expanding one. Perhaps more fundamental, socialism has always assumed a condition of "abundance" as the precondition for the inauguration of a "true" Communist society. Given the constraints of ecological limits that cannot be safely breached, that ideological premise must be abandoned; and the institutions and incentives of true communism re-thought.

More sobering yet— for who cares, in the perspective of ultimate environmental safety, if the institutions of present-day capitalism or socialism disappear?—is whether global requirements of pollution control and resource conservation can be imposed on—or will be shattered by—the ferociously guarded boundaries of "national interest." Indeed, we might well ask whether the approach toward the ecological disaster point will encourage the more equitable international distribution of the means of life, or will only serve to fortify the resolve of favored nations to preserve their own good fortune against the rest?

Thus the ecological problem is indeed fundamental—but in another way than that which the anti-growth scientists stress. Essentially, their dilemma of exponential growth and finite envi-

[4] The authors of the "Blueprint" do indeed describe a kind of balanced social system in which ecological safety is maintained by carefully planned small rural communities. Like all Utopias, it is a joy to contemplate. Alas, like all Utopias it contains not a word as to how we are to go from where we are to where we are supposed to be.

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ronmental space involves problems of technology that will be solved—or will not be solved—over a fairly long run. But much more immediate, there is another problem in the social changes that will have to be begun in our generation and carried further in the next generations to come. The "fundamental" problem is therefore a social as well as a technical one; and whereas I have indicated some reason for optimism with regard to our technical capabilities for adaptation, I do not find it so easy to be sanguine with respect to our near-term ability to bring about the needed social and institutional changes.

But that very fact may help us answer the question with which we began and with which we now end: how is the environmental challenge to be faced? For clearly something is required in addition to that "sense of detachment and balanced appraisal" of which I spoke before. This additional element is the cultivation and gradual dissemination of a changed attitude to the environment—indeed, to life itself: an attitude based on a wholly new awareness of the fragility of our planet as a life-supporting vehicle.

As I have stressed, it would be foolish to expect such a change in attitude to manifest itself quickly in the face of the needs, the desires, and the institutional inertias of our time. None the less a beginning can be made—indeed, is being made by the very arguments we have been considering in this piece. In becoming aware of the hitherto unsuspected existence of a crucial environmental challenge, we feel within ourselves the first stirrings of an unaccustomed view of the human future, and of our responsibility for assuring that there will be a human future. Our generation is unlikely to solve the technical problems that will guarantee the indefinite viability of the planet, and will surely not solve the social challenges that are indissolubly associated with mankind's survival. But in the startled recognition that an ultimate ecological problem exists, it can set the stage for more decisive action by generations to follow.

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DOES EUROPE HAVE A FUTURE?

By Jean Laloy

"WER von Europa spricht, hat unrecht," Bismarck said: "Whoever speaks of Europe is wrong." After reading a great deal of what has been written about Europe, one is tempted to agree with the old statesman. It has become increasingly difficult to get one's bearings. Are pro-Europeans for or against the Americans? For or against the Russians? For or against other Europeans? Can one find clear answers to these questions?

In the decade of neo-realism, it seemed wise to abandon dreams of the past, to rely on the balance of power and the prudence of sovereign governments. However, it must also be noted that even if the European idea has not mobilized as many partisans as, for example, the revolution in mores or women's liberation, it has not been extinguished. And with the entrance of the United Kingdom into the European Community, it will soon take a new form.

To understand this phenomenon of Europe, to imagine its future development, one must turn to its origins and look for what has changed in 20 years. One can thereby infer what possibilities are open to the Eur-europeans, situated between their Eur-american cousins, and the Eur-asiatics.

II

Those who spoke of "Europe" before the war was over or immediately after it, had no intention of creating a "superpower." The idea did not even exist. The guiding spirit of resistance movements, or The Hague Peace Conference of 1907, was a politico-moral one—that of reconciliation. For the German resistants of the White Rose, as well as for the resistance movements of Italy, France, Poland and the Low Countries, the two World Wars had originated in the absolute authority of the state. If one wished to prevent the same thing from happening yet another time, Germany should not be punished, as after 1919, but reintegrated into the human family, beginning with Europe. The means toward this end were implicit in the federal idea, which existed in various formulae, elaborated to a greater or less degree, and which was the basis of all the European resistance move-

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ments.[1] The war was thought of as not against Germany specifically, but rather as against the madness of hypernationalism; the remedy for the calamities of war lay in a collective effort to organize Europe in a fundamentally different way.

The Europe of the future can perceive, in this way, its furthest limits. The federal idea, in effect, collides with the hostility of the Soviets. It is known that from 1943 on the Russians were opposed to plans for a federation of Poland and Czechoslovakia. In 1944, they were cool to ideas for the union of Western Europe, which had been discussed several times in the press. Later, in 1948, they were to oppose plans for Balkan federation outlined by Dimitrov and Tito, even though this was a case of two Communist states. This hostility had profound roots: in 1915, from Switzerland, Lenin had criticized the slogan "A United States of Europe" as likely to distract revolutionaries from their most pressing task of overthrowing established institutions.[2]

In the United States during the war, the idea of a federal Europe did not receive firm support. There were various movements in its favor, but the Democratic administration and Roosevelt himself always seemed more interested in world problems than in European ones. Cordell Hull thought in terms of free trade, Roosevelt in terms of global organization and decolonization. When, in 1943, Churchill proposed that a world system be divided into regional groupings, one of these being European, Roosevelt declared himself for a one-world organization. It was this idea which inspired the Dumbarton Oaks agreements and the San Francisco Charter. Thus, at the moment of victory, the idea of a union of European states without distinction between winners and losers was eclipsed by different preoccupations.

However, the European idea continued to evolve. The development of the situation in Germany presented a dilemma. The Four Powers had to reach an understanding if a German political whole was to be reëstablished. When this understanding proved impossible, the Powers were faced with a choice: the Western zones of Germany could be kept under militiary occupation, or a larger framework had to be conceived to contain German dynamism. This framework, obviously, was Europe.

But how should the idea be translated into action?

[1] See W. Lipgens, "Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen, 1940–'45." Munich, 1968.

[2] *Cf.* Lenin, "The slogan, 'A United States of Europe'," August 23, 1915, *Works* (in Russian), Vol. 26, 5th edition, p. 351–355.

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III

It is often said that European unity was created by the cold war. One could more justly say that the cold war was specifically organized to make European unity fail. "Germany," Zhdanov declared in 1947 at the founding of the Cominform, "will be the principal stumbling block between the United States, England and France." In other words, it would not be possible to construct a unified Europe because the three powers would not be able to resolve the German problem. But they did resolve it, at least in the West. And they resolved it because the European idea offered them the means.

Without having to make room for Germany, the European idea would no doubt have remained a noble dream. But from the moment this idea began to assume substance it obliged the Europeans to turn toward America. Without American support, nothing could be done. The danger was too great. Not that the Soviet Union was threatening war, but it possessed the means of intimidation. The United States, for its part, having abandoned hopes for the rapid creation of a world order, was trying to create an order within more modest limits. It was from this moment that the European movement began to interest America.

The first European organizations, the European Coal Organization and the European organization of internal transport, grew out of the dissolution of the inter-Allied headquarters, SHAEF. It was necessary to apportion raw materials and food supplies for the devastated areas, without reference to national frontiers. The European Economic Commission of the United Nations was created in 1947 at American instigation, when there was fear of a serious crisis at the cessation of rehabilitation credits and aid. It was not then a question of stemming a flood, but more simply of applying a remedy to a catastrophic situation.

The plan for aiding Europe in 1947 did not create the European movement, but converged with it, giving it content and direction. This was not so much anti-Soviet as anti-hegemony, and was concerned with stopping "popular democracy" by economic and political means until the events of Prague definitely destroyed the precarious postwar equilibrium. Whatever assessment one may make today of the meaning of the Harvard speech of General Marshall, of a certain paternalism which necessarily developed in consequence, of U.S. interest in assuring itself prosperous markets, it is a curious fact that 25 years later the

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undertaking begun by Secretary Marshall led to the beginnings of a quarrel between the United States and the European Community. It is an odd form of imperialism which is blind enough to create its own rivals.

In any case, in Europe the Marshall Plan was understood to mark the end of American hesitations and the beginning of a long-term undertaking, leading both Europeans and Americans toward important innovations. Everyone who took part in the workings or negotiations of this period retains particular memories of it. Whatever the shocks to self-esteem or special interests, one had the impression of getting out of a rut, or moving toward something other than a simple alternation between peace and war.

However, the German problem remained. How could one treat as an equal a country which had neither government nor territory? And how, unless one treated it as an equal, could one undertake relations which, correct to begin with, could then become friendly? French leaders were particularly sensitive to this aspect of the situation. They had with difficulty obtained in 1944 an international authority for the Ruhr, charged with supervising the production and export of German coal. What chance was there that an organization of this type would survive the reëstablishment of normal relations? How could a repetition of the events which had paralyzed Briand be prevented when a Federal Republic came into being?

"Germany was refused everything at a moment when she should have been given something," Robert Schuman remarked in 1949, "and given everything when everything should have been refused."[3] This was the background of the Schuman Plan, which took shape in 1949–1950, at a moment of détente, after the Berlin crisis and before the Korean crisis, which no one was anticipating. In a pioneering spirit, in order to avoid giving Germany full sovereignty, it was necessary to sacrifice a corresponding part of French sovereignty. Based on equality and reciprocity, these sacrifices became permanent, and were able to serve as a foundation for a new kind of institution, surpassing any given sovereignty without abolishing it. A certain order and rationality were thus introduced into international relations. Within its functional and technocratic framework, the Coal and Steel Community reflected strictly European aspirations, and resolved the German question, at least in part. The Community

[3] *Cf.* Robert Rochefort, "Robert Schuman." Paris: 1965, p. 238.

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also aimed at renewing contacts with the East. The memorandum which Jean Monnet sent to the French government on May 3, 1950, which was the source of the Schuman Plan, had as its essential theme the necessity of evading the cold war and a Russo-American confrontation, which would lead to German predominance in Western Europe. It was therefore necessary to create a "balance." In this initial period Europe did not consider itself an instrument of the cold war. It found its security in a privileged relationship with the United States, but it did not adopt hostility toward the Soviet Union.

Thus the European idea, which was latent in the public mind, became reality through force of circumstances, and because a choice was made by European leaders.

It is no surprise that under these conditions the results were positive. The newly formed European Community survived the upheavals of decolonization, the failure of the European Army, and, after the death of Stalin, the considerable changes which occurred in relations with Russia. Reborn in 1957, the Community survived various shocks before being enlarged in 1971 in a way that had long been desired, and long resisted.

Does this mean that we have only to congratulate ourselves and to continue on our present course? This would be to deceive ourselves about present realities and to underestimate the risks which the undertaking continues to run.

IV

The greatest difficulty arises not from the inevitable wearing thin of political ideas, but from the general devaluation of language. At the end of the war certain words still had meanings which were obvious to everyone: to be liberated did not mean to be enslaved; to wish for understanding among countries did not mean preparation for conquest; to invoke justice did not mean planned injustice. The principle of contradiction still existed.

Today, many elements have become confused. On the one hand, there is no longer confidence in language as a medium for expressing another, immaterial order of reality; on the other, a language of double meaning is the rule almost everywhere. If I condemn you as a bloody imperialist, that actually means that I wish an understanding with you, but cannot say so for fear of offending one of my allies. Therefore, it is up to you to under-

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stand. If you refer to me as a "totalitarian," that means that you need to reassure your middle classes. But no one is fooled.

The disintegration of language leads to the disappearance of meaning. Any attempt at settlement must be a success or a failure; there is no possibility of finding a superior solution. The general political effects of this linguistic collapse are immense, and have been very much felt in Europe as a primary cause of weakness, although there are others.

The final shape of Europe, such as it existed in 1950, has become blurred. The world as presently constituted has been overwhelmed by the idea of sovereignty. Not only the sovereignties of Malta, Cyprus, Mauritius, Burundi, but also the sovereignties of the great powers, which, having drawn back from the temptation of crusades, are now coming out in favor of a healthy realism. A Guam doctrine exists not only for the United States, but perhaps also for China after the Cultural Revolution, if not for the Soviet Union since the Twenty-fourth Party Congress.

Given these conditions, many Europeans now lean toward the idea of a Europe which has once again become a center of power, of equal strength with the Russians, Americans, Chinese and the Japanese, joining them in the game of menace and ruse, *die grosse Politik*. Without denying the attractions of this possibility, or its merits, one can none the less remember that it does not correspond to the ideas of the founders of the European movement. And perhaps, too, it does not correspond to the European political temperament.

The fascination of power affects national opinion. Each country is more aware of the weight of its own interests, more inclined to question the sincerity of its partners, and consequently less likely to agree to even the smallest sacrifice. The "European language" no longer represents an awareness of a common cause, but is instead a cover for the defense of national interests. "Wer von Europa spricht, hat unrecht."

This evolution is occurring at a dangerous moment, as the United States is involved in a long-range policy shift and the Soviet Union expects to "cash in" on a 20-year effort to become the decisive voice in Europe. We shall not dwell here on the commercial and monetary tensions between the United States and the Europe of the Ten. These are considerable, and everyone knows what they are. But with all they contain that is harmful and even dangerous, these tensions will perhaps lead the two

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parties—if two there be—to recognize the necessity of an understanding on a different basis from that which has obtained for the last 25 years—or even ten years.

More serious still are the problems arising from the policies announced at Guam, of which Europe became aware after the Moscow agreements. It is not the agreements on strategic weapons which most drastically alter the situation, although, to be sure, they establish a certain continuity of Soviet-American interests and make a nuclear reaction from the United States a less likely response to crisis in Europe. However, they also make a Soviet threat of the same kind less likely. The situation is less desirable, from one point of view, and somewhat better from another. The fundamental balance remains.

Conversely, in the public domain, the Moscow declaration establishes between the United States and the Soviet Union a parallelism which gives rise to certain questions. If the United States considers "peaceful coexistence" the only alternative to war, is it not conceding that the struggle continues by every means short of recourse to arms? Can a true peace be founded on such a base? In undertaking never to seek a "unilateral advantage" to the detriment of the other side, what exactly are the two parties agreeing to? Will the Soviet Union have the right to occupy a European country if the country decides to detach itself from the Eastern system? How will these problems be viewed if they should arise in the heart of the Western alliance? A crisis like that between the United States and Japan does not exist between the United States and Europe; but the seeds of such a crisis do exist.

Finally, Europe must examine the intentions of the Soviet Union. Certainly, Brezhnev accepts the reality of the Common Market. But Khrushchev also accepted that reality in 1962, and that acceptance made no substantial difference. However, the Soviet Union can congratulate itself on the triumph of its European policies, which were defined nearly 20 years ago. These led to the crystallization of the situation which evolved from the war, a situation which, until now, most European states condemned as a consequence of the division of territories arranged at Yalta. Does this contain the basis of an agreement?

To this it must be added that Soviet military power has become large and diverse, spreading to East and South Asia and the Mediterranean—not to mention the seven seas and four oceans.

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Under these conditions, will the creation of a general European system of nonaggression open the way to interpenetration from West to East, or the other way around? Will Europe play the part of Greece vis-à-vis Rome or the part of Greece vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire? Be harbingers of liberty or be reduced to a freedom under surveillance?

In short, Europe is now caught between two fires. The United States supports political Europe—which doesn't exist—but distrusts economic Europe. The Soviet Union tolerates economic Europe as a "fact," but is hostile to political Europe.

Does Europe, then, still have a future?

V

The progress of first-generation Europe (ours) was generated by particular circumstances and a large idea. Will second-generation Europe benefit from the same opportunities?

The scope open to large powers is very well known: they can do everything or nothing. But which of these they will choose they will decide for themselves.

As for small powers, it is well known that they can do just about anything. They can fight or come to an agreement, play at blackmail or retreat into isolation. They still enjoy the ancient privileges of sovereignty.

But what can middle-sized powers do?

If they move, they disturb the great powers. If they do not move, they run the risk of perishing. If they wish to bring pressure on smaller powers, they become laughable. The same is the case if they try to act like great powers. In today's world, it is hard to be medium-sized. But Europe is the fatherland of middle-sized powers; Europe is where such powers were born. As Voltaire observed, it is "a kind of large republic, divided into several states . . . each corresponding to the others" (which is to say, maintaining constant relations, in war as in peace). After the excesses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these states have returned to a sense of their proper dimensions. Will they be able to draw sound conclusions from this realization?

One of these conclusions should be that middle-sized states must associate: to survive if they are industrial, for industry straddles frontiers; to exist if they wish concerted action, for in isolation none of them has the capacity to act effectively.

What has happened in all this to the ancient idea of reconcilia-

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tion? It continues, but the domain of its application has changed. It has become a search for the means to make large and different entities live together without harming each other, and thus without harming others. It is necessary to create not only a new world but a new kind of relationship, a means of living together which conciliates, at least in part, authority and liberty, equality and hierarchy, unity and diversity. The idea of a European organization is not a dream but one of those issues with very real present difficulties.

The problem faced by medium-sized states is the problem faced by everyone. But it presents itself to these states as a matter of urgency, and there are certain possibilities for resolving it. If these nations decide, even in part, on a course of action, they will have opened a way to that resolution. As in the sixteenth century, when the more or less centralized state succeeded in regrouping the feudal principalities, so in the twentieth, the Community can rise above the state without destroying it, and offer human beings, caught between nuclear weapons, the population explosion, pollution and despair, some reasonable prospects.

States preserve their territories, their institutions and their prejudices. But middle-sized states, which can neither turn to force nor remain inert (*i.e.* neutral), need to evolve, either separately or together. A postulate of this are institutions to guarantee peaceful change. One could even say that these institutions are the condition of any policy of reconciliation.

Europe can thus set for itself an objective, which is not only for itself (it belongs to everyone) but for which it has a special affinity. If it finds solutions, these will be used elsewhere later, perhaps even by the great powers. Even from this point of view, the creation in 1972 of a permanent committee to administer the Soviet-American treaty is an important fact. Here, between two rival powers, a means of communication has been established, which until now was particularly developed in the West, and specifically in Western Europe.

To assure that the general objective of peaceful transformation has practical results, one must envisage its application in various domains.

VI

Already in Western Europe many organisms exist to identify problems, prepare for their solution and put those solutions into

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practice. This is true in the economic field, although progress is still necessary before a genuine Community administration can be reached.

But in the political and military domains everything is still to be done. And without an organization for reflection, decision and application, no progress can be made. Without progress, one can only assume that the national societies of Western Europe will fall into dependence, and will not rise to the level demanded of them. It can justly be said that nothing must be done with undue haste, that first an economic and monetary union must be established. But during the establishment of such a union, preparations must be made for what will follow. Specific directions of research can be determined, and groups designated for organization.

On the political level, an attempt can be made to discover areas of interest sufficiently congruent to suggest common attitudes, areas in which differences are possible and tolerable, and areas which will remain exclusively national. Such an effort would eliminate from the first a certain number of false problems and would permit reflection on the nature of the institutions to be developed, or the methods to be undertaken, as well as of the stages which lie ahead. The first of these stages would be to draw up documents defining not only a common attitude, but common limits within which the participating governments would act, each government retaining for itself a certain margin within those limits. Several permanent commissions could begin to function on this basis, thus avoiding the necessity of immediately fixing the definitive location of the political organs.

One cannot go so far in the area of defense. However, the problem of relations with the United States must necessarily be faced. At times, a new defense agreement has been suggested, either within the Atlantic Alliance or as a substitute for it. Whether or not a route to this point can be perceived, a reëxamination of the conditions of security in Western Europe will shortly be necessary. It is hard to believe that the present conditions of European dispersion will allow this reëxamination to take place under auspicious conditions.

The conditions of dialogue between Europe and the United States exist. But organizations barely exist. This dialogue will necessarily take place on the economic and monetary plane, and one must hope it will not be a dialogue of the deaf. However,

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on the political and military level, everything depends on progress within Europe itself. The existence of a permanent American-Soviet dialogue organized on the basis of a treaty will perhaps make evident the necessity of closer contact between the United States and Western Europe. But the Europeans must still understand each other on this point, and such understanding is not easily reached. Perhaps the idea of independence should be considered. But does independence mean the power to do as one pleases? The power to do what seems right not only toward oneself but also toward a majority of others? The primacy of will or of reason?

At this point the most difficult questions must be faced. The idea of peaceful transformation, to the extent that it can lead to a softening of the political system of Eastern Europe, is diametrically opposed to the design of the Soviet Union. Many, therefore, incline to the view that it is better to keep silent rather than disturb the atmosphere. But this attitude can be questioned. It would be justified if a rapid and more-or-less complete transformation of existing régimes were in question; but that is not the case. One cannot see why, under these conditions, the West Europeans, while repudiating the spirit of the cold war, should not make their long-term aims clear. This would in no way inhibit provisional compromises but would balance them, removing the unilateral character which is a consequence of reflecting only one point of view.

In this area, where great resistance can be expected, one could perhaps begin by proposing institutions of a consultative character, made up of representatives from both East and West, charged with favoring a peaceful change in situations which generate crises, improving communications between East and West, and anticipating common measures to be undertaken against any new storms which might develop. Instead of a Europe conceived of as closed enclaves, one would have a Europe still divided, but which had become a terrain of encounter and experiment. One might perhaps activate certain long-term relations on the basis of a long-term political project.

Instead of the scheme recommended by the Soviet Union, namely (1) status quo; (2) European security; (3) withdrawal of American forces, one would have: (1) conciliation between the two systems (with a view to future reconciliation); (2) peaceful transformation (or amelioration) of dangerous, abnor-

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mal or unhealthy situations; (3) progressive modification of military arrangements.

It would undoubtedly be impossible to reach rapid agreement on such a basis. But even more important than agreement is the awareness of a reasonable finality beyond ideology, even if it is distant and apparently unobtainable. This does not prevent compromise but allows a reach beyond compromise, when the moment is ripe. That is what peace means. Peace is not peaceful coexistence and mutual resignation to an ineluctable struggle. Peace is the certainty that a way out, or ways out, exist, which reason can discern and will achieve if conditions are ripe. Certain solutions in Europe can contribute to peace, others cannot.

The European problem today can be seen as a tryptych:

(1) The first section should depict the system as it exists: half of Europe linked to the Soviet Union, and Germany cut by the demarcation line between the two systems.

(2) The second section should depict a system which might be entitled "Europe with the Soviet Union, without the United States." The Soviet Union becomes the dominant continental power, but all the states do not necessarily—or immediately—become Communist.

(3) In the third section, one sees a Europe intermediate between East and West, with the Eastern states leaning toward the Soviet Union, the Western states toward the United States. But the two groups of medium-sized states also maintain a certain degree of communication between themselves. In the center, Germany is either unified but contained by a larger system, or maintained as two states which have between them relations based on the idea of liberty and law. This section displays the essential character of this third Europe: leading toward détente and a softening of the Eastern régimes without changing their structures or their guarantees of security.

If one considers these three perspectives for what they are, that is to say, as long-term views which have some value in principle, one can discern the rules of a very simple game: for Russia, the best move is from one to two, omitting three; for the Western countries, to pass from one to three, skipping two.

The most likely outcome would be neither two nor three, but some unknown move which cannot be defined today.

If second-generation Europe wishes to play its part in the game, it must find its own solution. I have attempted, in this

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article, to suggest one. Europe must think about its options and means of action. I have listed several of these. Europe must also give itself a watchword. This one, formulated by the French philosopher, Etienne Borne, is proposed:

"Either struggle is the essence of the debate, or debate is the essence of the struggle."

In either case, there is struggle. In the first case, it is endless. In the second, there is a rational and humane ending. It is this ending which the Western Europe of tomorrow should propose, if it does not give up on itself today.

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THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM AT STAKE

By William Diebold, Jr.

"THE Bretton Woods system is dead." How often has that remark been made in the last year? Like most clichés, it blends truth and error and the problem is to know in what proportion. The ending of the dollar's convertibility into gold and its devaluation can certainly be taken to mark the end of the monetary system with which we have lived for most of the postwar period. But only some parts of that system worked as envisaged at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. Other key attributes developed quite differently. Whatever monetary system comes next—perhaps it will bear the name of Nairobi where the International Monetary Fund meets in the fall of 1973—will certainly alter some of the Bretton Woods rules and practices but may also have some features closer to the original design than to the dollar standard of the past decades.

Money was only one of the things that concerned the designers of the Bretton Woods world (as it may be called since it has no other name). Trade, agriculture, capital movements and many other matters came into their plans and not least the problem of relating the domestic economic policies of a country to its international economic position. The basic principle of the Bretton Woods approach was that as many problems as possible should be dealt with by continuing multilateral coöperation, much of it carried on through a series of international organizations each of which was the center of a cluster of rules governing the behavior of member countries. The formula sounds banal. We take these principles for granted even when we do not always observe them. Yet the general acceptance of this idea and the creation of at least some of the institutions that embodied it made the Bretton Woods world different from anything that had preceded it. The salient question today is not whether the Bretton Woods world is dead, but whether what comes next in international economic affairs builds on it or reverts to that form of chaos called economic nationalism.

Even before the Depression made intense economic nationalism almost universal, coöperation in international economic affairs between the wars was rather modest and there were few major international economic organizations. The openness of the

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world economy before 1914 was more the result of ideas about the proper role of government than of international coöperation. The designers of the Bretton Woods world were trying both to avoid the troubles of the interwar period and to provide greater welfare for more people than the nineteenth-century system did. While ascribing high value to free markets, they recognized that in the mid-twentieth century governments had to take far greater responsibilities for economic life than had been thought necessary (or even possible) for some time past. No system could survive that did not somehow reconcile the demands of domestic policy and the requirements—formal or not—of the international economy. The tension between the two sets of government obligations was bound to give rise to many difficulties, but there was also the great promise—in which most of the architects of the Bretton Woods system fervently and idealistically believed—that full participation in a well-ordered international economy could significantly increase the ability of countries to meet the desires of their citizens.

The Bretton Woods response to these problems was in many ways inadequate but it is hard to envisage a satisfactory international economic system that would not try to deal with them in one way or another. In doing so, it will have to build on at least some of what has been accomplished in the last 25 years. In that sense, the Bretton Woods system is not dead. It is, however, threatened, not only in its monetary features but in fundamentals. That is the fact which makes the economic troubles of recent years—and those yet to come—more important than many people realize. We are dealing with more than an unlucky convergence of separate developments in Europe, Japan and the United States, a clumsy handling of new difficulties, and the friction inevitable in shifts in power. All these elements are real enough, but underlying them is a threat to the whole system of international economic coöperation resulting from a combination of neglect, deterioration, failure to adapt to changed circumstances, and, above all, unwise responses by the major economic powers to their own problems and those of the system. Not the least of the delinquents is the United States.

Out of the stress, strain and challenge may come one of three results: some adaptation of the existing system; substantially new arrangements; or further breakdown and more economic nationalism whether rooted in individual countries or in blocs.

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How matters fall within this range of possibilities depends on many things, but especially on what the United States does.

II

The United States was vital to the creation of the Bretton Woods world and will play the key part, though in a different way, in its adaptation, alteration or demise. Such statements are not popular these days when the fashionable emphasis is on the decline of American power, the need for others to take a larger share of responsibility, the deterioration of the United States' competitive position in the world and the weakness of the dollar. These factors are real and important, and a central fact in the present situation is the gain in wealth and economic strength of other countries, notably Japan and Western Europe. Nevertheless, it is still the United States which has the greatest wealth and economic power to be found under a single sovereignty. Failure to understand the extent of American economic strength is dangerous. It encourages the belief that others will do what they cannot and obscures the extent of the damage which action by the United States may inflict on not only the welfare of others but the fundamental structure of international coöperation.

Great power has to be used circumspectly. Unfortunately, the climate in the United States for the responsible use of economic power is not good. Unemployment, inflation and worry about the balance of payments stimulate policies that pay no regard to the interests of foreigners. Between the close of the Kennedy Round in 1967 and the ending of dollar convertibility in 1971, American presidents did not treat foreign economic policy as a matter of first political importance except in crises, which is no way to build for the future or even to maintain past gains. The neglect gave way to an approach in which an appreciation of political significance is accompanied by high risks related in part to a dangerous mood that has developed in the country.

No one, so far as I know, has borrowed Joe Jacobs' inelegant words, "We was robbed," but many share his sentiments when they think of past American policy. According to this view, the United States has been too generous to the rest of the world. It carried on in the spirit of the Marshall Plan when the need was over, reduced its tariffs faster and further than foreigners reduced theirs, accepted other governments' excuses of domestic political necessities as justifying failures to live up to commit-

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ments and expectations and, in the interests of "foreign policy," too often ignored American economic interests. Negotiators who were regarded by foreigners as hard men to deal with, especially as they had all the weight of American power and wealth behind them (as well as the threat of congressional displeasure), are now spoken of by some Americans as if they had been running around the world giving things away.

Part of this revival of Will Rogers' view that "the United States never lost a war or won a conference" is the repeated statement that Europe and Japan are not carrying their fair share of the burden of defense. A more limited, but important, element is the conviction of many businessmen that the United States is more sinned against than sinning in the use of restrictions on trade and payments, discriminatory practices, nontariff barriers and the like. The United States is seen as having a very open economy in which a low tariff is a low tariff and competitive conditions prevail. In this view, foreigners are on an equal footing with domestic producers in the American market while in foreign markets Americans are at a disadvantage because nominally low tariffs are nullified by border taxes, administrative regulations, government discrimination in purchasing and restrictive business practices imposed by local interests.

People who believe they face this kind of world naturally feel that the time is long past for the United States to assert its national interests and to give less weight than in the past to the special pleas of others. Long-run objectives that somehow seem to recede into the future and political goals that grow dull with repetition should be subordinated to the "realities" of the here and now, such as the need for exports, employment and the improvement of the balance of payments. The United States should use its economic strength to ensure that foreigners treat us at least as well as we treat them (and occasionally, it sometimes seems, a little better, perhaps in recognition of our past generosity). We should, in short, be "like every other country" in the pursuit of our national interests in a highly competitive world. If our efforts to right the balance of the past and strengthen our position in the world arouse foreign resentment and retaliation or generate even more economic nationalism abroad, we should not be unduly alarmed. Most other countries—Japan, Canada and Western Europe are the ones principally in mind—are far more dependent on international trade than the United States.

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They will feel more impact from restrictions than we will and have more to lose in the long run. Consequently, the chances are good that they will sooner or later come to terms on arrangements that take better account of American interests than those of the past. To support this view, the successful tactics of Secretary Connally between August and December 1971 may be cited.

Can this prescription be right? There is some truth in the charges. For most of the postwar period, American foreign economic policy has been concerned with the creation and maintenance of a world economic system based on coöperation and the removal of barriers to trade and payments. This has sometimes required the sacrifice of narrowly conceived short-run aims and would certainly have been incompatible with the unrestrained use of American political and economic power for purely national advantages as conventionally conceived. In pursuit of political and security aims, the United States has sometimes accepted economic burdens or disadvantages. Other countries have benefited from American policies and have not fully adapted their own behavior to the improvement of their positions. None spends as much of its income on defense as the United States. Japan restricts imports and investment more than other industrialized countries (but the others, including the United States, require of Japan export restraint that they do not accept themselves). The European Community's Common Agricultural Policy is highly restrictive while the farm policy of the United States (formerly the great sinner) has improved. In many foreign countries government-business relations, administrative practices and restrictive arrangements among businessmen put Americans at a disadvantage. And so on—the list of legitimate complaints is long.

The same story may be told in other terms. The United States has not really been Santa Claus. The altruistic elements in its policy have been based for the most part on a fairly clear conception of the kind of world economy that would best serve the long-run interests of the United States as well as of other countries. One need only try to imagine where we would be if there had been no Marshall Plan, GATT or Bretton Woods. While other countries have benefited, so has the United States. Not all the failures, errors and disappointments in foreign economic policy can be traced to generosity, misguided idealism or the sharp practices of others. Foreigners would laugh at the idea that the

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United States has always ignored domestic pressures or short-run interests. "Congress will not accept an alternative" has forced more than one foreign government to swallow unpleasant medicine. It is hard to see how a more narrowly nationalistic (or selfish) economic policy by the United States would have achieved as much politically or economically as the one actually followed, in whatever terms it is characterized.

However one appraises the record of the last 25 years, it is not realistic to expect to be compensated now or in the future for past errors or generosity. The United States is entitled to call on others to live up to their obligations and get rid of restrictions that are left over from times when they were weak and the dollar was strong. But beyond that, progress is not likely to be made except through bargains that are mutually advantageous. In a world where trade, investment and capital movements are all mixed up and the relation between national and private interests is blurred, generalizations about other countries being more restrictive than the United States are hard to test. Only through negotiations can complaints be translated into policy. Demands for more burden-sharing in military affairs have to be related to basic judgments about the needs of American security as well as the sharing of decisions about common security and the relative freedom (or lack of it) of each partner in foreign policy matters. In development aid, the picture of a giant flow from an American cornucopia and a dribble of pittances from others is out of date (though the figures that show many other countries giving a larger share of their gross national product in aid than the United States do not tell the whole story either).

In short, the world remains a place of complex issues that can only be resolved in a constructive fashion by patience, determination and give and take. But people who feel unfairly treated by an ungrateful world need little persuasion to support strong measures to set things right. The nationalist and populist rhetoric that accompanied the unilateral economic steps the United States took in the summer of 1971 may have been adopted for bargaining purposes, but it also must be seen as both a warning of the temptations that international issues may offer politicians and an echo of a simplistic economic nationalism that the world has scarcely heard since 1939.

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III

The economic conditions of the late sixties and early seventies have aggravated American discontent with the world. When concern for the balance of payments is added to unemployment and inflation, it becomes hard to resist any promise of short-run advantage, no matter what imposition of new controls it requires. In the past, the ability to hold the line against protectionist pressures has often depended on the government's invoking international commitments and the need to adhere to the basic principles of liberal policy lest other countries retaliate. But what principles apply if policy is animated only by nationalism?

Perhaps because it is so difficult to answer that question—or because the logical answers are so distressing—some of the supporters of the "strong line" taken by the Nixon administration in August 1971 have said that its basic rationale was to put the United States in a position to resume its "established policy"—*i.e.* further liberalization and continued international coöperation. There is certainly a case for this view. Tactically, there are advantages in using discontent to fuel a strong policy. Politically, it can be helpful to make foreign governments understand that the United States is serious about the issues. Economically, an improvement in the U.S. export position will strengthen the case for the view that the United States can gain from further liberalization. But there are risks in such a course and the arguments for taking them would be stronger if there were a clear idea about where a resumption of the "established policy" would lead. Simply to continue "the Bretton Woods approach" is inadequate to contemporary conditions and few alternatives have been proposed.

The chief contender appears to be the idea of a five-power world. In the hands of skillful analysts who keep themselves and their readers aware of its assumptions and limitations, this concept may be useful in elucidating certain problems of a world that is yet to come. But as a guide to foreign economic policy it is at best grossly inadequate and at worst pernicious.

The inadequacy lies in silence and generalization. Quite apart from saying nothing about economic relations between rich and poor countries (which are likely to grow more important in the future), the concept conceals more than it reveals about economic relations among the five powers themselves. It is hard to

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judge what kinds of economic relations may eventually develop between the Communist and non-Communist parts of the world, or between Russia and China, but it strains credulity to suppose that in the foreseeable future they will resemble the economic relations of Japan, Western Europe and the United States. But the model makes no distinction and so is no help. No doubt many versions of economic relations among the non-Communist industrial countries are intellectually compatible with the theory of the five-power world, including some that would permit a high degree of international coöperation. But this model is not just an intellectual construct. Perhaps because it is so simple at its core, the five-power idea has found its way through official speeches and papers into general currency in a vulgarized form that seems to be influencing American thinking (or feeling) about foreign affairs. In this version it encourages the view that the five centers are in permanent rivalry with one another and that each must mobilize all its different kinds of power to compete with the others. In these circumstances national interests are almost bound to be interpreted in narrow mercantilistic terms and competition becomes not a beneficial force in the marketplace but an effort to assert power and a reason to refuse coöperation.

This may prove to be a correct view of the world of the seventies and eighties. It is certainly the world that the United States and other countries will create if they act on the assumptions of the vulgarized model. But even if the model is abandoned or left to the theorists, the world will move in the direction of economic nationalism unless the governments of the industrial powers devote themselves to finding an alternative.

IV

What alternatives there are to economic nationalism and how governments may pursue them are matters that go beyond the scope of an article that is analytical rather than prescriptive. But to understand what kind of a task has to be undertaken, five salient facts must be taken into account: (1) The basic decisions have to be taken by the industrialized non-Communist countries. (2) The economic relations of these countries present unprecedented problems which can be dealt with only by new methods and policies. (3) At the same time, the reinvigoration of some old policies is essential to retaining some of the advantages these countries have achieved over the last few decades. (4) To find

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satisfactory ways of dealing with present problems will be considerably harder than the task faced at Bretton Woods. (5) The distribution of power in the industrial world increases the means available for dealing with these problems but complicates the process of mobilizing resources behind policy.

The first of these statements does not mean that the Communist countries or those in the less developed parts of the world would have no part in shaping the world economy. Their influence may well be greater in the future than it was in the past. Nevertheless, the issues that will do most to determine the character of the world economy for some time to come will arise in the next few years in the economic relations of Europe, North America and Japan. Those relations are different from anything the world has ever seen. Trade barriers are at record lows. Direct foreign investment—a matter of enterprise and organization as much as of money—plays a greater part than ever before in shaping not only international economic relations but many national economies as well. Money is more truly international, in its movement and accessibility, than in the past. The result is frequently labeled "interdependence," a word that sums up the openness of economies to one another, their interpenetration, and a considerable fluidity of goods, money, enterprise and, to a degree, people. A truly international economy has been growing up, much of it in private hands, but public power remains national. The resulting tensions shape the basic problems of international economic life and provide its dynamics.

This new world economy is only in part the result of the Bretton Woods approach but one cannot disentangle the effect of the removal of barriers to trade and payments and the way the forces of technology, science, entrepreneurship and the efforts of governments to satisfy their citizens have responded to the resulting freedom. But for the future it is plainly not enough to continue past policies. The various elements of the Bretton Woods approach make a pattern of success, failure, inaction and irrelevance. Some fresh starts are needed and perhaps some approaches that failed once should be tried again. Most of the new problems, however, result from the successes, the measures which have done most to create openness and interdependence. For example, the removal of tariffs has made other kinds of trade restrictions more important; the freer movement of capital raises questions about the regulation of the multinational enterprise.

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While it is impossible just to "go back to Bretton Woods," it is also impossible to make a completely fresh start. Governments have to live with their pasts; part of the best that they have created can be kept only by retaining some of the arrangements they first made years ago. Unless some old rules are kept alive, old problems will reappear. (How many tariffs would have been reimposed in the last five years if there had been no GATT?) The mixture of old and new requirements is a troublesome one, not made for dramatization, popularization or even consistency. The contrast with the forties is great; then there was little to preserve and the need for fresh starts was plain.

That was not the only advantage the architects of Bretton Woods had. At the heart of their effort was the wish to remove barriers to trade and payments, an objective with years of teaching, preaching and theory behind it. The difficulty was to get governments to act. This kind of liberalization remains important, but to cope with the new problems arising from the high degree of interdependence that has been achieved is much more complicated. On many of the issues there is no clear agreement about who would benefit from what course of action. And if that is clear, there may still be no consensus about desirable objectives. And even if governments agree about broad objectives, they will disagree about how to reach them. Many so-called nontariff barriers, for example, are closely linked with the pursuit of domestic objectives that governments will not (and should not) give up simply to expand trade, such as the improvement of conditions in depressed areas and the reduction of pollution. The "coördination of national policies" is a favorite prescription for dealing with balance-of-payments problems, but to live up to the idea could raise delicate domestic questions. All this is the natural result of interdependence, which requires coöperation in "positive" action, not just "negative" agreements to remove barriers. Put another way, the need is for an increasing degree of international management of economic affairs. To reconcile the conflicting demands of a single electorate is hard enough, especially at a time when traditional economic values like growth and efficiency are being challenged—and for good reasons. It is much more difficult to find ways of getting enough international agreement to make common action possible.

To be sure, the industrial countries face these unprecedented problems with greater resources than ever before. But wealth

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and welfare can blur the awareness of problems and affluence can make it seem cheaper to subsidize inefficiency than to face the social and political costs of adjustment. The openness of the industrial economies plus the speed of technological change will probably sharpen the pressures for adaptation, thus adding to the burdens of governments. Europe and Japan are strong, not weak as they were at the end of the War, but the dispersal of power over more centers can be an obstacle to action. It is empty to argue about who has the power to veto what, but it is obvious that no system of international coöperation can be viable without the active participation of Japan and Europe.

It was unrealistic and somewhat self-indulgent for Americans to say for some years that it was time for others to take the lead in international economic affairs. There are good historical reasons, and understandable political and psychological ones, why Europe and Japan should be preoccupied with such matters as integration in the one case and the rapid entry into the upper reaches of the world economy in the other. These concerns will not disappear overnight. Still, it would be unrealistic and self-indulgent of the Europeans and Japanese to suppose that if they do not accord a higher priority than in the past to the requirements of the international economic system, the United States will not only do the job for them but take adequate account of their interests in what it does.

They should have learned from the monetary crisis of 1971 that if others confine themselves to insisting that the United States "do something," they may not like the results. If there are to be better alternatives, Europeans and Japanese must follow policies which, like American policy during most of the postwar period, have two tiers, one the pursuit of conventional national interests, and the other concern for the operation of the international economic system. Otherwise, it is unlikely that the nationalistic tendency in the United States can be kept in check.

V

If, in spite of the magnitude of the task, the people of the industrial world decide to try to save themselves from economic nationalism, what must they do? The agenda is quite clear.[1] Few

[1] These issues are discussed more fully in William Diebold, Jr., "The United States and the Industrial World: American Foreign Economic Policy in the 1970s." New York: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1972.

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doubt the need to reform the international monetary system. There is even a rather wide consensus about several essentials of a new régime, such as an internationally managed substitute for the dollar as the principal form of reserves and a better adjustment mechanism. There are also areas of intellectual and political disagreement—the dollar "overhang," flexible rates, the handling of short-term capital movements—which are important but surely negotiable as long as the need to act is accepted.

With regard to trade there is less consensus and a feeling in some quarters that it would be sensible to postpone serious efforts. This would be a major mistake. It is true that no great progress can be expected quickly, but if no serious effort is made to deal with a number of difficult problems, the deterioration of the last few years will continue and the negative mood of the United States that so strengthens economic nationalism will grow. There are many immediate targets: the trade impact of the enlargement of the European Community, some of the nontariff barriers of which American businessmen complain so bitterly, foreign complaints about American tax concessions on exports and the increased use by the United States of anti-dumping and countervailing duties. A broader effort to deal with fundamentals is also needed, but here the proper timing is difficult to judge. There is a good case for bold proposals—the elimination of tariffs on manufactured goods is a favorite candidate—but their positive psychological impact requires their having more credibility than any major government could give to them for the time being. One way of preparing the ground for larger initiatives is to repair, strengthen and perhaps in some respects amend the GATT while reaffirming its members' commitments to its basic principles.

As a practical matter, one serious effort in trade will lead to another. Governments have different priorities and to strike balanced bargains it will often be necessary to act on more than one subject at a time. Many so-called nontariff barriers cannot be dealt with by once-and-for-all agreements; codes, complaints procedures and statements of principles will become vehicles for continuing negotiation. The more open to one another economies become, the longer the list grows of the "conditions of competition" that are of international concern: prices, taxes, labor laws, credit arrangements, business practices. The more governments try to adapt their economies to changing needs, the more deeply they will become involved in "industrial policy," the compre-

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hensive or piecemeal shaping of parts of the national economy in ways that raise problems for other countries. Industrial policy affects investment as well as trade but investment issues will be on the agenda for other reasons too: increased worry at home and abroad about American investment, the links between investment and trade, the suspicion that multinational enterprises will elude the control of national governments. Still, investment questions do not seem as urgent as those concerning trade and money and may be treated case by case for some time to come.

Agriculture, in contrast, will have a high place on the agenda of international discussions in spite of a long history of disappointment. The record of trade liberalization in agriculture has been dismal compared with what has been achieved in the treatment of other products. Among experts there is a good bit of agreement that if there is to be any real progress international negotiations will have to be directed to the policies that give rise to the trade barriers in the first place, such as subsidies and price supports. The political difficulties of such a course are obvious but the importance attached to agriculture in Washington plus the discontent in Europe with the cost of the Common Agricultural Policy make it reasonable to try again.

One would have to be a fanatic, a con man or a negotiator to insist that there is only one satisfactory solution to each of the problems of money, trade, investment and agriculture. There is in fact a range of acceptable possibilities, a margin of tolerance for failure, several possible mixes of speedy achievement, slow progress, no progress and even, in a few matters, indefinite postponement. But in every specific instance there are certain needs that must be met and overall some minimum level of accomplishment that must be reached if there is to be anything like as much international economic coöperation in the next quarter-century as in the one just past. In monetary affairs, awareness of the dangers has grown in the wake of the crisis of 1971, and 1972 has brought some promise of constructive action. But even if successful monetary reforms are worked out in 1973, the dangers of a great rise in economic nationalism will not be averted. To make progress in trade, agriculture, investment and other matters will take longer and will not be possible unless there is a continuing awareness of the fact that behind every difficult problem, however isolated it may seem, there is a potential threat to the world economic system as a whole.

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International economic coöperation does not come about spontaneously. It requires conscious and sustained efforts by a number of governments. In the past the United States was the principal tender of the system. Those who would have it abandon that task contribute to the present danger. There is no one to take the United States' place. But it is also true that the United States will not be willing—and may not be able— to perform adequately in the new state of the world unless Europe and Japan also accept the need to make the maintenance of the system of international economic coöperation one of the objectives of their policies.

The builders of Bretton Woods had three important advantages: the need to do something was obvious; there was a surprisingly broad consensus about what ought to be done; the United States—while not in a position to dictate, as is often said—had enough power to overcome inaction most of the time. None of these conditions exists today and we shall not see their like again. In new circumstances, facing both old and new problems, the governments of the industrial countries again have choices to make. There are in the international economy of the industrial world two elements, both of its essence: interdependence and national power. Easily in contradiction, occasionally mutually reinforcing, and more often in a dynamic interaction, they can produce a wide range of results. Few people declare themselves against coöperation, but the combination of political power organized along national lines, the priority that politicians inevitably give to short-run considerations, and the cushion that affluence permits for uneconomic policies is a potentially lethal one. Awareness of these facts made possible the Bretton Woods approach, a combination of fear and hope. Now there is some fear —perhaps not enough. Hope seems stilled, or is taken for granted. Even the awareness of what the real questions are seems often to be lacking, or obscured.

When *Foreign Affairs* was started in 1922, efforts at economic coöperation were being made—as at Genoa. They were ultimately futile, but when *Foreign Affairs* was 25 years old in 1947 new and different efforts were at their height. These were successful, in their way and for a time, in holding economic nationalism in check. Now, as *Foreign Affairs* turns 50, the old questions have reappeared in both old and new forms. The shape of the world economy for quite a long time to come will depend on what answers are found this time.

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HOW THE COLD WAR WAS PLAYED

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE dates May 22, 1947, and May 22, 1972, span exactly 25 years. On May 22, 1947, President Truman signed a congressional bill committing the United States to support Greece and Turkey against Soviet designs, and the United States thereby assumed overtly the direct leadership of the West in the containment of Soviet influence. Twenty-five years later to the day, another American President landed in Moscow, declaring to the Soviet leaders that "we meet at a moment when we can make peaceful coöperation a reality."

Viewing the past 25 years of the cold war as a political process, this study seeks to evaluate the conduct of the two competitors and to draw some implications from the experience of a quarter-century's rivalry for the future of U.S.-Soviet relations. Its purpose is thus neither to seek the causes of the cold war nor to assign moral or historical responsibility for it.

To accomplish the above, two preliminary steps must be taken. The first is to identify the principal phases of the cold war, viewing it as a process of conflict and competition. The purpose of the periodization is to delineate phases of time in which the competitive process was dominated by a discernible pattern of relations; in its simplest form, this involves identifying phases in which one or the other side seemed to hold the political initiative, either on the basis of a relatively crystallized strategy and/or through more assertive behavior.

Second, it is necessary to focus on several dynamic components at work in the competitive process, the interaction of which shaped the relative performance of the two powers. Reference will be made within the several phases of the competition to the relative international standing of the two rivals, to their relative economic power, to their relative military power, and to the relative clarity and purposefulness of national policy, including the degree of domestic support for that policy.

Finally, it must be acknowledged that this writer sees the cold war as more the product of lengthy and probably ineluctable historical forces and less as the result of human error and evil. Two great powers, differentiated by divergent centuries-long experience and separated by sharply differing ideological

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perspectives, yet thrust into political proximity as a consequence of the shattering of the earlier international system, could hardly avoid being plunged into a competitive relationship. In brief, this was less a matter of Stalin or of Dulles and more of de Tocqueville.

Phase I—Shaping of the Confrontation, 1945–1947

This phase was essentially a preliminary one. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was yet directly pitted against the other. Within both societies active debates concerning the likely nature of postwar developments were yielding conflicting estimates and advice: in the United States the issue came out in the open with the Truman-Wallace split; in the Soviet Union there were overtones of it in Zhdanov's more militant posture, while the Varga debate about the postwar prospects of capitalism—though more muted than the corresponding discussions in the United States—indicated analytical disagreements concerning the future of the capitalist system.

Neither side thus was yet operating on the basis of clear-cut policies, backed by firm domestic support. Internal U.S. divisions continued into the presidential campaign of 1948, and it was only in 1947–1948 that a more crystallized American view emerged, backed by bipartisan support. George Kennan's famous article in *Foreign Affairs* of July 1947 represented in that respect a historic watershed. On the Soviet side, while the assumption of Western hostility was deeply ingrained in the official ideology, widespread popular disaffection, economic dislocations and the gradual reimposition of Stalinist controls after relative wartime relaxation—all reflected a very basic domestic weakness of the system as a whole, sharpening for Stalin the dilemmas of moderation or militancy (with the latter apparently advocated not only by Zhdanov but in very early postwar phases also by Tito and his associates in Jugoslavia and Bulgaria).

The international context in which the emerging hostility was crystallizing was clearly to America's advantage. While the Soviet Union emerged from the war with vastly enhanced prestige, with much accumulated good will even within the United States, and with highly subservient and influential Communist parties playing key roles in such countries as France and Italy, the Soviet position in the world was still very inferior to that of the United States. The Western Hemisphere was firmly in the

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American grip; Africa and the Middle East were politically controlled by America's allies (with American economic assets expanding particularly rapidly in the Middle East); the southern Asian arc was still part of the British Empire, while Iran already in 1946 was seeking U.S. political assistance against the Soviet Union; Nationalist China was striving to consolidate its authority; and Japan was subject to an exclusive U.S. occupation.

Economically and militarily, the relationship favored the United States, though the military aspect was clouded by some uncertainties. The United States emerged from the war with its GNP actually increased, while the Soviet Union, on the other hand, had suffered grievously during the war and by 1947 its GNP was probably less than one-third that of the United States (roughly equal to that of contemporary India or China).

The military picture was not as clear-cut. Neither side could afford to maintain the enormous forces that were at its disposal at the conclusion of the war. American armed forces, which at their peak numbered some 12.3 million men, were rapidly demobilized because of domestic political pressures and economic need. By 1947, American ground forces had shrunk to only about 670,000 men. At their peak, Soviet armed forces numbered about 11.3 million men. Contrary to postwar myths, the Soviet Union did not refrain from large-scale demobilization, which was an economic necessity, given wartime devastation and enormous manpower losses; by 1947 the Soviet Union had only approximately 2.8 million men under arms.

For political reasons, the Soviet government chose to keep its demobilization a secret. As a result, contemporary Western estimates of Soviet military strength were considerably higher than reality. The element of uncertainty in the military relationship was also introduced by the U.S. monopoly in atomic bombs. Presumably because of this fact, it suited the Soviet Union not to disabuse the West of the otherwise politically costly notion that it was only the United States (and Great Britain) that disarmed following the war. This provided an important counter to the American atomic monopoly, perhaps inhibiting the American side from exploiting it politically. Moreover, in the immediate postwar era there was considerable uncertainty both as to the actual destructiveness of the new atomic weapons and the American capacity to deliver these weapons on Soviet targets. Because of lags in production and the termination of some atomic facili-

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ties, the U.S. atomic stockpile by 1947 was well under 100 bombs, with a cumulative damage-inflicting capacity roughly equal to that imposed on Nazi Germany during World War II, and thus not on a scale sufficient to guarantee the effective destruction of the Soviet Union.

Both sides were thus in an ambiguous position. Unsettled political and social conditions in the West as well as the Soviet advantage on the ground favored the Soviet Union in the event of hostilities in Europe. The U.S. nuclear monopoly as well as the vastly superior American economy—not to speak of the general exhaustion of the Soviet society—boded ill for the Soviet Union in the event of any protracted conflict. The standoff that followed, in a variety of limited confrontations, was the logical outcome, especially given the absence of directly conflicting political goals. The West, vastly overestimating Soviet strength, did not contest Soviet primacy in Central Europe, fearing instead a Soviet push westward. The Soviet Union, preoccupied with consolidating its wartime gains and concerned lest the West exploit its weaknesses, only half-heartedly probed the newly established perimeters.

Phase II—Soviet Probes, 1948–1952

The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union crystallized during the next phase. Within both societies there emerged a form of political consensus: in America the crushing defeat of Henry Wallace and the appearance of bipartisan support for an actively anti-Soviet policy signaled the end of postwar uncertainty; in the Soviet Union (as well as in Eastern Europe) the imposition of Stalinist terror created an atmosphere of a beleaguered camp ("imperialist encirclement") dominated by implacable ideological hostility toward its rivals.

The cold war now became primarily an American-Soviet affair. By 1947 the United States had assumed responsibility for British undertakings in Greece and Turkey and, more generally, taken the lead in fashioning the strategy of the West. American goals were succinctly expressed in the concept of "containment." Essentially, the strategy rested on two premises: Soviet expansion must be halted, by both military and political means; and this in turn would create the preconditions for an eventual mellowing or even breaking up of the Soviet system. Soviet actions indicated an accelerated effort to subordinate Eastern Europe to

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full Soviet control, while Soviet probes in Berlin and Korea appeared to have been aimed both at the consolidation of existing Communist power and, had an American response been lacking, also the expansion of the Soviet sphere.

During this phase, the United States continued to enjoy the decisive advantage in economic power and international influence, though its relative military position in some respects actually worsened. The U.S. economy grew during this phase to over $400 billion (in 1966 dollars), and the United States was able to undertake a massive program in injecting its capital into Western Europe, thus reinforcing a vital political link. Soviet postwar recovery was pressed energetically and the Soviet economy passed its prewar levels with the GNP crossing the $150 billion mark (in 1966 dollars) by the time of Stalin's death.

The international climate was similarly skewed to U.S. advantage. The coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the defection of Jugoslavia (with its overtones of Soviet bullying), the purge trials in Eastern Europe and eventually the invasion of South Korea all created a distinctly anti-Soviet mood. In some respects, however, this was misleading. Probably a more accurate measure of international attitudes was provided by the February 1951 vote condemning the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The pro-U.S. vote was 47 to seven with ten abstentions. India and Burma joined the Soviet Union in opposition to the resolutions, while Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Yemen, Jugoslavia, Algeria and Afghanistan abstained. The southern arc of the Eurasian continent was thus beginning to divorce itself from a clear-cut identification with the United States.

Heightened international tensions, especially after the outbreak of Korean hostilities, prompted both powers to step up their military preparedness. Paradoxically, the tendency in the West at the time—in contrast to the earlier phase—was somewhat to underestimate Soviet strength. Soviet ground forces were being built up rapidly in order to offset any Western atomic threat. Soviet defense spending—despite a decline to under $30 billion in 1948 from its wartime high of about $50 billion—was still more than twice that of the United States, and Soviet armed forces grew in manpower to almost five million men by the time of Stalin's death, a figure approximately one million above prevailing Western estimates and considerably in excess of the U.S.

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1.6 million men under arms. American defense spending did not rise until the Korean War (having dropped precipitously from over $70 billion in 1945 to under $12 billion by 1950), but then it did so rapidly, exceeding by 1952 in total dollar value Soviet military allocations.

More important in the shifting military relationship was the development by the Soviet Union of the atomic bomb. That development came earlier than American planners had expected and by 1951 the Soviet Union already possessed a modest stockpile of atomic bombs (numbering about 60 weapons, or roughly one-tenth of the U.S. stockpile). Increasingly binding U.S. political and military commitments to Europe were hence designed to cancel any advantage the Soviet Union could derive from this new situation and thus to preserve the inherent asymmetry in the American-Soviet relationship.

On balance, this phase of the cold war can be said to have involved clashes reflecting a more assertive Soviet pattern of behavior, with the United States essentially responding to perceived threats. The consequence of the clashes were three major developments, all to U.S. advantage: the launching of Western economic recovery and the shaping of a new political coalition; the initiation of a rapid U.S. military build-up designed to erase the Soviet advantage on the ground; the rebuff of the Soviet Union in two, and possibly three, crisis areas: Berlin, Korea and Jugoslavia. Soviet military power was effective only in shielding the Soviet political predominance in Eastern Europe, an area not even actively contested by the West.

The historical significance of the Korean War, in addition to its crucial impact on U.S. rearmament, poses an especially tantalizing question: to what extent was it merely a Soviet miscalculation, based on the assumption of U.S. disengagement from the mainland of Asia and perhaps also stimulated by Stalin's desire (reflecting long-standing Russian interests) to transform a united Korea into a Soviet dependency (instead of a Chinese or eventually a Japanese one), and to what extent was it a calculated move deliberately designed to stimulate American-Chinese hostility? Stalin's suspicions of China are well documented, while the predominant U.S. inclination prior to the Korean War was to seek some sort of an accommodation with the new government on the Chinese mainland. In any case, the opportunity to stimulate a head-on clash between America and China must have been

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welcomed by Stalin, and deservedly so. The ensuing 20 years of American-Chinese hostility were certainly a net gain for the Soviet Union.

Phase III—Assertive Rhetoric vs. Policy of Status Quo, 1953–1957

The coincidence of apparent external successes with domestic political change in the United States (not only in leadership but, even more notably, in ideological climate) led to the next phase in the rivalry, a phase seemingly dominated by greater U.S. assertiveness.

The new American policy, articulated by the winning Republican side during the presidential election of 1952, seemed to signal a basic departure from the U.S. strategy of containment: the adoption, instead, of an offensive "policy of liberation" designed to roll back the Soviet Union from its newly acquired East European satellites.

Soviet leaders had cause to view this change in American tone with some anxiety. Their insecurity was doubtless heightened by a series of internal crises, the cumulative effect of which was to sharpen the contrast between the self-confident and, on the whole, self-satisfied America of the early Eisenhower years and the troubled Russia torn by post-Stalin dissensions. A grave and enduring political crisis ensued in the wake of Stalin's death, with internecine conflicts consuming the energies of the top Soviet leaders. Its eruption precipitated a marked decline in the effectiveness of Soviet control over Eastern Europe—the area at which the new U.S. policy ostensibly pointed—and it sparked a series of violent uprisings. Finally, Soviet uncertainty about the future of Sino-Soviet relations caused Soviet leaders to redress the more overtly irritating aspects of the relationship established between Stalin and Mao in 1949, but without quieting entirely Soviet anxieties about the future.

More urgent from the Soviet point of view was the fact that during this phase the United States was beginning to acquire a strategic capability for inflicting significant damage on the Soviet Union which, coupled with the generally more crusading mood of Washington, seemed to lend credibility to the offensive character of U.S. policy. U.S. military spending, though it declined somewhat from the Korean War peak of $61 billion, stabilized around the mid-$30 billion mark during the first Eisenhower administration, while manpower under arms ranged from 3.5 mil-

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lion to 2.8 million men. In effective manpower, the Soviet Union still retained a considerable edge (almost 2 to 1), since by 1955 its armed forces numbered some 5.7 million men, with Soviet defense spending for this period estimated as roughly equivalent to $30 billion per annum. The big margin, strategically and politically, was in respective nuclear vulnerability. The United States proclaimed itself committed to the doctrine of massive retaliation, and the modernization and expansion of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) did create during this phase, probably for the first time, a situation of high Soviet vulnerability to a large-scale U.S. atomic attack. By 1955, the U.S. nuclear-weapons bomber fleet capable of undertaking two-way attack missions on the Soviet Union had grown to about 400 aircraft, and the total number of U.S. bombers capable of executing an atomic attack on the Soviet Union was in the vicinity of 1,350; the corresponding Soviet figures were only about 40 and 350 respectively.

The Soviet atomic insecurity was heightened still further by the continuing economic gap and by persisting international isolation. On the international plane, despite stepped-up Soviet activity, the isolation of the Soviet Union remained as complete as it had been since the days of the early fifties. The economic asymmetry also remained roughly what it had been at the time of Stalin's death: if anything, the gap widened slightly in absolute figures, with the U.S. GNP reaching in 1955 the figure of $508 billion (in 1966 dollars), and the Soviet Union increasing its to about $185 billion. Relatively, the Soviet Union moved up somewhat, with a GNP about 36 percent of that of the United States. None the less, the death of Stalin and the subsequent temptation on the part of competing Soviet leaders to cater more to domestic aspirations prompted a debate whether to enhance the Soviet standard of living, necessarily at the expense of defense budgeting.

However, the U.S. side during this phase also began to be increasingly apprehensive about its security. Even the very limited Soviet striking power created, for the first time, some domestic U.S. vulnerability to a Soviet nuclear attack. This heightened sense of insecurity was reinforced by the unexpectedly rapid Soviet acquisition of an H-bomb, with the Soviet Union testing an operational weapon before the United States. A special RAND study concluded that even with an inferior striking power the Soviet Union might be able to launch a devastatingly

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effective first strike against the American Strategic Air Command bases.

The combination of domestic and international strains led the Soviet side to initiate a series of steps pointing toward a détente in East-West relations. Even before Stalin's death, the Soviet side hinted that it might be willing to explore the possibility of a reunited but neutralized Germany, and some of the post-Stalin successors appeared to have been inclined to pursue this path. More significant was the Soviet readiness to conclude a peace treaty with Austria, resulting in the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country. Khrushchev's accommodation with Jugoslavia terminated that particular crisis, while "the spirit of Geneva"—following the 1955 summit meeting—prompted on both U.S. and Soviet sides publicly announced troop cuts.

On the Soviet side, the critical turning point, prompting the termination of this particular phase in the cold war and initiating a new one, probably came with the October-November crisis of 1956. The almost total U.S. passivity in the face of enormous Soviet indecision regarding what seemed for a while like the imminent collapse of Soviet rule throughout Eastern Europe apparently convinced the Soviet leaders that American assertiveness was in fact only a domestically expedient myth. The skillful Soviet exploitation of the unprecedented allied differences over the Suez affair also fed Soviet optimism, and a novel tone of assertiveness increasingly began to be heard from the Kremlin.

This phase of the cold war was thus essentially one of missed U.S. opportunities. It was the American side which failed to capitalize on the political and military momentum generated by the repulsion of Stalin's probes—either by exploiting to its own advantage the surfacing Soviet weaknesses or by taking advantage of the Soviet interest in a détente. The doctrine of massive retaliation, accompanied by cuts in U.S. ground forces, left too narrow a margin between the extremes of war or peace for the U.S. policy-makers to exploit the U.S. strategic preponderance. The post-1953 Soviet anxiety about U.S. capabilities and intentions now gave way to a radically different Soviet reading of the rivalry. If during 1953 to 1956 the Soviet Union can be said to have exaggerated its own strength in order to deter the United States from acting assertively, from 1957 on the Soviet leaders were inclined to exaggerate their own strength in order to exploit it on behalf of a more assertive Soviet behavior.

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Phase IV—Premature Soviet Globalism, 1958–1963

"The East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind": These words uttered in the Kremlin by Mao Tse-tung in late 1957 set the tone for the next phase of the cold war. The Soviet concept of détente changed accordingly. If in the early fifties it was primarily designed to shore up a threatened status quo, in the late fifties it was meant to help effect a change in it. Soviet leaders thus sought to combine summit diplomacy from a position of apparent strength with a recourse to open threats in order to compel the removal of the United States from Berlin, still the most sensitive spot in the East-West relationship.

Soviet international activity acquired for the first time a distinctly global range. Soviet involvement in the Middle East was widened and politically deepened; Soviet ties with North Africa expanded; the Soviet Union became deeply involved in the Congo crisis, and it developed close political and even some ideological links with the new African governments of Mali and Guinea; the Soviet Union provided extensive support to President Sukarno of Indonesia, and—most symbolic of its new policy—the Soviet Union began to aid, though at first rather cautiously, the new Castro government in Cuba.

If Mao Tse-tung's remarks can be said to have set the tone for the next phase, perhaps the key signal—in any case, so interpreted by the other side—was provided by Khrushchev's so-called "national liberation struggle" speech of early 1961. Delivered almost literally on the eve of the inauguration of the new U.S. President—and read avidly by him—his speech represented for the United States what almost a decade earlier Dulles' concept of the "policy of liberation" probably meant to the Soviet leaders: an ominous warning of an activist policy based on force, even if not exercised through the application of direct force.

What Khrushchev appeared to be saying was that the balance of power had tipped; that ideologically decisive change could now be effected by "national liberation struggles" carried on under the protective umbrella of Soviet power; that Communist gains could be securely protected; and that the West would have to yield even in Berlin, where Soviet tactical advantages could be asserted under the protection of the newly acquired Soviet strategic capabilities. In effect, Khrushchev's policy seemed emulative of Dulles': "massive retaliation" would deter U.S. counter-

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actions, enabling the desired changes to be effected at a lower threshold of risk.

This more assertive policy was pursued in an international atmosphere which, for the first time since World War II, was turning distinctly less favorable to the United States. By 1960, the United States was finding itself in a minority on the China question (*i.e.* those abstaining as well as opposed to the U.S. position were now more numerous), and on the defensive on such issues as Cuba or the Congo. The question of Cuba became for the United States (especially after the débâcle of the Bay of Pigs) what Hungary had been earlier for the Soviet Union: a source of embarrassment and strain.

All of this contributed to an atmosphere which seemed to pit an energetic and assertive Soviet Union against a fumbling and defensive America. Though John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency after waging a campaign in which American weakness (particularly the so-called missile gap) was one of his principal charges, events shortly after the inauguration seemed to bear out the self-confident mood of Soviet leaders. U.S. ineptitude during the abortive invasion of Cuba was followed shortly thereafter by American passivity when the Soviet Union took unilateral action to partition Berlin effectively.

Yet the underlying reality of the relationship was more complex than its appearance, and that underlying reality was to surface before long. Politically, the change in the U.S. leadership did bring to the top a new and younger élite, which gained increasing self-confidence and which proceeded rapidly to build up U.S. military power. Within the Soviet Union, on the other hand, Khrushchev's personal position remained far from consolidated, with internal political struggles surfacing again, with unprecedented public displays of continued disagreement within the leadership manifesting themselves at the Twenty-second Party Congress. Moreover, the increasingly bitter struggle with China further complicated Soviet decision-making, both forcing the Soviet Union to compete with China's militancy and somewhat reducing the Soviet Union's own room for maneuver.

The Soviet rate of growth also began to wobble in the early 1960s. Moreover, the American economy, after the slowdown of the second half of the fifties, began to accelerate, so much so that not only the absolute but even the relative gap between the two economies widened between 1961 and 1965.

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Most significant of all, however, were developments in the military field. This phase marked the beginning of a new strategic competition, with power measured increasingly by the number of missiles capable of inflicting strategic damage on the respective homelands of the two rivals. On the Soviet side, the number of men under arms actually decreased during these years. By 1960, the level had dropped to some 3.6 million men, and Khrushchev even proposed to cut it down further to 2.4 million. At the same time, Soviet military expenditures continued to rise, to approximately $40 billion per annum, with the priorities put on modernization of equipment, and particularly on expansion of Soviet missile strength.

The atmosphere created by Soviet boasting was very conducive to highly exaggerated U.S. estimates of Soviet power. In 1960, Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) strength was semi-officially estimated as already around 100 missiles, and publicly was projected to reach the impressive figure of 500 missiles by 1961. In fact, during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 the Soviet Union had only about 70 liquid-fueled ICBMs (of somewhat dubious reliability) capable of being targeted on the United States, and it did not reach the 500 mark until 1966–67. The new Kennedy administration, responding to what appeared to be both aggressive Soviet intentions as well as capabilities, sharply increased U.S. defense spending, passing the $50 billion mark in 1962. Both U.S. strategic and conventional forces were reinforced. The former were designed to deny the Soviet Union the advantage of strategic threat; the latter were designed to meet head-on the new threat of insurgency and to enable the United States to wage the so-called 2½ wars, *i.e.* both in Asia and Europe simultaneously. The United States was in fact widening its strategic edge. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was in a position to deliver several times as devastating an attack on the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union could on the United States, even though by then American civilian losses might have been on the prohibitive scale of some 30 or so million fatalities.

From the Soviet point of view, however, the politically decisive factor was the realization by the Soviet decision-makers of the fact that their society was several times more vulnerable than the American. This imposed a constraint on the Soviet use of strategic pressure even on behalf of moves in areas where the

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Soviet Union enjoyed a tactical advantage, as for example in Berlin. Furthermore, the rapid increase by the United States in NATO's nuclear strength (by some 60 percent in 1961 to 1963, as a consequence of deployment, according to Secretary McNamara, of "thousands of U.S. warheads") meant that a European confrontation would quickly become a strategic one.

It was this asymmetry in power that led the Soviet Union to introduce medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) covertly into Cuba. Mikoyan confirmed this to a closed meeting of Communist ambassadors, held in Washington after the Cuban missile crisis (as recounted later by the Hungarian chargé present). By early 1962, the top Soviet leaders knew that in fact they did not have the strategic advantage they had claimed (and that American leaders *knew* this as well). What is even more important, the Soviet leaders probably knew what American leaders at the time could not yet know: that during the next several years the strategic gap would further widen in U.S. favor.

The Cuban confrontation was thus in all likelihood a last desperate gamble to achieve a payoff for an assertive Soviet strategy undertaken back in 1958. But that strategy rested on an insufficient base of power; it did not enjoy a sufficiently dynamic economic foundation or the backing of an adequately developed military technology; and it overestimated the revolutionary potential for global radical change. As events during the next phase were to demonstrate, conditions were not yet ripe for a Soviet policy that was meant to be both global and revolutionary. The casualty of this policy was the East-West détente, which seemed within grasp in 1958 or 1960; the consequences were the massive U.S. strategic build-up of the early 1960s and a new phase in the cold war, a phase dominated by increased U.S. assertiveness.

Phase V—The Cresting of American Globalism, 1963–1968

The ideology for American globalism was provided by John Kennedy's inaugural address; American preponderance was dramatized by the Soviet backdown during the Cuban confrontation in 1962; the globalist policy came into its own during Lyndon Johnson's presidency, which coincided with the high watermark of the progressive post-World War II expansion of a worldwide U.S. presence.

The Soviet backdown in Cuba was widely regarded as signaling a protracted setback to Soviet global ambitions. American

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predominance was taken for granted, and American strategic superiority was blissfully portrayed as unchallengeable. Secretary McNamara went so far as to assert in 1965 that the "Soviets have decided that they have lost the quantitative race, and they are not seeking to engage us in that contest. It means there is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours."[1]

However, the new phase did not involve a return to the mutual hostility of the fifties. Indeed, American global assertiveness was initially accompanied by a stepped-up search for accommodation with the Soviet Union. The test-ban agreement of 1963 and the establishment of the Washington-Moscow "hot line" represented major breakthroughs, signaling the growing recognition on the part of both powers of their stake in somehow stabilizing the arms race. On the political plane, the new phase saw also a more active U.S. interest in developing closer ties with Eastern Europe. President Kennedy stressed during his electoral campaign the desirability of peaceful economic and cultural engagement with Eastern Europe, and President Johnson carried this approach even further, altering in October 1966 the postwar U.S. priorities in Europe. Heretofore German reunification had been held to be the precondition for a European settlement; henceforth, East-West reconciliation was seen as laying the basis for a European settlement, eventually pointing to some resolution of the German question. Moreover, East-West reconciliation, it was expected, would help to increase East European independence from Soviet control.

If confident self-assertiveness was characteristic of the American mood during the initial years of this phase, anxiety and ambiguity appear to have dominated the Soviet outlook. At first, the change from Khrushchev to Brezhnev-Kosygin coincided with a distinct sense of letdown. The heroic competition with America —economic, political and even spatial—had clearly ended in a defeat, symbolized toward the end of the decade by the American landing on the moon. The Soviet leaders were evidently jolted by the directness of the 1962 American threat of a strategic attack on the Soviet Union, and the Cuban débâcle doubtless contributed to Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964. In addition, there is circumstantial evidence indicating that the post-Khrush-

[1] *Congressional Record*, Vol. III, Part 6, 89th Congress, 1st session, April 7, 1965, p. 7271.

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chev Soviet leaders concluded that world affairs more generally were in a "reactionary" or "counterrevolutionary" phase, with the United States instigating the various international setbacks for "progressive" forces, deprived of Soviet nuclear protection. That appears to have been the meaning attached by Soviet leaders to the fall of Goulart in March of 1964 in Brazil, of Ben Bella in June of 1965 in Algeria, of Papandreou in July of 1965 in Greece, of Nkrumah in February of 1966 in Ghana, and of Sukarno in March of 1966 in Indonesia—all statesmen whom Khrushchev had actively cultivated. In the words of the official organ of the Italian Communist Party (August 4, 1967):

> For the policy of the *status quo* and the attempts to divide the world into zones of influence between the two super-powers, U.S. imperialism is gradually substituting a revised and corrected re-edition of the old policy of *roll back,* giving birth, within the framework of nuclear coexistence with the USSR (caused by reasons of *force majeure*), to a series of local interventions (economical, political, military) designed to modify the world equilibrium by means of setting up reactionary regimes, or by support given to them, and liquidation of the progressive forces and movements in individual countries.

Soviet confidence was even further damaged by the widening rift with China, by the surfacing of liberal sentiments in Czechoslovakia, and by the shattering defeat by Israel of Nasser's army, equipped and trained by the Soviet Union (including the embarrassing capture by the Israelis of some Soviet military advisers). The international gains of the preceding years appeared everywhere to be in jeopardy, with the prematurely assertive Soviet globalism prompting not only the massive U.S. military build-up but the global political American counteroffensive.

The Soviet response was, accordingly, cautious. In effect, for a while the new Soviet team did not have a foreign policy beyond that of retrenchment and very ad hoc responses to new situations. The drift contributed to a rather widespread sense of malaise, and perhaps even emboldened the Chinese to step up both their anti-Soviet polemics and border tensions.

However, as in the Soviet case during the preceding phase, American global assertiveness obscured a reality which was becoming steadily less favorable to the American side. The mounting U.S. engagement in the war in Vietnam, transforming what initially appeared to be a relatively limited shoring-up operation into a more massive and costly intervention, significantly reduced American freedom of action, prompted severe strains in the U.S.

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economy and society, absorbed much of the U.S. defense budget, and weakened the U.S. international position. As a result, America neither translated into deeds the vision held up in President Johnson's 1966 speech on East-West reconciliation in Europe nor made the slightest move to complicate the Soviet decision to occupy forcibly in August 1968 the increasingly liberalized Czechoslovakia. Similarly, diplomatic passivity marked the U.S. posture in the Middle East, with the result that before long the Soviet Union was able to reëstablish and even widen its badly shaken position in the Mediterranean area.

In the meantime, Soviet diplomacy with regard to the Vietnam War became increasingly skillful. Its essence can be described with the words: "exploitation of opportunities" and "reduction of risks." The war had the effect of increasing disproportionately the U.S. stake in Soviet good will, and at the same time it significantly decreased American international standing.

On the economic plane, the situation was more mixed. The American economy continued to grow steadily, but the Soviet economy regained much of its forward momentum and resumed its upward climb relative to the United States. By 1967, the U.S. GNP stood at $762 billion; the Soviet at $372 billion, or 49 percent of the U.S. total, although the Soviet economy continued to be plagued by operational inefficiency and lack of adequate technological innovation. However, inflationary trends were beginning to beset the United States, with the war in Vietnam making it increasingly difficult for the United States to pursue its domestic programs of social renewal.

The biggest change, however, was to come in the military relationship. On the surface, U.S. supremacy seemed secure. In 1965, Defense Secretary McNamara estimated that in terms of delivery systems "we have a superiority of approximately 3 or 4 to 1. . . . In qualitative terms, it's impossible to come up with a precise evaluation but it far exceeds 3 or 4 to 1. . . . The programs we have under way are more than adequate to assure our superiority in the years ahead." By 1968, the steady build-up in U.S. ground forces also gave the United States for the first time in the history of the rivalry a lead in the number of men under arms (3.5 million *vs.* 3.47 million). However, this particular increase was due primarily to the Vietnam War, as was also the case with the continuing increase in U.S. military expenditures from $52 billion in 1965 to over $80 billion in 1968.

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In reality, despite Secretary McNamara's extraordinary optimism, the military balance was quietly shifting away from U.S. supremacy. It gradually became clear that some time earlier in the decade—presumably some time before the Cuban crisis, though the outcome of the crisis obviously reinforced the decision—the Soviet leadership decided to respond to the American missile build-up with one of its own, thereby eventually making good on Khrushchev's premature claims. Soviet defense spending moved steadily upward, crossing the $50 billion mark in 1967 and reaching $55 billion in 1968, thereby effectively matching and even surpassing U.S. defense spending, outside of the Vietnam War effort. By 1968, Russia (with some 900 operational ICBMs and America leveling off at 1,054) was well on the way to erasing the margins of superiority authoritatively claimed by Secretary McNamara three years earlier.

Though by 1968 the United States still enjoyed a marked strategic edge (especially in strategic bombers—over 600 to less than 200 for the Soviets—and submarine-launched missiles targetable on respective homelands—656 to 45), in reality both sides had the capacity to destroy each other as viable societies, with neither possessing a decisive first-strike capability. Although this changed relationship imposed on both sides a far greater obligation than heretofore to take closely into account the likely consequences of any unilateral application of force on the international scene, it meant a greater change for America, till then relatively invulnerable.

Most important of all, however, was the conjunction between this change and the collapse within the United States of the postwar consensus concerning foreign affairs. Like the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin, by the latter part of the sixties the United States found itself in the midst of a deep political crisis, involving major convulsions within the ruling élite and a general crisis of social values. With the Vietnam War precipitating a divisive national debate about foreign policy aims, the U.S. global engagement became increasingly devoid of positive domestic support. As a result, the initiative thus gradually passed to the Soviet side.

Phase VI—The Shaping of a Mixed Relationship, 1969–

Just as Khrushchev's fall from power ushered in a period dominated by American assertiveness, Johnson's fall from power in

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1968 opened a new phase, dominated by rising Soviet self-confidence and expanding global involvement. Soviet analysts began to evaluate the world again in terms of the general crisis of capitalism, and Soviet leaders—though much more cautious in their pronouncements than Khrushchev—were apparently concluding that the world was again shifting from a quiescent state into a dynamic condition, more favorable to "revolutionary" than to "reactionary" trends.

This new phase also saw the consequence of a policy that was no longer primarily regional or handicapped—as had been particularly the case under Khrushchev—by a vast disproportion between ends and means. Exploiting both the domestic American malaise and the Vietnam conflict, the Soviet leaders proceeded to fashion their own equivalent of the earlier Kennedy-Johnson combination of American globalism and bridge-building. The wider scope of the new Soviet strategy involved a rather different kind of policy from that pursued earlier by Khrushchev: his was not only globally premature but globally undifferentiated, spreading thinly still thin Soviet resources, relying heavily on economic aid and ideology. His successors, putting more reliance on diplomacy and military presence, exploiting nationalism even while significantly reducing Soviet economic aid (and concentrating it on a few key targets), not only have been pursuing a more selective strategy, but have appeared to focus it on the vast Eurasian continent: isolating China in the East, and flirting with Japan; consolidating the Soviet position in South Asia, while the United States was tied down to the war in Vietnam; expanding their presence in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East; and seeking to draw Western Europe into closer economic and political ties—hopefully pointing to the "Finlandization" of Western Europe. Continentalism rather than, as in the past, either regionalism (focused on Europe almost entirely) or premature globalism (undifferentiated in form), was the central character of the new Soviet policy.

This strategy coincided with the American reëxamination of its foreign policy. The redefinition of American policy by 1972 was clearly leading the United States into increased reliance on a triangular pattern of politics, exploiting the Sino-Soviet cleavage to gain increased leverage in bilateral American-Soviet relations. In response, the Soviet Union, obviously concerned about the new Washington-Peking relationship, sought to bal-

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ance the negative consequences of any American-Chinese accommodation through its own initiatives vis-à-vis Washington, designed to convince the American side of the greater desirability of an American-Soviet accommodation. Beyond that, the Soviet Union appeared to be still counting on the possibility of a more pro-Soviet leadership emerging in China after Mao; in the meantime Soviet military pressure on China did result in the cooling down of Chinese border pressures. None the less, China came to represent a growing source of Soviet security concerns, necessitating a major redeployment of forces and reallocation of resources.

The military dimensions of the American-Soviet relationship during this phase have been dominated by a new element of uncertainty. The pace of the Soviet strategic and tactical build-up, as well as intensive development of home civil defense, appeared to indicate a desire to acquire a war-fighting capability in the context of parity—which, if attained, could give the Soviet Union a significant edge in any protracted crisis-bargaining. Soviet defense spending continued to rise (crossing the $55 billion mark by the late sixties), while American defense expenditures outside of the Vietnam War remained unchanged. With the American strategic forces on a plateau since 1967, the Soviet Union was able by 1970 roughly to match the United States in the strategic sector, while some of its programs could even be interpreted as seeking to obtain by the mid-1970s a decisive first-strike capability. Moreover, the Soviet Union made major strides toward the acquisition of effective naval power and long-range air- and sea-lift capabilities, and began to develop the argument (in the words of one Soviet commentator) that these forces would be able in the future to induce a U.S. recognition of "the inevitability and irreversibility of the social changes dictated by the will of the peoples."

The result was that both powers were now checking each other, and—more dangerous—their power frequently overlapped (as in the Mediterranean). This prompted heightened pressures on them to develop more stable rules of behavior (*e.g.* the 1972 agreement on avoidance of naval incidents), but it also increased the probabilities of friction.

The improved Soviet military posture was purchased at a very high economic price, especially given the continuing disparity between the two economies. With a GNP in the early 1970s of

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about $500 billion (or under one-half that of the United States), the Soviet Union was attempting to match—perhaps even exceed—the U.S. military effort, with the costs and complexity of that effort growing at an almost exponential rate. Increased Soviet interest in somewhat moderating the military competition was doubtless thus stimulated in part by economic pressures, even if some sectors of the Soviet leadership (especially the military) may have continued to press in favor of a military posture that at a minimum assured the Soviet Union a reliable war-fighting capability and at the maximum eventually a decisive first-strike capability.

None the less, this most recent phase in the American-Soviet relationship also saw increased Soviet optimism concerning longer-range economic prospects. In 1971 Premier Kosygin even revived—though in a moderated form—the earlier Soviet prognosis of an eventual victory over the United States in economic competition. U.S. economic difficulties and tensions between America and her European and Japanese allies reinforced the Soviet expectations, even though the Soviet economy continued to suffer from inadequate scientific-technological innovation for which it sought remedies in periodic domestic economic reorganizations and in increased technological importation from the the more advanced West.

What made for even greater uncertainty about the eventual outcome of this particular phase was the increasing importance of domestic political changes within both systems. The new bipolar checking relationship, even though it heightened the risks of a crisis, also meant that both sides were being pushed by the very nature of the checking relationship into a new competition, one in which the domestic performance of the two systems was becoming an increasingly vital aspect of the competition. Their respective abilities to cope with the rising demands for the implementation of the concepts of liberty and equality (the former more in the Soviet Union; the latter more in the United States) was becoming an important ingredient in a competition that was now less a purely traditional one and more and more part of a global political process, increasingly inimical to sharp demarcating lines between the foreign and the domestic.

In this regard, both sides were plagued by major intangibles. Turbulent change in America made for uncertainty about the character of America's involvement in world affairs and that, in

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turn, nurtured some of the Soviet optimism about the historical significance of this particular phase in the rivalry. Soviet—particularly Great Russian—nationalism was obviously attracted by the prospect of the Soviet Union emerging as the number-one world power, and this feeling, even more than ideology, provided the social propellant for sustained competition with the United States. Yet change in the Soviet Union, less visible and more repressed, is also taking place, and its eventual surfacing could have enormous implications. Increased social demands for a higher standard of living, intellectual dissent, generational unease, rising tensions between Great Russian nationalism and the more aroused nationalisms of the non-Russian nations, coupled with the conservative reaction of the ruling party élite —all cumulatively increased the importance of domestic considerations in Soviet foreign policy decision-making.

The combined effect of increasing external complexity (symbolized by Vietnam for the United States and by China for the Soviet Union) and of rising domestic demands was to pressure both powers into limited but expanding accommodations. The number of bilateral U.S.-Soviet agreements continued to expand, and the process culminated in May 1972 with the Moscow summit. That meeting was held within days of an act of U.S. military compulsion directed largely against the Soviet Union: the mining of North Vietnamese ports. The Soviet failure to respond indicated the high Soviet political stake in the accords, even though these agreements involved calculated gambles on both sides.

In essence, the Moscow accords represented a clear short-term political gain for the Soviet side, and a short-term strategic gain for the American side; in the longer run, they could turn out to be politically more beneficial to the American side, provided the longer run does not see the strategic relationship skewed to a considerable Soviet advantage. On the political plane, the agreements involved an American acknowledgment of U.S.-Soviet parity as well as the legitimization of postwar Soviet gains in Eastern Europe (symbolized also by the related visit by Nixon to Warsaw, the first presidential visit to a capital of an East European state not defying Moscow). In the longer run, the process of accommodation could dilute Soviet ideological militancy, provided that the relationship of strategic parity is not upset. In that strategic relationship the agreements had the effect of halting the quantitative momentum of the Soviet deploy-

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ment while leaving open the competition in its qualitative aspects, where the United States remains clearly superior; in the longer run, however, the existing Soviet quantitative advantage could become quite significant if the qualitative U.S. lead is erased.

This is why there is a sensitive interdependence between the political and the strategic aspects of the Moscow agreements, and the character of the next phase in the competitive relationship will be very much affected by the degree to which the U.S. Congress recognizes the interdependence. There is little reason to doubt that the Soviet leadership is sensitive to it.

Conclusions

Several broader observations emerge from our analysis of the different phases of the cold war. They are as follows:

Cyclical pattern: The American-Soviet relationship appears to have been punctuated by alternating offensive and defensive phases, with neither side demonstrating the will or the capacity for sustained political momentum. After the initial skirmishing had gradually given way to a sharper rivalry, the Soviet Union adopted a more offensive policy during the years 1948 to 1952; the United States then gained the initiative and appeared to be on the political offensive during the years 1953 to 1957; the Soviet Union in turn became more assertive and maintained an offensive posture between 1958 and 1963; that policy collapsed in 1963, and between 1963 and 1968 the United States pursued an activist global policy; however, by the late sixties the Soviet Union regained its momentum, while the United States was experiencing "an agonizing reappraisal" of its foreign policy. This has initiated the present phase in the relationship.

As the Soviet side gained in strength and self-confidence, its policies—both strategic and political—tended to emulate the American. In many respects, Soviet policy during the premature fourth phase was imitative of the American during the third phase; American reliance on "massive retaliation" and "the policy of liberation" were later matched by Soviet nuclear threats and promises of support for "national liberation struggles." Similarly, the present phase of the relationship has seen strong reverse overtones of the political and strategic postures adopted by the United States during the fifth phase.

Relative performance: In a narrow sense, the Soviet performance may be said to have been superior to the American, at

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least in so far as the relative Soviet position improved considerably. From a general position of inferiority (in the context of reciprocal hostility) the Soviet Union has moved to a level approaching a global condominium with the United States (in the context of a more mixed coöperative-competitive relationship); there are probably still some Soviet leaders arguing on behalf of preponderance as the Soviet goal for the next stage, and this is what makes the present phase so very critical. However, such a judgment must be qualified by the consideration that both sides succeeded in their basic defensive aims, even though in the last several years the Soviet Union has pierced southward (into the Middle East and Asia), through the weakest parts of the perimeters drawn by the U.S. policy of containment. (The rebuff Moscow has recently suffered from Egypt modifies but does not substantially change the picture.) Moreover, the Soviet leaders did botch up their alliance relationship with China, whereas the American side showed greater skill in maintaining complex alliance relationships.

Given the nature of the Soviet system, Soviet leaders have been in a better position than the American policy-makers to exploit politically whatever assets they had at their disposal. In that sense, Soviet policy has tended to be somewhat freer from objective restraints than the American. The Soviet Union thus adopted offensive postures when opportunity seemed to beckon, even if at a relative disadvantage in two or even three of the four comparable elements noted during each phase: relative international influence, respective military and economic power, domestic cohesion on behalf of national policy. In contrast, the United States has tended to become more assertive only when all or most of these factors were favorable, as the following table indicates:

Phase I	1945–1947 Preliminary Skirmishing	
1	international standing	U.S. advantage
2	military power	probably a Soviet advantage
3	economic power	overwhelming U.S. advantage
4	domestic policy base	uncertainty in both
Phase II	1948–1952 Soviet Union Assertive	
1	international standing	U.S. advantage
2	military power	marginal Soviet advantage?
3	economic power	decisive U.S. advantage
4	domestic policy base	U.S. advantage

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Phase III	1953–1957	United States Assertive	
	1	international standing	U.S. advantage
	2	military power	U.S. advantage
	3	economic power	U.S. advantage
	4	domestic policy base	U.S. advantage
Phase IV	1958–1963	Soviet Union Assertive	
	1	international standing	declining U.S. advantage
	2	military power	uncertain U.S. advantage
	3	economic power	U.S. advantage
	4	domestic policy base	probable U.S. advantage
Phase V	1963–1968	United States Assertive	
	1	international standing	marginal U.S. advantage
	2	military power	clear U.S. advantage
	3	economic power	U.S. advantage
	4	domestic policy base	declining U.S. advantage
Phase VI	1969–	Soviet Union Assertive	
	1	international standing	roughly equal
	2	military power	marginal U.S. advantage?
	3	economic power	U.S. advantage
	4	domestic policy base	Soviet advantage

On the whole, throughout the relationship, both sides have been essentially prudent and restrained. Each has avoided pushing the other beyond the point of no return. In this regard, note must be taken of the extraordinarily salutary effect of nuclear weapons; in a more traditional setting, without the restraining effect of nuclear weapons, it is likely, given mutual hostility and occasionally very sharp provocations, that a major American-Soviet war would have occurred.

Missed opportunities: It is only natural that in a highly complex relationship between two remote powers, divided not only by distance but by ideology and culture, there should occur a number of instances in which one side has misinterpreted the intentions of the other, or miscalculated the anticipated reactions (or nonreactions) of the other, or simply interpreted as key signals actions or statements which perhaps were not meant to be key signals.

In addition, one may also speculate concerning major opportunities that each side failed to exploit in order to alter fundamentally the relationship. Two such missed opportunities stand out. The first was America's. It involved the years 1953 to 1957 when the Soviet world was in the deepest disarray. A more active policy, combining a willingness to contrive a new European re-

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lationship (including perhaps a neutralized Germany) with a credible inclination to exploit Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe, might have diluted the partition of Europe and maybe even transformed the rivalry into a less hostile relationship. Instead, the U.S. policy was one of rhetorical assertiveness, pointing toward the "liberation" of Eastern Europe, but in fact preoccupied with building up NATO, including within it a rearmed West Germany. Both the cold war and the division of Europe were thereby perpetuated.

The other key missed opportunity appears to have come not long afterwards. Precisely because by 1958 the United States had given overt indications of a willingness to settle for the status quo, there seems to have existed an "objective" opportunity for a real détente. Instead, the Soviet leaders, who themselves had earlier fostered the détente (largely, it appears, for tactical reasons: to deflect U.S. hostility at a time of considerable U.S. preponderance), now decided to exploit what they construed to be an American psychological and political weakness to achieve a major breakthrough. The initiation of the Berlin crisis produced several years of acute tensions, launching in turn the massive U.S. strategic build-up of the Kennedy years, escalating the arms race, setting in motion the U.S. counteroffensive, and postponing by almost 15 years any abatement in U.S.-Soviet hostility.

The role of military power: Because the two powers avoided a direct war, it is extremely difficult to assess the actual importance of absolute and relative military power to the unfolding pattern of competition. To the extent that judgment may be hazarded, it appears that one of the key reasons why every offensive phase has failed to attain its apparent objectives has been that the offensive side either lacked, or considered itself lacking, the needed margin of superiority in order to extract a decisive political advantage. The value of military power has thus been primarily defensive, but defensively it may well have been the critical factor.

However, it is noteworthy that in the two phases in which the United States has appeared to be the more assertive partner in the relationship, it was the United States that enjoyed an unambiguous military advantage. Thus it might be said that America has been more inclined to rely on military superiority as the basis for political assertiveness, even though she has abstained from direct military probes of the opposite camp. On the other

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hand, the Soviet Union, even though militarily weaker, has been more inclined in its offensive phases to probe militarily or to use military pressure for political objectives, provided the overall context seemed to create favorable political circumstances and the basis for political confidence.

Until now, the stability of the relationship has not been tested by an assertive Soviet policy conducted in the context of clear Soviet military superiority.

The unclear but present danger: The acceptance of numerical parity in the American-Soviet military relationship raises two uncertainties about the future. The first pertains to the ability of the two political systems to engage effectively in protracted crisis-bargaining, bargaining which in the setting of relative parity would test to a far greater extent than ever before the psychological and political staying power of the two systems. A major crisis between the two powers would be likely to have especially unsettling consequences in the United States, which heretofore based its deterrence of the Soviet Union on a significant margin of superiority. Since what the Russians could undertake prudently has depended in the past on what they thought they could do safely, the erosion of American superiority and the coincident overlapping of power could have the effect of widening the margins of Soviet initiatives.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union has apparently tried to terminate rapidly third-party conflicts lest they escalate into big-power confrontations. However, Soviet dilatory tactics during the India-Pakistan war of 1971 stood in contrast with the Soviet behavior during the earlier warfare of 1965, not to speak of Soviet eagerness to dampen the Middle East war of 1967, and their unwillingness to provide Egypt with offensive arms. Thus we simply do not know to what extent Soviet prudence in the past was primarily a function of Soviet weakness rather than an enduring aspect of Soviet behavior.

The second uncertainty arises out of the Moscow SALT agreements of May 1972. The agreements permit qualitative improvements in the context of quantitative parity. These improvements —much more difficult to verify than quantitative expansion— could eventually threaten the parity arrangement. Indeed, because improvements in quality are more difficult to verify, anxieties may again arise unless additional agreements, providing for more verification and additional limitations (especially in

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regard to testing) are not forthcoming within the next few years.

The next several years in the American-Soviet relationship are likely, therefore, to be very critical. They will determine whether the competitive relationship can be both stabilized and balanced by more coöperative elements, as indicated by the several U.S.-Soviet accords announced in late May 1972, or whether the competition will again assume an essentially hostile character. In the latter case, the outcome of a crisis between the two powers would depend not only on the relative power position of the two sides but also on the ability of their respective political systems to maintain domestic support for crisis-bargaining in the context of enormous psychological stress.

The present character of the relationship: During phases two and three, the relationship between the two rivals operated within the context of bipolar politics conducted on the basis of unified blocs. Phases three, four and five saw the gradual emergence of polycentric politics, conducted in the context of bipolar but still rather asymmetric power. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the present phase of the relationship is to say that it involves a bipolar checking power relationship, operating in the context of a multiple state interplay, with the Peking-Washington-Moscow triangle providing the critical political interplay. The relationship involves some overlapping power, with its potential for dangerous frictions, while the multiple state interplay (replacing the earlier bloc confrontations) makes for a more extensive but less intensive rivalry, balanced by increased coöperation in certain specialized areas. Moreover, the Moscow agreements of 1972, while not terminating the rivalry, do involve a significant codification of "the rules of the game" under which the rivalry is to be conducted, and thus signify a change toward a more mixed relationship.

In that relationship, the Soviet Union now possesses strategic power of a global character, but it still lacks the other attributes of a truly global power. Its policy and thrust remain that of a continental character, and preponderance over the Eurasian continent currently appears to be its central objective. On the American side, the earlier policy of containment is being recast into a more complicated structure in which other states—notably China, Japan and, hopefully, a more united Europe—are to help in offsetting the Soviet Union.

It hence appears unlikely that the earlier Pax Americana will

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give way in the foreseeable future to a new Pax Sovietica. Aside from that fact that the Soviet Union is economically far from being a global power, even its military might still lacks the truly global character of American military resources and deployment at the high point of American globalism. More important still, Pax Americana, to the extent that it ever existed, was in large measure the product of the genuine desire of many nations to commit the United States after World War II to global involvement.

In fact, and contrary to the recent wave of conspiratorial, Manichean, or simply economically determinist historical "revisionism" of the cold war, Pax Americana was as much the product of non-Americans egging the United States on as of American design. Moreover, nuclear proliferation, the appearance of the new American-Chinese-Soviet triangular relationship, as well as the enormous varieties of revolutionary change in the less-developed nations, simply preclude the kind of world preponderance that the United States at one time enjoyed.

The wider picture: The American-Soviet competition in the years ahead will be influenced to a degree greater than heretofore by domestic factors as well as by changes in the global context. For much of the cold war, both powers were able to superimpose the primacy of their competitive relationship over domestic aspirations, while the existence of hostile blocs and the enormous disproportion between American and Soviet power on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other, reduced the significance of outside factors.

In the context of the bipolar checking relationship and of the emerging multiple state interplay, both societies are facing increasingly articulate social demands, and in both societies a new planetary consciousness is emerging, focusing on the common stakes of all mankind. Moreover, in both societies there is mounting awareness of the overwhelming complexity of social change in the developing parts of the world and a growing concern about the ability of existing international arrangements to cope with these problems effectively. Neither the American nor the Soviet leaderships can fully control domestic change or superimpose their will on international developments, though for the time being the Soviet leadership is in a better position to manipulate and contain its domestic pressures for change. It is doubtful, however, that this relative advantage will be retained indefinitely.

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In addition, the Soviet Union confronts the unique challenge posed by China. China challenges both Soviet revolutionary purity and territorial integrity. The very scale of that challenge defies rational calculation and compensates for the obvious relative industrial and strategic weakness of the Chinese threat. It has already induced major Soviet strategic investments and troop redeployments. And there is little likelihood that in the years ahead China will cease to be a source of great Soviet concern.

The combination of global and domestic complexity—assuming that in the meantime the bipolar checking relationship is not suddenly skewed militarily in favor of one party—may over time induce progressively a more coöperative American-Soviet relationship, particularly in regard to a whole host of new problems confronting mankind. The agreements of 1972 already suggest that the cold war is gradually being transformed from an implicitly apocalyptic conflict to an explicitly relativistic competition; both sides are bound by a common stake not only to avoid a major war but partially to regularize the rivalry.

This changing character of the competition—from a direct and antagonistic rivalry into a more mixed relationship increasingly responsive to international and internal influences—is more in keeping with a pluralist view of the world than with the monochromatic Soviet conception. In the longer run, the combined effect of international pluralism and domestic pressures may therefore have a deeper effect on the nature of the Soviet system than of the American, provided that in the meantime the American system proves responsive to the need for *both* internal innovation and external staying power.

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AFTER THE COLD WAR

American Foreign Policy in the 1970s

By George F. Kennan

IN the years since the end of the Second World War, American foreign policy has consisted primarily of the effort to cope with two immensely difficult problems which the events of that war brought into being, neither of which had been adequately anticipated and which the discussions among the victor powers at the end of the war failed to solve. One was the question of how should be filled the great political vacuums created by the removal of the hegemonies recently exercised by Germany and Japan over large and important areas of the Northern Hemisphere. The uncertainty and emerging disagreement over the attendant questions concerned not only much of Central and Eastern Europe but also parts of East Asia that had been overrun by the Japanese, including—alas—Indochina; and the settlement of the Asian aspects of the problem came to involve not only the United States and the Soviet Union and the inhabitants of the affected territories themselves but also, with the completion of the Chinese Revolution, the new communist power in China.

The second great problem with which American policymakers of the postwar period had to struggle was one for which they were equally unprepared: what to do now, in time of peace, with the fearful new weapon of mass destruction they had created during the war and had used, at the end of the struggle, against the Japanese. The problem was effectively without precedent. It might well be argued (the writer himself adheres to this school of thought) that it should not have taken the nuclear weapon to persuade people that war, as a method for resolving conflicts among industrially advanced great powers, had become inordinately costly, dangerous and self-destructive. The First World War, one might say, should have been adequate evidence of this. But the nuclear weapon involved a change in degree of destructiveness so great as to be in effect a change in kind; and the questions as to how—or whether—it should be fitted into national arsenals, and what relation it should bear to traditional concepts of the role of weaponry, had never been faced before. It fell to the United States, as the first to develop this weapon, to

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take the lead in seeking solutions to the problem; and the subsequent agonies of decision—whether to base defense plans on the new weapon; what to do about sharing control of it; whether to magnify the problem along the way by proceeding to the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb; and how, finally, to react to the acquisition by a political antagonist of a comparable capability, along with adequate means of long-range delivery: these agonies of decision were all no more than stages in the effort to find correct solutions to the problem as a whole.

It remains to be noted that these two great bewilderments of the postwar period (if one may call them that) were mutually interconnected and interreacting. The political conflicts arising over the problem of the filling of the vacuums threatened—in the eyes, at least, of a world public conditioned to viewing war as the logical outcome of serious conflict among great powers—to lead to hostilities. It thus accentuated the significance of weaponry generally. The tendency, on the other hand, to see in the nuclear explosive the "absolute weapon" and to believe that a clear preëminence in its development would permit a power to dictate terms to any power which did not have it or was inferior in the development of it, suggested that this might turn out, in the end, to be the decisive factor in the solution of great political problems, such as those connected with the filling of the political vacuums in East and West. Each of these bewilderments, therefore, increased the other.

II

Today, after the lapse of a quarter of a century, it must be recognized that at least one of these problems—that of the nuclear weapon—is still very much with us. Indeed, it is in some ways more serious and more urgently in need of solution than it was 25 years ago. The destructive power of existing arsenals of this nature has increased many fold. Our own monopoly of the weapon has disappeared. It has been developed in great quantity by our leading political adversary. Improvements in delivery systems have rendered our entire territory technically vulnerable to attack by it. It is steadily proliferating into the arsenals of other powers, not all of which can be depended upon to observe even that measure of restraint which the great powers have heretofore been able to muster. In so far as the two major nuclear powers are concerned, enormous interests, economic and bureaucratic,

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are now vested, on both sides, in the cultivation of this form of weaponry. And its proliferation into further hands is stimulated by the fascination it holds for world opinion, particularly the opinion of those who do not yet possess it but cannot divest themselves of the belief that if they had it, it would bestow upon them some sort of magic power they do not now command.

It is instructive to compare this state of affairs with the hopes and objectives entertained by American statesmen in the initial postwar period, as they proceeded to design American policy in this new field. For neither has this policy led to any effective international control of the weapon, as many then hoped, nor has it given us any incisive increase in political bargaining power, as others may have conceived. With relation to our leading adversary it is politically useless to us, because it is checkmated by his reciprocal capability. With relation to the non-nuclear powers it is useless because it is not a weapon with which one achieves, actually, any specific political purpose (for that, it is too destructive, too little discriminating, too little susceptible of intelligent gradation). Appalling as has been the readiness of the American military establishment and successive American administrations to use other means to wreak devastation from the air on foreign territory, notably that of Vietnam, the United States has not yet come to the point where it would be prepared to inflict on helpless populations, whose governments had no ability to reply in kind, the fearful devastations of which the nuclear weapon is capable. However one looks at it, therefore, American policy in the field of nuclear weaponry—a policy marked by basing our defense posture upon it, by our early commitment to the principle of first use in any serious encounter with another great power, and by our attempt to assure ourselves a commanding lead in the development of it—has been a failure. Whether it could have been otherwise is anyone's guess.

The first tentative recognition, in practice, of the sterility of this policy has found its expression in the conduct of the SALT talks with the Russians. This is, of course, only a small step. Even if successful, it will relieve only a small portion of the existing danger. Experience shows that there are limits to what can be achieved in the field of disarmament by formal contractual agreements, particularly such as would require congressional approval in this country. SALT will have to be supplemented by much more in the way of unilateral gestures of restraint in

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weapons development on both sides—gestures inevitably involving some degree of risk—if the ever greater dangers of the weapons race are to be substantially mitigated.

All this suggests that if and when the United States has finally extracted itself from the quagmire of Vietnam and has thereby recovered some peace of mind as well as some freedom of action, the time would be ripe for a searching critical examination, at the highest level, of the results of our policy of 25 years in this field, with a view to seeing whether different principles of action, including above all a greater readiness to accept minor risks in the interests of diminishing major ones, would not offer better prospects of success.

III

If the nuclear problem, then, is still very much with us, the problem of the vacuums—at least as a prime claim on the attention of American policy-makers—has been largely resolved.

The first and most vital of these vacuums, from the American standpoint, was Western Europe itself. It, too, after all, had been largely under German occupation. With the withdrawal of the German forces its political future, too, was not without question. The state of shock and insecurity in which its peoples found themselves, as the Nazi grip was released, together with the great strength of Communist parties among the reviving political forces, raised questions which rightly concerned the Western statesmen of the post-hostilities period. The problem was resolved, as we all know, by the successful insistence of the peoples of the region, with the aid of the United States, on continuing an independent political existence outside a Soviet hegemony. Soviet acceptance of this situation occurred, in reality, with the failure of the Berlin blockade in 1949.

This was, of course, never a complete or willing acceptance, valid for all time. Ideology alone would have forbidden it. Since 1949 the Soviet government has continued to press, wherever it could, for the disruption of NATO and the removal of the presence and influence of the United States from the region as a whole. Those West European Communist parties that retained the affiliation with Moscow have aimed, as a rule, in that direction. Clearly, this objective, if realized, would have provided the Soviet Union with important new possibilities for the exertion of influence in Western Europe.

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But one cannot say that this effort has constituted, since 1949, a prime and immediate goal of Soviet policy; nor has it at any time shown serious prospects of success. In this sense we are able to say that to the extent Western Europe represented a political vacuum in the conditions of 1945 to 1947, that vacuum has now been satisfactorily filled and no longer represents a serious political problem between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As the strength, self-confidence and unity of the West European community grow, the importance of the American involvement naturally declines. We are already approaching a point where Western Europe could, if it so wished, effectively defend *itself, by its own means and without American assistance, against* any pressures or efforts from the Soviet side to exert undue influence. But this point has not yet been reached, particularly not in the consciousness of the West Europeans themselves, conditioned as they are to seeing their security as resting in the American nuclear umbrella. And it is from this fact that there flows the continuing significance and necessity of NATO.

NATO is of course not a perfect instrument. Its effectiveness is threatened today by a number of factors: the sulky nonparticipation of the French; the vacillations of Iceland; the shortsighted acquisitiveness of the Mintoff government in Malta; the discontent of large portions of the West European public with the new régime in Greece; the parlous internal state of Italy; and the growing signs of potential instability in Germany, particularly the ineffectiveness exhibited by official authority in the face of student radicalism. It is no time for panic about the state of Europe; but it is also no time for complacency.

There are, of course, very narrow limits to what the United States could expect to do about any of this. There never was a time when Americans could be more to the West Europeans than they are to themselves. The success of their defense of their own independence depends in the first instance on what they themselves do. Meanwhile, however, NATO represents a solemn American commitment, the most important one we have, and the one most firmly anchored in the interests of our own security. Whatever changes the coming years may bring in the configurations of American policy, this is a commitment the United States must continue to meet—America must meet it loyally but modestly, recognizing the primary interest of the West Europeans in their own security, encouraging them to assume leadership in the

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assurance of it wherever they are prepared to do so, shifting to the other side of the Atlantic the burden of decision in such matters as rapidly as this may safely be done, but never giving the Europeans reason to doubt the reliability of America's commitment to the obligations of the pact. It is only too obvious that this definition precludes any hasty, unbalanced and unilateral withdrawal of American forces now stationed on the Continent.

It is difficult, in these circumstances, to see the justification for great indignation, apprehension or suspicion over the suggestions and proposals recently advanced for a European Security Conference and for a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe. Suggestions of this nature, coming now from one side, now from another, have already been in the air for more than three years. The complexity of the problems they raise—particularly the question of force reductions—suggests that they will still be there three years hence.

There is no reason in principle why one should not wish to talk with the Russians and the other Communist governments of Eastern and Central Europe about such problems. The acceptance of a political division of Europe, as an arrangement expected to prevail long into the future, does not necessarily imply the perpetuation of the existing expensive, in some respects onerous, in some respects even dangerous, military arrangements. There *should* be better and safer ways for Europe to live; and what is important is not that one should decline resolutely to discuss such matters with people outside the Alliance but that the positions one adopts, when one discusses them, are reasonable ones, consistent with the security of the entire Western community and sufficiently anchored in a Western consensus so as not to represent a threat to Western unity. Sooner or later the West Europeans will have to think about such matters and to think about them independently, in the acknowledgement of their own primary responsibility. The present time, more than a quarter of a century after the end of the war which produced the problems in the first place, is not too early to begin; and there is no reason why people on this side of the water should wring their hands in nervousness because others have undertaken to do so.

The problems concerning consolidation and expansion of the Common Market are another matter. The sharp divisions of opinion that prevail in the European countries themselves over the various component questions suggest that it is very difficult

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for anyone, native or outsider, to see very far into the future regarding the consequences of one or the other of the proposed courses of action. One may doubt that the outcome of these various controversies—who is to join the Market, what the terms of membership or association are to be, etc.—is really of vital importance to this country. We have problems, indeed, in our financial and commercial relations with Western Europe. It could scarcely be otherwise. But there is not sufficient differentiation today in these problems, as between large countries and small ones, between countries belonging to the Market and countries not belonging, to justify us in taking strong positions one way or another. Having enjoyed for many decades both the advantages and the headaches that go with great size, the United States has no reason to begrudge or to fear the same status in others. The restraint shown by successive American administrations in making judgments with relation to the tortuous quest for greater economic unity within the West European community has thus not been lacking in justification. Americans, writhing under the agonies of their involvements in other parts of the world, may take comfort in the reflection that here is at least one great problem the solution of which they may safely leave to others.

IV

The counterpart of the effective Soviet recognition of the division of Europe is of course the comparable acceptance by the West of the corresponding situation in the Center and East of the Continent. This acceptance was already implicit in the creation of NATO and especially in the association of West Germany with the Alliance. These arrangements created a situation in which it would be impossible for any of the countries of the Soviet bloc to move on a serious scale toward a normalization of relations with Western Europe without appearing, in Soviet eyes and in the eyes of the world, to be undertaking something in the nature of a *renversement des alliances* and thus challenging Soviet military and political prestige. They signified the abandonment by the West of any realistic hope of unifying the Continent by peaceful means in the foreseeable future, and, implicitly at least, the acceptance of the de facto division. This, however, was for many years not openly acknowledged, particularly in West Germany. The recent initiatives of Chancellor Willy Brandt, founded on the reasonable conclusion that the

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continued refusal to acknowledge the real situation held more disadvantages than advantages for Germany and for Europe, merely brought into the open and sealed with the stamp of acceptance what had long been a fact.

If today a shadow of doubt continues to hang over the durability of the dominant Soviet position in Central and Eastern Europe, it flows not from Western policy but from the attitudes and reactions of the respective peoples themselves. That Soviet hegemony over this region involves serious strains has been made painfully evident, at one time or another, in every one of the countries except Bulgaria. To some extent, the strains have been eased here and there by relaxations in the rigor of Soviet control; but basically, the situation continues to be in many ways delicate and difficult, and there is a tendency for new forms of strain to arise as older ones are removed.

The West, having accepted the division of the Continent and made arrangements predicated on this acceptance, has no reason to exert itself to heighten these strains. On the contrary, since it is already amply clear that efforts in this direction can easily place the East European peoples in situations even more onerous and tragic than those they knew before, no Western statesman really has a right to take the responsibility of encouraging them. But the Soviet leaders, on the other hand, should recognize that the burden they have assumed, in endeavoring to keep these peoples for an indefinite time within their own military, political and ideological orbit, is one of their own choosing, and is carried at their own risk. If it proves heavy at times, they must not blame anyone but themselves.

V

A somewhat different, and more complex, situation prevails in East Asia. It may be said that the vacuum created by the retirement of the Japanese from the areas they had occupied in mainland China has now been filled—to at least the grudging satisfaction of all interested parties. But three great questions remain in which both the United States and the Chinese Communists have an interest: Korea, Taiwan and Indochina.

Even prior to the recent Vietnam involvement, the security of South Korea represented a serious American commitment. Its seriousness has been heightened by the unwise acceptance by the United States of Korean assistance in Vietnam. The Chinese

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Communists, too, will have to take account of that fact. There are times in life when one finds one's self committed even by an opponent's mistakes.

The United States has, of course, never made up its mind as to what might realistically and safely be sought as a permanent solution to the Korean problem. The best that could be expected, one might suppose, would be a return to something resembling the effective neutralization of the country that prevailed before the 1880s—before, that is, the delicate arrangement of earlier decades was disturbed by the bungling intervention of Americans in search of trade. It was a situation in which both the major interested powers—Japan and China—showed themselves prepared to refrain from attempting to make political and military use of the territory, leaving it to the Koreans to settle their own internal affairs in their own peculiar way. The United States, in the postwar period, never accepted this concept, preferring to pursue the unrealistic goal of a wholly non-Communist and "democratic" unified Korea. But things have been changing, both in East Asia and in American policy. The effort, in any case, to find a better solution than the situation which prevails today should not be abandoned, for the present situation is not wholly devoid of danger. Meanwhile, the United States has no choice but to stay the course.

The position of the United States with respect to Taiwan is a weak one, and has been so ever since FDR and Harry Hopkins, acting with staggering frivolity and scant regard for the principle of self-determination, tossed the island to China at the Cairo Conference in 1943. Being viewed as part of China, the island will, so far as the United States is concerned, ultimately have to make its peace with the powers that be on the Chinese mainland. If, of course, the terms of this accommodation were to be a complete absorption into the life of the mainland, without any distinguishing status, it could be a drastic and unhappy outcome for the inhabitants. But the Chinese have more than once recognized the advantage to themselves of conceding special status (always in practice, never in theory) to areas which they claim as part of China, if this seemed useful to their own external commercial and financial exchanges; and the Chinese genius for unadmitted compromise may yet discover a similar solution for the Taiwanese people. The United States can perhaps use its dwindling influence in this direction, though it will have to have a very

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light touch to make it effective. More than that it cannot do. The bed it must lie on, here, is of its own making.

As for Vietnam, the less said at this point, the better. In this, the most disastrous of all America's undertakings over the whole 200 years of its history, the United States has not only contrived to do a great deal that is unconstructive in the immediate past but has precluded itself from doing much that is constructive for some time into the future. The only graceful and halfway posture it can adopt will be one of total withdrawal, followed by silence and detachment, leaving initiatives to others.

VI

The fact that the filling of the vacuums is no longer a serious problem in Soviet-American relations, coupled with the growing awareness on both sides of the unnecessary expense and danger of the unrestricted competition in the cultivation of nuclear-tipped missiles, and a readiness to try to arrive at certain minimal understandings in this respect, does not mean that the Soviet Union is no longer a serious problem in American foreign policy. The Soviet régime continues to be inspired by an ideology hostile in principle to the Western nations, from which it dares not depart. It continues to be dependent on certain habits of conduct, in part inherited from earlier Russian régimes—a passion for secrecy, an exaggerated preoccupation with internal security, a rather childish suspicion of foreigners, a tendency to propagandistic exaggeration and distortion, and above all, the maintenance of armed forces considerably greater than any visible external danger would seem to justify—which make it in many respects an uncomfortable neighbor. To this must be added the ties it continues to maintain to certain foreign communist parties. These ties no longer have the firm disciplinary connotations they had in Stalin's day, but still are not wholly devoid of political significance and present a further dimension of insecurity from the standpoint of the Western countries.

Yet the problem Russia presents for American policy-makers differs markedly, and in the main favorably, from what it was 25 years ago. The world communist movement, once a monolithically controlled instrument of Stalinist power, is now widely fragmented; only a portion of it retains a relationship to Moscow which could cause it to serve as a vehicle for Russian policies. Not only that, but the highest priority in Soviet policy

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appears to be given today to the effort to resist encroachments by the Chinese on Soviet influence among radical-socialist and "anti-imperialist" movements across the world—an undertaking which does not greatly concern the United States and does not represent a field of conflict in Soviet-American relations.

This situation can, of course, change, as can Soviet policy toward Western Europe; and this warrants a continued wariness on the Western side. But altogether these circumstances mean that there are today no political issues between the Soviet Union and the United States which could conceivably be susceptible of solution by war, even if the state of weaponry had not made any major military conflict between the two powers unthinkable. And this being the case, the weapons race—a race which, admittedly, is not confined just to nuclear weapons alone—has to be regarded as essentially devoid of political justification. The two powers may have conflicting interests or desiderata in other parts of the world. The armed forces they maintain could conceivably have roles to play with relation to third parties. But none of these conflicts of interest are remotely great enough to justify the madness of a Soviet-American war. There is no reason, then, why the two powers, even if no fonder of each other than they are today, should not be able to coexist indefinitely without armed conflict —with no more than the usual maneuvering and skirmishing in relations with third parties.

One wonders whether the implications of this situation have been fully taken into account. Even the smattering of information that leaks out to the general public suggests that the greater part of the military activity carried on by both sides—particularly on the naval level—is inspired by planning scenarios in which the appearance of the other party as the major antagonist is taken for granted, and the encounter itself assumes the aspect of an inevitable certainty. Why? There is, as we have just seen, no political justification for such an assumption. And who, with even a superficial glance at the historical record, could doubt the self-fulfilling quality of most military planning of this nature? In the light of what now goes on in the Soviet-American field, Woodrow Wilson's horror and indignation upon discovering, in 1914, that the War Department had a Division of Plans, seem less naïve than they have over the intervening decades. Perhaps he was right to be suspicious of such activity.

It is clear that one must try to be prepared for a variety of con-

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tingencies. But does this necessarily mean that the ships and submarines of these two powers must go on indefinitely shadowing each other across the world oceans in a never-ending game of blind-man's buff that is as ridiculous as it is dangerous? Could not the two navies bring themselves, pressed by their governments, to accept each other's presence on the high seas as a normal phenomenon and learn to exchange courtesies and even services in the spirit of comradeship and mutual respect that has generally united seamen of all nations? Could they not perhaps even collaborate occasionally on constructive undertakings? The idea of employing military and naval forces in the struggle against pollution and destruction of the environment is not new with this writer.[1] It has been suggested, for example, that the two navies might collaborate in helping the riparian powers of the Mediterranean Sea to master the problems of pollution that now threaten its natural salubriousness and usefulness. Perhaps the thought is practical, perhaps not. But where is the official willingness to examine it? Or others like it?

These last observations have been addressed to the Soviet Union because it is here that the military rivalry is most dangerous. They apply, of course, no less to Communist China. If the problems of Taiwan and Vietnam can be laid to rest (and without the liquidation of the second, in particular, no coherent thinking about the future of American policy is possible at all), the two powers will have no really serious conflict of interest except possibly in Korea; and even here no general military conflict could be useful to either party as an approach to the solution.

In the case of China, the greatest danger would seem to lie not in military rivalry but in the entertainment, following the Nixon visit, of unreal dreams of intimacy. For reasons only a social psychologist could explore, euphoric dreams of this nature have long been a congenital weakness of American opinion. After two decades of frustration, this tendency is again appearing.

It is perhaps a good time to remind ourselves that Chinese and Americans, for all the courtesy of Chinese hosts and for all the impressive good order now evident in mainland China, are very different peoples. In international—as in personal—life, the best recipe for coexistence between very different people is elaborate courtesy—and distance. History suggests that Chinese tend to

[1] See article by Morris Janowitz entitled "Volunteer Armed Forces and Military Purpose" in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1972.

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regard all overt manifestations of diplomacy—including exchanges on the official level—as a species of ceremonial, in the course of which due deference is always paid to the excellent qualities of the Chinese people and the dignity of the Chinese state. Real problems are discussed, or sometimes treated without discussion, in more delicate ways. Foreigners, furthermore, and particularly Western foreigners, are not really popular with the Chinese; it is plain that there are limits to the period of time over which their presence in China, even as guests, is fully appreciated. This leaves relatively little room for the more fulsome forms of international "contact" in terms of which Americans like to conceive of international friendship and collaboration. But if the United States is prepared to respect Chinese sensibilities, to accord to its relations with China that punctiliously ceremonious character which those sensibilities demand, and not to expect too much in terms of an American presence in China, there is no reason why an acceptable and outwardly pleasant relationship should not be established and indefinitely maintained.

VII

If, then, the United States does not have as many specific sources of conflict with the great communist powers as it accustomedly thinks of itself as having, and yet has some, the same might be said of its obligations to others. Aside from NATO and South Korea, already mentioned, it has only two major and serious commitments: one to Japan, the other to Israel. (The enduring and imperative need for the most careful cultivation of cordial relations with the two North American neighbors, Canada and Mexico, is too obvious to require special mention.)

Japan is the natural ally of the United States in East Asia. The United States has a vital interest in assuring that the immense industrial potential of the Japanese archipelago does not become associated, through any relationship of dependence or undue influence, with the vast manpower of mainland China or the formidable military potential of the Soviet Union. The fact that this is also a vital interest of Japan herself is what provides the basis of an effective Japanese-American alliance.

This does not mean, to be sure, that there must necessarily be an indefinite maintenance of American bases, or stationing of American forces, on Japanese territory. It means in fact that such arrangements should not exist at all unless they flow from clearly

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expressed Japanese desiderata and have the acknowledged support not just of precarious parliamentary majorities but of Japanese political opinion as a whole. But it also means that the United States cannot remain indifferent to the fate of Japan, as a fellow Pacific power, and must be prepared to take a friendly and coöperative interest in Japanese security whenever the Japanese need that interest and are prepared to welcome it. Japan, by the same token, has a vital interest in the ability of the United States to carry on as a strong and effective force in international affairs; and Japanese statesmen have shown themselves, ever since the recent war, to be well aware of that fact.

These realities are, of course, already expressed in the existing Japanese-American Treaty of Mutual Coöperation and Security. But that pact was conceived in the most harrowing period of the cold war, and it was generally understood as reflecting the narrow anxieties and rigidities of that day. The treaty itself is unexceptionable. It will presumably continue to be supplemented periodically by agreements on specific questions of military collaboration to fit the circumstances of the moment. But it is important that it be understood, in the coming years, as the reflection of mutual interests broader and more enduring than those which led to its initial conclusion.

As for Israel, the commitment is founded less on demonstrable geopolitical interests than is the case with Japan, but it is no less real. No one could deny that the United States, by its conduct over the course of 25 years, has incurred a heavy moral commitment to the preservation of the state of Israel and the protection of its inhabitants against massacre or political disaster at the hands of their irreconcilable Arab neighbors. As in all such cases, the main burden of responsibility lies, of course, with the people to whom the commitment is made. The commitment assumes a reasonable degree of prudence, restraint and good will on their part. It is not a blank check for any and all behavior. The task of American policy-makers, as they themselves have well understood, consists of trying to assure to the Israelis that which is really essential to the maintenance of their existence as a state, of dissuading them from claiming more than is essential to that purpose, and of avoiding any escalation of the situation into a serious Soviet-American conflict. This is a thankless, complex task—a species of Sisyphean labor—which the United States has been performing—not badly on the whole—for many years,

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and which it must expect to pursue for many years to come.

That the pursuit of this task has to proceed at the cost of America's relations with most of the Arab peoples is unfortunate but scarcely avoidable. In many respects this is, perhaps, less regrettable than it seems. Given the present passionate, volatile and intensely self-centered disposition of the Arabs, their friendship could be, as the Russians would probably testify, in many instances hardly less onerous than their hostility. But their state of mind does raise serious questions regarding the reliability of the Middle East as a source of oil for the West, above all, for Western Europe.

The oil business is of such complexity that any attempt by governments to regulate it or influence it presents formidable difficulties. But the steady increase in the costs of Middle Eastern oil, the ruthless greed with which the governments in question have pressed their advantage in negotiations with the companies, the justifiable doubt that they can or will spend to any very good purpose the enormous tribute they are now levying, and the growing unreliability of the countries in question as sources of supply to the West in this vitally important commodity: these factors raise serious problems, not so much for the companies, which regularly pass on their losses to the Western consumer, but for the consumer himself, who has no means for protecting his individual interest. Economic as well as strategic considerations may soon make it necessary for the Western governments to exert their authority individually and collectively, with a view to reducing Western dependence on the Middle East as a source of fuel. It is not too early for them to begin to study how this might be accomplished.

There remains the problem of the so-called "third world": the band of states that sweeps from the Indian subcontinent through sub-Saharan Africa to the west coast of South America. In its relations with these many countries the United States finds itself face to face with two unpleasant facts. The first is the legacy of Vietnam.

In the fluid stream of international life, there is nothing which cannot and will not in due time be forgotten and forgiven, as are now most of the follies of the European colonial powers in earlier centuries. But these things take time. The cynicism about America's purposes which was to some extent endemic among the poorer nations even before Vietnam but which has been

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mightily fed by the Vietnam War, and of which our political antagonists did not fail to take due advantage, will not be overcome in a day. In the meantime, American initiatives will court misunderstanding, and for that reason will best be avoided.

To this must be added the fact that experience has now shown the insubstantiality of most of the concepts of foreign aid by which American statesmen were inspired as they attempted to design their relationships with the underdeveloped countries in the 1950s and 1960s. The assumption that aid should bring gratitude and admiration; the fetish of industrialization; the belief that others would be aided by becoming more like us; the concept of economic aid as a desirable and effective weapon in the cold war; the neglect of the factor of overpopulation; the belief that economic advancement is automatically conducive to political maturity and democracy; the failure to recognize that the pace of change is fully as important as its nature, and that instability can as easily be sown by desirable change too rapidly achieved as by change undesirable in nature: one by one, these misconceptions have now been revealed, leaving us disappointed, frustrated and sorely in need of rethinking the whole problem. That rethinking will take time. It can hardly be carried out, as a subject of national discussion, before the great confusing element of Vietnam has been cleared away. Meantime, the best the United States can do is to channel through international bodies as much of its aid effort as possible (bearing in mind that these bodies can themselves be compromised if too large a proportion of their support comes from the United States), but to do this with its eyes open, regarding these donations as a species of goodwill advertising and not promising itself too much in the way of demonstrable results.

VIII

This completes the listing of specific situations, dangers and commitments to which American statesmen will have no choice but to give serious and responsible attention in the remaining years of the 1970s. The list fails, as will readily be noted, to include a number of situations (the state of affairs prevailing in southern Africa might be an example) in which others, for one reason or another, would see weightier grounds for American involvement than does this writer. But it represents, as it stands, a fairly formidable set of problems: most of them complex, some

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of them highly recalcitrant, one or two of them, as of today, without visible possibility of solution. They suffice, at the very least, to make ridiculous the thought of a retirement of the United States into anything resembling the earlier posture of isolation.

Formidable as they are, these specific demands do not exhaust the range of either the challenges or opportunities facing American policy. They are flanked by two situations of a general and universal nature which not only will demand the attention of our government in these coming years but will present the greatest possibilities for constructive statesmanship that lie before it.

The first of these concerns international action for the improvement and preservation of natural environment on a world scale. Two and a half years ago, in this same journal, I urged the establishment of an international environmental authority. I conceived of it initially as an agency only of the major industrial and maritime nations, both Communist and non-Communist, not universal in membership and not administratively subordinate to the United Nations. This concept was rejected, in effect, by the international community, including the United States, which preferred to follow the more leisurely and laborious course of further study within the United Nations, and action only on the basis of a universal consensus. This decision, for which there was admittedly much to be said, made possible the extensive but inconclusive airing of the problem which took place at, and in connection with, the recent Stockholm Conference.

But meanwhile, the deterioration of environment on a global scale, occasioned not least by the reckless abuse of the high seas, has continued essentially unabated. There is still no authority in the world charged with, and capable of, putting a stop to the pollution and destruction of environment where these processes occur in media, such as the high seas or the atmosphere, that are not under the sovereign control of any nation. Even conceding that the most serious excesses in pollution occur within national boundaries, those which do not are also far from negligible. An international authority continues to be needed not just to inhibit unsound practices in the international field but also to bring intelligent pressure on individual governments in exercising their own environmental responsibilities. Here is a rich field for American ingenuity and initiative, one that continues, Stockholm notwithstanding, to call urgently for attention.

The second great problem of universal significance with rela-

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tion to which the United States has both a duty and a rare opportunity for constructive action is the restructuring of the internaional community and the development of the full potential of the United Nations. The effort to achieve a world made up exclusively of sovereign entities, all completely equal in status; the absolute quality of the modern concept of sovereignty; the increasing fragmentation of the international community; the consequent phenomenon of the mini-state—an entity saddled with a modality of participation in international life to the demands of which its resources are patently inadequate; the damage done to international parliamentarianism by the wild incongruities produced by the principle of "one country, one vote;" the contradiction involved in this steady multiplication of sovereignties in certain parts of the world in an age when governments elsewhere—governments of greater age and more mature understanding—are trying precisely to bridge the rigidities of sovereignty and to recognize a higher and more unified pattern of obligations: all these factors call out for the sort of study of the problem, and leadership in attacking it, which the United States is outstandingly equipped to give. The failure to find reasonable answers to these questions has already had an adverse effect on the United Nations and has limited the contribution—so desperately needed—which that organization should be capable of making to the improvement of international life.

The possibilities of American diplomacy are not limited, therefore, to the correction of past mistakes, or the overcoming of the instabilities resulting from the heritage of the past war and the great process of decolonization. There are other possibilities: ones that have wider and more promising horizons—ones for the solution of which American strength is needed and the American genius is peculiarly suited. These possibilities can be tapped only in the measure that Americans contrive to put aside the fixations and rigidities of the cold war and to recognize that humanity is threatened by common dangers—in the field of weaponry, of environment, of the organization of international life—more important to it than the competitive ones that have preoccupied statesmen in earlier ages.

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THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS. Edited by Evan Luard. New York: New York University Press, 1972, 240 p. $8.95.

Essays examining a number of recent civil wars (in Spain, Greece, Lebanon, Laos, Congo, Yemen and Cyprus), their impact on international relations and the problem of regulating them through law or institutions.

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER. VOLUME IV: THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. Edited by Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, 637 p. $17.50 (Paper, $9.50).

This fourth volume in the series deals with issues of conflict management emerging from recent or cumulative technological and scientific advances.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE POLITICS OF DEFENCE. By David Owen. New York: Taplinger, 1972, 249 p. $7.95.

The author, a former Minister for the Royal Navy, finds the present machinery for defense decision-making to be disturbingly defective, especially in its potential for dangerous escalation.

THE INTERNATIONAL IMPERATIVES OF TECHNOLOGY. By Eugene B. Skolnikoff. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1972, 194 p. $2.95.

An analysis of the probable impact of technological advances on international political systems and their doubtfully adequate institutions.

IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON THE ARMS RACE. Edited by B. T. Feld and others. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971, 379 p. $12.50 (Paper, $2.95).

Papers and discussion from the 10th Pugwash Symposium, held in June 1970.

THE WAR FOR THE CITIES. By Robert Moss. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1972, 288 p. $6.95.

In this useful book on urban guerrilla warfare the author anticipates that this may come to be the most prevalent form of political violence in the coming decade.

BIR-HAKEIM, 10 JUIN 1942. By Général Koenig. Paris: Laffont, 1971, 427 p. Fr. 30.

A posthumously published account of the battle by the French commander.

JUNGLE ALLIANCE: JAPAN AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY. By Joyce C. Lebra. Singapore: Donald Moore for Asia Pacific Press, 1971, 255 p. (Detroit: Cellar Book Shop, distributor, $8.00.)

The best treatment in English so far of the curious joint diplomatic and military enterprises of the Japanese Empire and the Indian colony during the Pacific War. Professor Lebra brings alive the legendary undercover agent Major Fujiwara of the "F Kikan," the charismatic crypto-Fascist independence fighter Subhas Chandra Bose and the quixotic but doomed Imphal campaign.

General: Economic and Social

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PEACEKEEPING IN PHASE II. By Harald B. Malmgren. New York: Quadrangle Books (for the Atlantic Council of the United States), 1972, 267 p. $8.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Between leaving the Johnson administration and his 1972 appointment as Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Mr. Malmgren became a prolific and vigorous commentator on American foreign economic policy. This book is a clear, well-argued and, naturally enough, well-informed analysis of the best ways of negotiating about trade issues in the years to come.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD: AMERICAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1970s. By William Diebold, Jr. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1972, 463 p. $13.50.

About two-thirds of the foreign economic transactions of the United States are with Canada, Japan and Western Europe. Thanks in part to the process of international economic coöperation begun at the end of World War II, these economies are more closely linked than ever before. But the old framework is no longer adequate, and no new one has yet been devised. What this means for U.S. policy and what the possibilities are for the coming decade provide the focus for this major study.

TRANSNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ECONOMIC REGIONALISM ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. Edited by Hans Günter. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972, 479 p. $19.95.

Will the multinational corporation someday face the multinational labor union? The most interesting papers in this volume deal with aspects of that question; in a field where good data are sparse, some have a good bit of documentary value.

GLOBAL CORPORATIONS: THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF WORLD ECONOMIC POWER. By Richard Eells. New York: Interbook, 1972, 242 p. $8.95.

THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE. Edited by Louis T. Wells, Jr. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1972, 259 p. $3.00.

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE. By Raymond Vernon. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1972, 236 p. $3.00.

THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN TRANSITION. Edited by A. Kapoor and Phillip D. Grub. Princeton: Darwin Press, 1972, 505 p. $14.95.

A veteran student of corporations, Professor Eells of Columbia tackles the popular new model. The strength of his book is in raising broad political, social and even philosophical issues; its weakness is that he does not get very deeply into them. Louis Wells' collection brings together most of the basic works concerning one of the principal contributions to new thought made by the Harvard Business School's project. Its director, Raymond Vernon, reprints his major articles of the last few years. Ranging more widely, Kapoor and Grub have put together an excellent comprehensive collection, recommended for those who would like to survey the field.

IN DEFENSE OF PEOPLE: ECOLOGY AND THE SEDUCTION OF RADICALISM. By Richard Neuhaus. New York: Macmillan, 1971, 315 p. $6.95 (Paper, $1.95).

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It had to come: an attack on the ecology movement as "a seductive diversion from the political tasks of our time." A Lutheran pastor sees not only a blunting of radical political efforts but false values, a tendency to subordinate the human to the animal that has produced horrid results in the past. A provocative voice of dissent.

ONLY ONE EARTH. By Barbara Ward and René Dubos. New York: Norton, 1972, 225 p. $6.00.

Two leading scholars in their fields, with the assistance of many distinguished consultants, have prepared this succinct statement on "The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet," reviewing the wide range of environmental and demographic problems the world faces.

IN DEFENSE OF EARTH. By Lynton K. Caldwell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972, 295 p. $8.50.

A good bit of history and some philosophy are rather attractively deployed to introduce the author's fairly concrete proposals for new and more effective national and international arrangements to protect the biosphere.

MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION FOR POLLUTION CONTROL. Edited by Allen V. Kneese and others. New York: Praeger (for the Atlantic Council of the United States and Battelle Memorial Institute), 1971, 356 p. $15.00.

WORLD ECO-CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE. Edited by David A. Kay and Eugene B. Skolnikoff. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972, 324 p. $12.50 (Paper, $2.50).

MAN IN THE LIVING ENVIRONMENT. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press (for the Institute of Ecology), 1972, 288 p. $12.50 (Paper, $2.50).

Three samples of the literature that have to be read by those who want to get below the surface in understanding the international aspects of ecology. The papers in the first two collections stress economic and organizational issues. The third volume is a set of recommendations by scientists that leaves it to others to assess economic, social and political difficulties of implementation.

THE THEORY OF PROTECTION. By W. M. Corden. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 263 p. $8.00.

"Effective protection"—which takes account of tariffs and quotas on inputs as well as outputs—turns out to be as promising and as full of difficulties in theoretical analysis as in practical application.

MANPOWER FOR DEVELOPMENT. By Eli Ginzberg. New York: Praeger, 1971, 331 p. $10.00.

PLANNING AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By John C. Honey. New York: Dunellen, 1970, 108 p. $8.50.

FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT LENDING—LEGAL ASPECTS. Edited by Seymour J. Rubin. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1972, 352 p. $18.20.

Three significant aspects of development handled differently but well. Ginzberg's volume is in many ways the richest. Honey is succinct in covering much ground. The papers and discussions in the Rubin volume, sponsored by the American Society of International Law, cover both international agencies and national practices.

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ESSAYS ON MODERNIZATION OF UNDERDEVELOPED SOCIETIES. Edited by A. R. Desai. New York: Humanities Press, 1972, 2 v. $40.00.
THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR NATIONS. Edited by Gustav Ranis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972, 439 p. $24.95.
LAS N.U. Y EL TERCER MUNDO. Edited by Victoria Abellan. Barcelona: Ediciones Japizua (for the Departamento de Derecho Internacional de la Universidad de Barcelona), 1971, 661 p.

To keep up with the best work in development and modernization one must peruse selectively large volumes of papers. To celebrate its 50th anniversary, the Department of Sociology of the University of Bombay invited an extraordinary number of specialists to write on a wide variety of subjects. In Professor Ranis' volume some excellent economists addressed themselves to the nature of the gap and alternative ways of narrowing it. The University of Barcelona's comprehensive but rather prosaic volume is of interest primarily as a sampling of Spanish thought in the field.

BRITAIN, THE EEC AND THE THIRD WORLD. By Lord Campbell of Eskan and others. New York: Praeger (in association with the Overseas Development Institute), 1972, 95 p. $7.50.

Very good for data and arguments about the effect on poor countries of Britain's entry into the European Community.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. By Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, 367 p. $10.00.

This very interesting inquiry into productivity in agriculture, based on American and Japanese experience, stresses the importance of economic incentives plus the organization of governmental research. The implications for less-developed countries are explored with emphasis on the need for markets that accurately reflect requirements.

The United States

MEMOIRS, 1950–1963. By George F. Kennan. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1972, 368 p. $12.50.

Written with customary grace and felicity of phrase, this second volume lacks the meat of the first in that the author's official service was only two brief and less-than-happy tours as Ambassador abroad. His account of these events and of his writing and lecturing career is intensely introspective and personal in tone, and in substance devoted more to rebutting critics than to breaking new ground.

A POLITICAL EDUCATION. By Harry McPherson. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1972, 467 p. $10.95.

In a year of political books, this is the best—beautifully written, sensitive to the moral ambiguities of power and brimming with first-hand observations which will be quoted by historians for generations. The author came to Washington in 1956 as a staff assistant to Senator Lyndon Johnson and after service in the Defense and State Departments was special counsel to LBJ, 1965–69.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, 1941–1947. By John Lewis Gaddis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, 396 p. $12.50 (Paper, $3.95).

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An important addition to the growing literature on the subject. The author, avoiding the single-cause explanations of some economic determinists, stresses domestic political pressures on American leaders and the influence of lessons "learned" from the Second World War.

A NEW ISOLATIONISM: THREAT OR PROMISE? By Robert W. Tucker. New York: Universe Books, 1972, 127 p. $6.00 (Paper, $2.25).

A brief, provocative attack on the shibboleth that isolationism and security are mutually exclusive. The author contends that the strategic conditions that required the abandonment of isolationism in 1939 no longer exist.

NO CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER: A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR II. By Bruce M. Russett. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 111 p. $6.00 (Paper, $1.95).

A bold dissent from the sacrosanct assumption that participation in the war against Hitler was a strategic necessity for the United States. Russett's arguments against interventionism go beyond those of Robert Tucker in his "A New Isolationism."

AFTERNOON ON THE POTOMAC? By Roy Jenkins. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972, 59 p. $3.95.

Pithy commentary and constructive criticism by the most literate of contemporary British politicians. The 1971 Henry L. Stimson Lectures at Yale.

PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POLICY. By I. M. Destler. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, 329 p. $10.00.

This important book contains both a critical history of the numerous and ineffective proposals since 1945 to reform the conduct of foreign policy and a sophisticated strategy for enhancing the role of a Secretary of State responsive to presidential needs. The author calls for more attention to bureaucratic realities and less to neatly rational but unreal machinery.

PAPERS ON THE WAR. By Daniel Ellsberg. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972, 309 p. $7.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Memoranda, articles, speeches and testimony prepared between 1965 and 1971, and patched together with footnotes and introductions by the man who made public the Pentagon Papers. The book is an uneven but often compelling source for understanding the author's involvement as participant and then critic in the Vietnam War.

ANATOMY OF AN UNDECLARED WAR: CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PENTAGON PAPERS. Edited by Patricia A. Krause. New York: International Universities Press, 1972, 271 p. $8.95.

The proceedings of a 1971 conference on the revelations of the Pentagon Papers. The participants were 17 antiwar Congressmen and 19 other Americans and Vietnamese.

THE END OF NOWHERE: AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD LAOS SINCE 1954. By Charles A. Stevenson. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972, 367 p. $8.95.

A painstaking reconstruction of bewilderingly complex events which have often been overshadowed by the greater prominence of U.S. relations with Vietnam. A postscript in which the author revises some of his conclusions in the light of the Pentagon Papers is particularly interesting.

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DEAN ACHESON. By Gaddis Smith. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972, 473 p. $11.50.

This volume in the series, "The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy" deals only with the subject's four years (1949–53) as Secretary of State. The author combines praise and restrained criticism in concluding that Acheson, because of his relationship with President Truman and his intellectual and administrative skills, was the most powerful Secretary of State of the century. Acheson's policies are seen, on balance, as appropriate for those years if not as permanent principles.

THE PATTON PAPERS, 1885–1940. By Martin Blumenson. Boston: Houghton, 1972, 996 p. $15.00.

General George S. Patton, Jr., had as great a concern for his own place in history as he did an interest in the history of other warriors. His voluminous papers are now in the Library of Congress where they will be open to general researchers in 1975. The largest portion of the present volume, consisting mostly of diaries and family letters, traces Patton's participation in the First World War.

IN THE FULLNESS OF TIME. By Paul H. Douglas. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972, 642 p. $13.50.

Senator Douglas reviews his life—personal, academic, military and above all political—in frank and fascinating detail and provides an invaluable source for a history of the Senate and its major legislative achievements in the years 1949–66.

IN SEARCH OF NIXON: A PSYCHOHISTORICAL INQUIRY. By Bruce Mazlish. New York: Basic Books, 1972, 187 p. $6.95.

A bold, tentative, but unsuccessful attempt to use psychoanalysis and the imperfectly defined technique of "psychohistory" to understand the President's behavior.

O CONGRESS. By Donald Riegle with Trevor Armbrister. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972, 297 p. $7.95.

The lively diary from April 1971 to March 1972 of a young, unorthodox Republican Congressman: his disenchantment with the administration, his alliance with the McCloskey campaign, crises in his personal life.

McGOVERN: A BIOGRAPHY. By Robert Sam Anson. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972, 303 p. $7.95.

This authorized biography is far better than the average of the genre and comparable to James M. Burns' 1960 study of John F. Kennedy. The author is a young, liberal journalist.

THE GREAT COALFIELD WAR. By George S. McGovern and Leonard F. Guttridge. Boston: Houghton, 1972, 383 p. $8.95.

This meticulously detailed account of the 1914 Colorado coal strike is a revision of Senator McGovern's 1953 doctoral dissertation at Northwestern University. The monograph is valuable in itself, as evidence of the principal author's sympathies, and as a source for an understanding of his education.

PRIVATE FACES, PUBLIC PLACES. By Abigail McCarthy. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972, 448 p. $8.95.

A moving autobiography by a very thoughtful woman, the wife (now separated) of former Senator Eugene McCarthy.

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NIXONOMICS: HOW THE DISMAL SCIENCE OF FREE ENTERPRISE BECAME THE BLACK ART OF CONTROLS. By Leonard Silk. New York: Praeger, 1972, 212 p. $6.95.

A brisk, witty, slightly disorganized account of how policy changed, by a *New York Times* man who understands economic ideas as well as political forces.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1970. By William P. Lineberry. New York: Simon and Schuster (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1972, 359 p. $9.95.

With this volume the Council on Foreign Relations resumes its valuable and long-established series of annual surveys of international developments and the U.S. role in them.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1968–69. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, distributed by Simon and Schuster, 1972, 605 p. $14.95.

The discontinuation of the State Department's annual "American Foreign Policy: Current Documents" in 1969 with the volume for 1967 makes the existence of the Council of Foreign Relations' careful compilation of official public documents all the more valuable as a reference. The present volume contains a cumulative index for 1965–69.

THE CHANGING VALUES ON CAMPUS. A Survey for the JDR 3rd Fund by Daniel Yankelovich, Inc. New York: Washington Square Press, 1972, 246 p. $2.95 (Paper).

The results of an intensive survey of the shifting attitudes of American college students over the years 1968 to 1971. Among the conclusions: decreasing pessimism, polarization and acceptance of violence.

The Western Hemisphere

ONE COUNTRY OR TWO? Edited by R. M. Burns. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1971, 287 p. $7.50.

A dozen high-quality essays by English-speaking Canadians examining the consequences for the rest of Canada of the separation of Quebec. None of the authors favors "two countries," but all agree on the necessity of planning for what is a strong possibility although not an immediate probability.

RECOVERING CANADA'S NATIONHOOD. By D. W. Carr. Ottawa: Canada Publishing Company, 1971, 222 p. $7.50 (Paper, $4.50).

An impassioned plea for Canadians to begin effective resistance to American influence. The author denounces the idea that Canadian economic autonomy is impossible.

SOVIET SEAPOWER IN THE CARIBBEAN: POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS. Edited by James D. Theberge. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University), 1972, 175 p. $13.50.

A useful volume, of particular interest in the light of recent dramatic developments in U.S.-Russian relations.

PATTERNS OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN. Edited by Emanuel de Kadt. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1972, 188 p. $12.00.

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Interesting essays on geopolitical relationships and the U.S. role in the Caribbean accompany studies of Jamaica, Cuba, Guatemala and the Dutch and French Caribbean. The treatment is short but concentrated.

THE FOREIGN POWERS IN LATIN AMERICA. By Herbert Goldhamer. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the RAND Corporation), 1972, 321 p. $10.00.

A particular virtue of this detailed and scholarly volume is its analysis of the impact on Latin America of the important non-Hemispheric powers as well as the United States.

CUBA: THE MEASURE OF A REVOLUTION. By Lowry Nelson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972, 242 p. $10.00.

A famous sociologist, returning to the subject of his classic study of rural Cuba, examines Castro's revolution. His assessment: "deprivation, disillusionment, and increasing suppression."

LEADER AND VANGUARD IN MASS SOCIETY: A STUDY OF PERONIST ARGENTINA. By Jeane Kirkpatrick. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971, 262 p. $12.50.

The relevance of the apparently timeless attractions of Peronism to forthcoming political events in Argentina lends interest to this well-researched study in depth.

DEMOCRACY, MILITARISM, AND NATIONALISM IN ARGENTINA, 1930–1966. By Marvin Goldwert. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1972, 253 p. $8.00.

The military, and its relationship to the totality of political and social life, are examined in yet another attempt to explain the course of Argentine history since the fall of Yrigoyen.

THE CHILEAN REVOLUTION: CONVERSATIONS WITH ALLENDE. By Régis Debray. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, 201 p. $6.95.

A long introduction by Debray, the theorist of revolution, and a postscript by President Allende round out the recorded conversations in which these famous leftists discuss the nature of the new régime in Chile.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND PERU. Edited by Daniel A. Sharp. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1972, 485 p. $10.00.

A competent collection of studies covering the main aspects of the interplay between post-revolutionary Peruvian developments and U.S. policy. The chapters devoted to American business interests and the role of the United States in the international lending agencies will be interesting to many.

Western Europe

A BROKEN WORLD, 1919–1939. By Raymond J. Sontag. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 415 p. $8.95.

A remarkable synthesis of the interwar period, by a well-known historian, and appearing in the distinguished series, "The Rise of Modern Europe."

POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN DE GAULLE'S REPUBLIC. By Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972, 393 p. $8.95.

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A decade of French politics incisively analyzed and brilliantly recorded; an authoritative work of wit and insight, by two English experts on France.

RENCONTRES AVEC . . . DE GAULLE. By Jules Moch. Paris: Plon, 1971, 406 p. Fr. 33.60.

A veteran French Socialist recalls his many interviews with de Gaulle, whom he supported during the war and criticized during the Fifth Republic. Few political revelations, but memorable examples of de Gaulle's sublime egotism.

THE DIPLOMATIC DIARIES OF OLIVER HARVEY, 1937–1940. Edited by John Harvey. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972, 448 p. $10.00.

Harvey was Principal Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary and, at the end of the period here covered, Minister in Paris. His diary is a highly readable and interesting source, not likely to give much comfort to latter-day apologists for appeasement. The foolishness of much of British politics at the time was apparent to at least this well-informed contemporary.

BRITAIN AND THE MAKING OF EUROPE. By Ian Davidson. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972, 150 p. $7.95.

The European editor of the *Financial Times* gives a lucid account of the functions of the European Community in the last few years, with some sober thoughts on how Britain's entry could affect the Community's open-ended future.

THE BRITISH PRESS AND GERMANY, 1936–1939. By Franklin Reid Gannon. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 314 p. $10.50.

A close examination of Britain's national press shows that the attitudes toward Nazi Germany were more complex and less divided than had once been assumed.

A PERSONAL RECORD: THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT, 1964–1970. By Harold Wilson. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1971, 836 p. $15.00.

Recollections of trying years, with no small thought given to personal reputation. Little drama or reflections, many details.

THE MYTHS OF CABINET GOVERNMENT. By Richard H. S. Crossman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 126 p. $5.95.

In these revised Godkin Lectures a prominent member of the Wilson cabinet attempts a new interpretation of British politics, arguing that power rests with the prime minister and not with the cabinet.

NORTHERN IRELAND: A REPORT ON THE CONFLICT. By the London *Sunday Times* Insight Team. New York: Random House, 1972, 316 p. $7.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A much-expanded version of a special two-article report for the London *Sunday Times*. An informative mixture of instant history and hard-hitting reporting, with no effort to minimize the horrors and the dangers or to exculpate the British.

REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, 1918–1919. By F. L. Carsten. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 360 p. $11.95.

A comparative study of the revolutionary possibilities in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, with particular emphasis on the role of workers' and soldiers' councils. A judicious appraisal, based on much new archival material.

DETENTE IN EUROPE: REAL OR IMAGINARY? By Josef Korbel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, 302 p. $10.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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An intelligent effort, based chiefly and necessarily on newspaper accounts, to understand the origins and first stages of the present policy. "The policy of détente is both a hope and a danger," according to this assessment which stresses American disengagement from Europe as a major factor in the present trend.

LOCARNO DIPLOMACY: GERMANY AND THE WEST, 1925–1929. By Jon Jacobson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, 420 p. $13.00.

The promise and the realities of the last great détente in Europe are examined closely and intelligently, with much attention paid to new primary sources.

GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS, 1918–1933. By Harald von Riekhoff. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, 421 p. $15.00.

A sober assessment of the diplomatic relations between the two countries, based on German and Polish sources, and set against the background of general European politics. A work of timely significance.

REPUBLIC TO REICH: THE MAKING OF THE NAZI REVOLUTION. Edited by Hajo Holborn. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, 491 p. $12.95.

These essays, by leading German scholars, provide important new insights into the rise of Nazism. They were expertly selected and introduced by the late Hajo Holborn who had a profound impact on the study of this theme, here and abroad.

NAZIS AND WORKERS: NATIONAL SOCIALIST APPEALS TO GERMAN LABOR, 1919–1933. By Max H. Kele. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972, 243 p. $9.50.

A scholarly study of Nazi efforts to woo workers—and their success which the author argues has been considerably underestimated.

AMERICAN POLICY AND THE DIVISION OF GERMANY: THE CLASH WITH RUSSIA OVER REPARATIONS. By Bruce Kuklick. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972, 286 p. $9.50.

A critical study of American policy on the major issue of reparations, set in the general context of revisionist literature. The author contends—as has become fashionable—that "a hostile and belligerent American attitude . . . and an unrealistic attitude . . . were responsible for the partition of Germany and perhaps for the rigid division of Europe."

VON BERLIN AUS GESEHEN. By Axel Springer. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1971, 319 p. DM. 26.

A collection of outspoken speeches, letters and interviews by the controversial publisher; instructive and interesting, even when at times glib and self-congratulatory.

GEHLEN: SPY OF THE CENTURY. By E. H. Cookridge. New York: Random House, 1972, 402 p. $10.00.

A British journalist writes a good story about the mysterious general who performed great feats of espionage for several masters—successively.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE ROAD TO YALTA: SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1941–1945. By Louis Fischer. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 238 p. $8.95.

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This book, planned as the second volume of a history of Soviet foreign relations from 1917 to the present, was uncompleted at the time of the author's death in January 1970. The narrative runs from the German assault on the Soviet Union to the eve of the Yalta conference.

THE HEIRS OF STALIN: DISSIDENCE AND THE SOVIET REGIME, 1953–1970. By Abraham Rothberg. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972, 450 p. $14.50.

A valuable account of the Soviet leadership's responses to artistic, political and scientific dissidence since Stalin's death.

THE NEW TSARS: RUSSIA UNDER STALIN'S HEIRS. By John Dornberg. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972, 470 p. $10.00.

A rather somber account of the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, by the former chief of *Newsweek*'s Moscow bureau.

UNCENSORED RUSSIA: PROTEST AND DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Peter Reddaway. New York: American Heritage Press, 1972, 499 p. $10.00.

A translation, with commentary, of the underground *Chronicle of Current Events* for the period April 1968–December 1969.

BRIDE OF THE REVOLUTION: KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN. By Robert H. McNeal. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972, 326 p. $10.00.

A serious biography of Lenin's wife and collaborator, Nadezhda Krupskaya.

FOUNDATIONS OF A PLANNED ECONOMY, 1926–1929. By E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies. New York: Macmillan, 1971, 1 v. in 2 pts. $25.00.

In this first volume of the continuation of his vast *A History of Soviet Russia,* Mr. Carr, now with R. W. Davies as collaborator, turns to economic developments in the crucial three years preceding the spring of 1929. The treatment is by topic; concurrent domestic politics will be dealt with in the subsequent volume.

ECONOMIC METHODS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRODUCTION. By E. G. Liberman. White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1972, 180 p. $15.00.

The Soviet economist, frequently considered the intellectual father of his country's industrial reforms, here corrects misinterpretations (in both East and West) of his ideas about the use of "profit." He examines the relations among central planners, decisions by enterprises and the wishes of consumers.

THE SPOILS OF PROGRESS. By Marshall I. Goldman. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1972, 372 p. $7.95.

Appropriately dedicated to Lake Baikal, this is a serious study of environmental pollution in the Soviet Union. It is evident that state ownership of the means of production is not in itself a remedy.

SOVIET PLANNING TODAY. By Michael Ellman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 219 p. $10.00 (Paper, $4.45).

A quite technical analysis of recent Soviet efforts to develop a theory of an optimally functioning socialist economy.

SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS. By J. Wilczynski. New York: Praeger, 1972, 350 p. $17.50.

A systematic analysis of recent economic reforms in the eight Socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

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RED SQUARE AT NOON. By Natalia Gorbanevskaya. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972, 288 p. $7.95.

An account, by one of the participants subsequently adjudged insane by the authorities, of the brief 1968 demonstration in Red Square protesting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK REFORM MOVEMENT. By Galia Golan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 349 p. $16.50.

A scholarly study of the belated but powerful reform movement that developed within the Czechoslovak Communist Party from 1962 to the climax of 1968.

THE POLITICS OF CULTURE. By Antonín J. Liehm. New York: Grove Press, 1972, 412 p. $10.00.

A translation of extended interviews with leading Czech writers and intellectuals during the brief flowering in 1967–68.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE BUREAUCRATIC ECONOMY. By Ota Šik. White Plains (N.Y.): International Arts and Sciences Press, 1972, 138 p. $10.00.

An English translation of Šik's important critical lectures, first delivered in the summer of 1968.

THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: ITS EFFECTS ON EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz. New York: Praeger, 1972, 210 p. $14.00.

A mélange of 11 essays dealing with various aspects of the impact of the 1968 invasion on the other states of Eastern Europe.

POLITICS IN INDEPENDENT POLAND, 1921–1939. By Antony Polonsky. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, 572 p. $24.00.

A thorough study of political life in interwar Poland, giving particular attention to the disintegration of Pilsudski's "guided democracy" in the years after the May 1926 coup.

HUNGARY. By Paul Ignotus. New York: Praeger, 1972, 333 p. $11.50.

An illuminating history of Hungary by a journalist now living in London. Interesting introspective reflections on 1956 and its aftermath.

HUNGARY AND THE SUPERPOWERS: THE 1956 REVOLUTION AND REALPOLITIK. By János Radványi. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972, 197 p. $5.95.

The author, a former Hungarian diplomat who served as chargé d'affaires in Washington from 1962 to 1967, here provides some extremely interesting information on international affairs in the late 1950s and early 1960s; for example, the Chinese role in the Hungarian crisis of 1956; some new evidence on the Cuban missile crisis; and the eventual normalization of U.S.-Hungarian relations after 1956.

THE COMMUNIST STATES IN DISARRAY, 1965–1971. Edited by Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972, 363 p. $13.50 (Paper, $4.95).

Essays on tensions and conflicts within the Communist world in the second half of the 1960s.

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VON BREST-LITOVSK ZUR DEUTSCHEN NOVEMBERREVOLUTION. Edited by Winfried Baumgart. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1971, 750 p. DM. 118.

This well-edited and significant book comprises three diaries written in Russia —of a journalist, Alfons Paquet, a general, Wilhelm Groener, and an admiral, Albert Hopman—for the period from March to November 1918. A valuable source for this rather murky period of the Russian Revolution and German-Soviet relations.

MAKARIOS: FAITH AND POWER. By P. N. Vanezis. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1972, 196 p. $5.95.

A brief sketch of Cypriote history and a favorable portrayal of the Archbishop.

The Middle East and North Africa

POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Paul Y. Hammond and Sidney S. Alexander. New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1972, 666 p. $19.50.

The political capstone of a distinguished series of volumes prepared under the auspices of RAND and Resources for the Future. For the most part, familiar pieces by familiar names, but some of them outdo themselves and the total result is a first-rate and comprehensive book.

SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By George Lenczowski. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972, 176 p. $4.00.

A veteran observer draws on data from many sources and wisely refrains from over-interpretation of the facts. The result is a most informative book.

MAPAI IN ISRAEL: POLITICAL ORGANISATION AND GOVERNMENT IN A NEW SOCIETY. By Peter Y. Medding. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972, 326 p. $16.50.

A detailed study of Israel's major political party, devoted largely to its structure and internal politics but with some attention to external problems that have had an impact on the party's leadership.

NASSER. By Anthony Nutting. New York: Dutton, 1972, 493 p. $10.00.

Nutting uses the biographical format to give a well-conceived history of the Middle East crises of Nasser's time. Much is familiar, but from the author's own diplomatic experience and personal acquaintance with Nasser and his cohorts come points of considerable interest.

LES DOCUMENTS DU CAIRE. By Mohamed Hassanein Heikal. Paris: Flammarion, 1972, 314 p. Fr. 32.

Disappointing as memoirs or biography because of its episodic structure, Heikal's book nevertheless gives us fascinating glimpses of Nasser's dealings and conversations with world leaders of his day: Dulles, Eden, Khrushchev, Tito and others. Accuracy not guaranteed.

THE TRUCIAL STATES. By Donald Hawley. New York: Twayne, 1971, 379 p. $10.00.

Useful as a handbook and light history, this volume still leaves a solid treatment of recent political developments in the region to be written.

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TROUBLED ALLIANCE: TURKISH-AMERICAN PROBLEMS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1945–1971. By George S. Harris. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1972, 263 p. $4.50.

A running account of a whole gamut of difficulties—from the status of forces to the opium trade—that have plagued Turkish-American ties. The author sees a waning, though not an end, of the association, and an eventual tilt on Turkey's part toward Europe.

THE POLITICS OF AFGHANISTAN. By Richard S. Newell. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972, 236 p. $9.50.

A handbook with some helpful information on recent political and economic developments.

South and Southeast Asia

FIRE IN THE LAKE: THE VIETNAMESE AND THE AMERICANS IN VIETNAM. By Frances FitzGerald. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972, 491 p. $12.50.

For the author culture is destiny; and the weight of South Vietnamese history guarantees not only that East and West will never meet in Vietnam but that the West can only with difficulty understand why. The American intervention is seen as doomed to ineffectiveness by this cultural gap, and the revolution it seeks to prevent as the inevitable outcome of the internal developments of Vietnamese society.

THE AIR WAR IN INDOCHINA. Edited by Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff. Boston: Beacon Press, rev. ed., 1972, 289 p. $8.95 (Paper, $3.95).

This scholarly appraisal by Cornell University's Air War Study Group traces the inexorable logic of technology, strategy and emotion by which military techniques, morally repugnant and legally dubious, became the only ones available to a great power determined to protect its interests and its prestige. Moral for small nations: do not if possible allow one great power to include you in its definition of interest or prestige and at all costs not two or three.

NOTHING, AND SO BE IT. By Oriana Fallaci. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972, 320 p. $7.95.

This document, a beautiful and terrible book on the war in Vietnam by an angry and despairing woman, was originally published in Italian. It is a statement of moral anguish which transcends politics.

THE GREAT DIVIDE: BRITAIN—INDIA—PAKISTAN. By H. V. Hodson. New York: Atheneum, 1971, 563 p. $12.50.

A first-rate study of the events leading up to the partition of India in 1947. The author, a former constitutional adviser to the British Viceroy in India, particularly emphasizes the achievements of Lord Mountbatten during this critical period.

INDIA-PAKISTAN: THE HISTORY OF UNSOLVED CONFLICTS. By Lars Blinkenberg. Copenhagen: Munksgaard (for the Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut), 1972, 440 p. Kr. 75.

A Danish scholar and foreign service officer who knows the Indian subcontinent well surveys in great detail Indo-Pakistani relations "from the political science angle."

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MALAYSIAN POLITICS. By Gordon P. Means. New York: New York University Press, 1970, 447 p. $9.95.

The author, a Canadian scholar, concludes his detailed examination of Malaysian politics by predicting that "communal tensions and cleavages in Malaysian society will become even more pronounced over the next decade."

East Asia and the Pacific

800,000,000: THE REAL CHINA. By Ross Terrill. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1972, 235 p. $7.95.

Terrill, an Australian journalist and Harvard scholar, distills his 1971 travel notes into a remarkably vivid picture of the flavor of life in the China of the table-tennis era. His reflections on the shaping of Chinese diplomacy and on the tensions in Chinese intellectual life are particularly insightful and instructive.

CHINA: AN INTRODUCTION. By Lucian W. Pye with Mary W. Pye. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972, 384 p. $10.00.

A masterly introduction to the history and politics of contemporary China. Pye's clear-eyed and unsentimental analysis combines concision and sweeping coverage, producing a survey which will rank among the best in its class.

JOURNEY BETWEEN TWO CHINAS. By Seymour Topping. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 459 p. $10.00.

The Assistant Managing Editor of *The New York Times* revisited China in 1971 after a 22-year absence. These discursive memoirs cover the high points of the author's career over that time span and offer some interesting observations on China in an age of rapid change.

CHINA AND THE OVERSEAS CHINESE: A STUDY OF PEKING'S CHANGING POLICY, 1949–1970. By Stephen FitzGerald. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972, 268 p. $19.50.

In this carefully researched study of a complicated legal, social and political problem, the author finds evidence that a cautious realism balances nationalism and revolutionary imperatives in at least this sphere of Chinese foreign policy.

LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS. By James Chieh Hsiung. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, 435 p. $12.50.

Can the concepts of international law hold any appeal for a régime dedicated to radical change? Professor Hsiung's study suggests that revolutionary governments are like most of their conservative counterparts in this respect: the law will be utilized and obeyed when it is advantageous to do so, ignored or denounced when not.

A TASTE OF FREEDOM: MEMOIRS OF A FORMOSAN INDEPENDENCE LEADER. By Peng Ming-min. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972, 270 p. $6.95.

These vividly evocative memoirs will do much to clarify the tangled Taiwan political tragedy for those who know it only in abstractions.

FORECAST FOR JAPAN: SECURITY IN THE 1970's. Edited by James William Morley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, 249 p. $9.50.

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The six contributors examine Japan's military options for the next decade and conclude, *pace* Brzezinski, that the chrysanthemum blossom is not so fragile: superpower status is possible in the next decade without seriously dislocating the economy. But the consensus judgment is that the conservative mainstream—business, bureaucracy and party politicians—now have a workable formula and will be in no hurry to change it.

JOHN GUNTHER'S INSIDE AUSTRALIA. Completed and edited by William H. Forbis. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 370 p. $10.00.

The late John Gunther had collected material for this book for several years and he visited Australia and New Zealand before he died in 1970. Mr. Forbis has done an excellent job in completing the volume and in preserving the Gunther style. The result is typical Gunther: lively and well-informed.

AUSTRALIA IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By Ian Bellany. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1972, 144 p. (Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, distributor, $7.80.)

Australia with the bomb? Yes, argues the author, if India or Japan has it, or if the U.S. pullback from East Asia goes too far; specialized manpower will be the only significant bottleneck in the way of an Australian nuclear arm by 1980. A fine, tough book with interesting observations, *inter alia*, on airbreathing missiles, enriched uranium reactors and the loopholes in the nonproliferation treaty.

THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE: PAPUA, NEW GUINEA 1968. Edited by A. L. Epstein and others. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971, 398 p. (Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, distributor, $12.95.)

Take a model parliament and set it in a soil where cargo cult, ritual mud fight and sorcery have deeper roots than ballot or campaign. Give it real problems (land shortage, clash of loyalty, giant foreign enterprise) but no powers. Outcome? Mass confusion, disinterest and seeds of discontent were what the Australian research team found.

Africa

AID TO AFRICA: A POLICY OUTLINE FOR THE 1970's. By Paul Streeten. New York: Praeger, 1972, 169 p. $12.50.

This study by an experienced practitioner of development economics combines an incisive critique of current economic indices for measuring the efficacy of aid programs with specific policy proposals. It emphasizes the need to see aid in two contexts: in terms of the development aims of the poor countries; and in terms of the worldwide economic structure, created by the advanced industrial nations.

TOWARD MULTINATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN AFRICA. By B. W. T. Mutharika. New York: Praeger, 1972, 434 p. $20.00.

Strong on data about agricultural and industrial commerce of African countries and the extent of current multinational coöperation among them; weak—and windy—on analysis of political and economic factors affecting integration.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF TROPICAL AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT. By A. M. O'Connor. New York: Pergamon, 1971, 207 p. $9.50.

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A very matter-of-fact survey of the distribution of resources, agricultural and industrial production, trade and income among sub-Saharan nations; its effect is to underscore the general conclusion that those who have will get more.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SECESSION, 1966–1970. By Ntieyong U. Akpan. London: Frank Cass, 1972, 225 p. (Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, distributor, 1972, $11.00.)

In this personal memoir the former leader of the civil service in what was once Biafra has the advantage of being among the first to tell his tale. Corroboration of his stance as an opponent of secession and of many subsequent excesses of the Ojukwu régime awaits the further accounts of others who were there.

AFRICAN TRADERS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA. By Peter C. Garlick. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 172 p. $7.25.
THE CHANGING ECONOMY OF THE LOWER VOLTA, 1954–67. By Rowena M. Lawson. New York: Oxford University Press (for the International African Institute), 1972, 127 p. $9.25.
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF RURAL TRANSFORMATION: A CASE STUDY OF EASTERN NIGERIA. By David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock. New York: Praeger, 1972, 387 p. $19.50.

Three studies of the effects of cultural factors on economic development. The first two, dealing with Ghanian businessmen and farmers respectively, reinforce each other's conclusions about the inhibiting effects of family structure and the need for security. The third book, on the other hand, emphasizes the effectiveness of demonstrated economic advantage in stimulating Ibo and Ibibio farmers in Nigeria to adopt new techniques and enterprises.

CONFLICT IN THE CONGO: THE RISE AND FALL OF LUMUMBA. By Thomas Kanza. Baltimore: Penguin, 1972, 345 p. $3.25 (Paper).

A narrative of Patrice Lumumba's brief, turbulent career as Prime Minister of the newly independent Republic of the Congo related by his Minister for U.N. Affairs in minute and often moving detail.

ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND ZAMBIAN COPPER: A CASE STUDY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT. Edited by Mark Bostock and Charles Harvey. New York: Praeger, 1972, 274 p. $18.50.
TOWARDS ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE. By M. L. O. Faber and J. G. Potter. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 134 p. $8.50 (Paper, $3.95).

These two volumes provide a comprehensive analysis of the Zambian nationalization of the copper industry: the group of papers edited by Bostock and Harvey examine the provisions and prospects of the takeover chiefly in relation to the structure of the Zambian economy, while Faber and Potter, who were formerly members of the Zambian government, provide an anatomy of the corporate structure of the mining industry up to 1963 and an insider's view of negotiations with the British South Africa Company at the establishment of independence in 1964.

APARTHEID. Edited by Alex La Guma. New York: International Publishers, 1972, 245 p. $1.65 (Paper).

The chief value of this collection of poetry and prose essays by black and white exiles from South Africa is in reviewing the root causes of their ostracism and recalling the militance of the black political operatives of the African National Congress (now banned in South Africa but still operating in exile).

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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Africa

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Asia and the Pacific Ocean

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DEVELOPMENT prospects and planning for the coming decade (with special reference to Asia): report of the Fifth Interregional Seminar on Development Planning, Bangkok, Sept. 1969. New York, 1971. 178 p. (ST/TAO/SER.C/133.)

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Errata: July 1972 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* p. 607, l. 5, *for* "have been" *read* "be;" l. 6, *for* "as then understood" *read* "as understood at the time;" l. 33, *for* "declaration" *read* "delegation"

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